Arnd and Michael,
What do you think of "should_faccessat" or "entrusted_faccessat" for
this new system call?
On 12/09/2020 02:28, James Morris wrote:
> On Thu, 10 Sep 2020, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
>
>> On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 08:38:21PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>>> There is also the use case
On Thu, 10 Sep 2020, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 08:38:21PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> > There is also the use case of noexec mounts and file permissions. From
> > user space point of view, it doesn't matter which kernel component is in
> > charge of defining the policy.
On 10/09/2020 22:05, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 09:00:10PM +0100, Al Viro wrote:
>> On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 07:40:33PM +0100, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
>>> On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 08:38:21PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
There is also the use case of noexec mounts and file
On 10.09.2020 23:05, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 09:00:10PM +0100, Al Viro wrote:
On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 07:40:33PM +0100, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 08:38:21PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
There is also the use case of noexec mounts and file permissions.
On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 09:00:10PM +0100, Al Viro wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 07:40:33PM +0100, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
> > On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 08:38:21PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> > > There is also the use case of noexec mounts and file permissions. From
> > > user space point of
On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 07:40:33PM +0100, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 08:38:21PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> > There is also the use case of noexec mounts and file permissions. From
> > user space point of view, it doesn't matter which kernel component is in
> > charge of
On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 08:38:21PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> There is also the use case of noexec mounts and file permissions. From
> user space point of view, it doesn't matter which kernel component is in
> charge of defining the policy. The syscall should then not be tied with
> a
On 10/09/2020 20:08, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Thu, 2020-09-10 at 19:21 +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>> On 10/09/2020 19:04, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
>>> On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 06:46:09PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
This ninth patch series rework the previous AT_INTERPRETED and O_MAYEXEC
On Thu, 2020-09-10 at 19:21 +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> On 10/09/2020 19:04, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
> > On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 06:46:09PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> >> This ninth patch series rework the previous AT_INTERPRETED and O_MAYEXEC
> >> series with a new syscall:
On 10/09/2020 19:21, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>
> On 10/09/2020 19:04, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
>> On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 06:46:09PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>>> This ninth patch series rework the previous AT_INTERPRETED and O_MAYEXEC
>>> series with a new syscall: introspect_access(2) . Access
On 10/09/2020 19:04, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 06:46:09PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>> This ninth patch series rework the previous AT_INTERPRETED and O_MAYEXEC
>> series with a new syscall: introspect_access(2) . Access check are now
>> only possible on a file
Hi,
This ninth patch series rework the previous AT_INTERPRETED and O_MAYEXEC
series with a new syscall: introspect_access(2) . Access check are now
only possible on a file descriptor, which enable to avoid possible race
conditions in user space.
For now, the only LSM hook triggered by
On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 06:46:09PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> This ninth patch series rework the previous AT_INTERPRETED and O_MAYEXEC
> series with a new syscall: introspect_access(2) . Access check are now
> only possible on a file descriptor, which enable to avoid possible race
>
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