On Sunday, September 15, 2013 08:56:46 AM Lee, Chun-Yi wrote:
> Hi experts,
>
> This patchset is the implementation for signature verification of hibernate
> snapshot image. The origin idea is from Jiri Kosina: Let EFI bootloader
> generate key-pair in UEFI secure boot environment, then pass it to
On Thu, Sep 26, 2013 at 04:48:00PM +0200, Jiri Kosina wrote:
> > The only two problems I see are
> >
> > 1. The key isn't generational (any compromise obtains it). This
> > can be fixed by using a set of keys generated on each boot and
> > passing in both K_{N-1} and K_N
>
On Thu, 26 Sep 2013, James Bottomley wrote:
> > could you please describe the exact scenario you think that the symmetric
> > keys aproach doesn't protect against, while the assymetric key aproach
> > does?
> >
> > The crucial points, which I believe make the symmetric key aproach work
> > (an
On Thu, 2013-09-26 at 08:24 +0200, Jiri Kosina wrote:
> On Wed, 25 Sep 2013, James Bottomley wrote:
>
> > > I don't get this. Why is it important that current kernel can't
> > > recreate the signature?
> >
> > The thread model is an attack on the saved information (i.e. the suspend
> > image) bet
於 四，2013-09-26 於 14:22 +0200，Vojtech Pavlik 提到：
> On Thu, Sep 26, 2013 at 02:06:21PM +0200, Pavel Machek wrote:
>
> > > For the symmetric key solution, I will try HMAC (Hash Message
> > > Authentication Code). It's already used in networking, hope the
> > > performance is not too bad to a big imag
於 四，2013-09-26 於 14:06 +0200，Pavel Machek 提到：
> Hi!
>
> > For the symmetric key solution, I will try HMAC (Hash Message
> > Authentication Code). It's already used in networking, hope the
> > performance is not too bad to a big image.
>
> Kernel already supports crc32 of the hibernation image, yo
On Thu, Sep 26, 2013 at 02:21:23PM +0200, Michal Marek wrote:
> > Is not it as simple as storing hash of hibernation image into NVRAM
> > and then verifying the hash matches the value in NVRAM on next
> > startup? No encryption needed.
>
> I think that part of the exercise is to minimize the num
On 26.9.2013 14:06, Pavel Machek wrote:
> Actually...
>
> Is not it as simple as storing hash of hibernation image into NVRAM
> and then verifying the hash matches the value in NVRAM on next
> startup? No encryption needed.
I think that part of the exercise is to minimize the number of writes to
On Thu, Sep 26, 2013 at 02:06:21PM +0200, Pavel Machek wrote:
> > For the symmetric key solution, I will try HMAC (Hash Message
> > Authentication Code). It's already used in networking, hope the
> > performance is not too bad to a big image.
>
> Kernel already supports crc32 of the hibernation i
Hi!
> For the symmetric key solution, I will try HMAC (Hash Message
> Authentication Code). It's already used in networking, hope the
> performance is not too bad to a big image.
Kernel already supports crc32 of the hibernation image, you may want
to take a look how that is done.
Maybe you want
於 四，2013-09-26 於 10:19 +0800，joeyli 提到：
> 於 三，2013-09-25 於 17:25 -0400，Alan Stern 提到：
> > On Wed, 25 Sep 2013, David Howells wrote:
> >
> > > I have pushed some keyrings patches that will likely affect this to:
> > >
> > >
> > > http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs.git
On Wed, 25 Sep 2013, James Bottomley wrote:
> > I don't get this. Why is it important that current kernel can't
> > recreate the signature?
>
> The thread model is an attack on the saved information (i.e. the suspend
> image) between it being saved by the old kernel and used by the new one.
> The
於 四，2013-09-26 於 02:27 +0200，Pavel Machek 提到：
> On Wed 2013-09-25 15:16:54, James Bottomley wrote:
> > On Wed, 2013-09-25 at 17:25 -0400, Alan Stern wrote:
> > > On Wed, 25 Sep 2013, David Howells wrote:
> > >
> > > > I have pushed some keyrings patches that will likely affect this to:
> > > >
>
On Thu, 2013-09-26 at 02:27 +0200, Pavel Machek wrote:
> On Wed 2013-09-25 15:16:54, James Bottomley wrote:
> > On Wed, 2013-09-25 at 17:25 -0400, Alan Stern wrote:
> > > On Wed, 25 Sep 2013, David Howells wrote:
> > >
> > > > I have pushed some keyrings patches that will likely affect this to:
>
於 三，2013-09-25 於 17:25 -0400，Alan Stern 提到：
> On Wed, 25 Sep 2013, David Howells wrote:
>
> > I have pushed some keyrings patches that will likely affect this to:
> >
> >
> > http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs.git/log/?h=keys-devel
> >
> > I intend to ask James to
於 三，2013-09-25 於 22:04 +0100，David Howells 提到：
> I have pushed some keyrings patches that will likely affect this to:
>
>
> http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs.git/log/?h=keys-devel
>
Thanks for your point out, I will respin my asymmetric keys patch base
on this
On Wed, 25 Sep 2013, James Bottomley wrote:
> > Why are asymmetric keys used for verifying the hibernation image? It
> > seems that a symmetric key would work just as well. And it would be a
> > lot quicker to generate, because it wouldn't need any high-precision
> > integer computations.
>
> T
On Wed 2013-09-25 15:16:54, James Bottomley wrote:
> On Wed, 2013-09-25 at 17:25 -0400, Alan Stern wrote:
> > On Wed, 25 Sep 2013, David Howells wrote:
> >
> > > I have pushed some keyrings patches that will likely affect this to:
> > >
> > >
> > > http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/d
On Wed, 2013-09-25 at 17:25 -0400, Alan Stern wrote:
> On Wed, 25 Sep 2013, David Howells wrote:
>
> > I have pushed some keyrings patches that will likely affect this to:
> >
> >
> > http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs.git/log/?h=keys-devel
> >
> > I intend to ask
On Wed, 25 Sep 2013, David Howells wrote:
> I have pushed some keyrings patches that will likely affect this to:
>
>
> http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs.git/log/?h=keys-devel
>
> I intend to ask James to pull these into his next branch. If he's happy to do
> s
I have pushed some keyrings patches that will likely affect this to:
http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs.git/log/?h=keys-devel
I intend to ask James to pull these into his next branch. If he's happy to do
so, I can look at pulling at least your asymmetric keys
Hi experts,
This patchset is the implementation for signature verification of hibernate
snapshot image. The origin idea is from Jiri Kosina: Let EFI bootloader
generate key-pair in UEFI secure boot environment, then pass it to kernel
for sign/verify S4 image.
Due to there have potential threat fr
22 matches
Mail list logo
