On 09.04.21 16:12, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
On Fri, Apr 09, 2021 at 03:50:42PM +0200, David Hildenbrand wrote:
3. Allow selected users to still grab the pages (esp. KVM to fault them into
the page tables).
As long as fault leads to non-present PTEs we are fine. Usespace still may
want to mloc
On Fri, Apr 09, 2021 at 03:50:42PM +0200, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> > > 3. Allow selected users to still grab the pages (esp. KVM to fault them
> > > into
> > > the page tables).
> >
> > As long as fault leads to non-present PTEs we are fine. Usespace still may
> > want to mlock() some of guest
It looks quite hacky (well, what did I expect from an RFC :) ) you can no
longer distinguish actually poisoned pages from "temporarily poisoned"
pages. FOLL_ALLOW_POISONED sounds especially nasty and dangerous - "I want
to read/write a poisoned page, trust me, I know what I am doing".
Storing th
On Wed, Apr 07, 2021 at 04:55:54PM +0200, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> On 02.04.21 17:26, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> > TDX architecture aims to provide resiliency against confidentiality and
> > integrity attacks. Towards this goal, the TDX architecture helps enforce
> > the enabling of memory integ
David Hildenbrand writes:
> I have no idea how expensive would be bouncing writes (and reads?)
> through the kernel. Did you ever experiment with that/evaluate that?
I would expect it to be quite expensive, as in virtio IO performance
tanking.
-Andi
On 02.04.21 17:26, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
TDX architecture aims to provide resiliency against confidentiality and
integrity attacks. Towards this goal, the TDX architecture helps enforce
the enabling of memory integrity for all TD-private memory.
The CPU memory controller computes the integri
On Wed, Apr 07, 2021 at 04:09:35PM +0200, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> On 07.04.21 15:16, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> > On Tue, Apr 06, 2021 at 04:57:46PM +0200, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> > > On 06.04.21 16:33, Dave Hansen wrote:
> > > > On 4/6/21 12:44 AM, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> > > > > On 02.0
On 07.04.21 15:16, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
On Tue, Apr 06, 2021 at 04:57:46PM +0200, David Hildenbrand wrote:
On 06.04.21 16:33, Dave Hansen wrote:
On 4/6/21 12:44 AM, David Hildenbrand wrote:
On 02.04.21 17:26, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
TDX architecture aims to provide resiliency against c
Christophe de Dinechin writes:
> Is there even a theoretical way to restore an encrypted page e.g. from (host)
> swap without breaking the integrity check? Or will that only be possible with
> assistance from within the encrypted enclave?
Only the later.
You would need balloning. It's in princi
> On 7 Apr 2021, at 15:16, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
>
> On Tue, Apr 06, 2021 at 04:57:46PM +0200, David Hildenbrand wrote:
>> On 06.04.21 16:33, Dave Hansen wrote:
>>> On 4/6/21 12:44 AM, David Hildenbrand wrote:
On 02.04.21 17:26, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> TDX architecture aims to
On Tue, Apr 06, 2021 at 04:57:46PM +0200, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> On 06.04.21 16:33, Dave Hansen wrote:
> > On 4/6/21 12:44 AM, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> > > On 02.04.21 17:26, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> > > > TDX architecture aims to provide resiliency against confidentiality and
> > > > inte
On 4/6/21 9:33 AM, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 4/6/21 12:44 AM, David Hildenbrand wrote:
>> On 02.04.21 17:26, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
>>> TDX architecture aims to provide resiliency against confidentiality and
>>> integrity attacks. Towards this goal, the TDX architecture helps enforce
>>> the enabl
On 06.04.21 16:33, Dave Hansen wrote:
On 4/6/21 12:44 AM, David Hildenbrand wrote:
On 02.04.21 17:26, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
TDX architecture aims to provide resiliency against confidentiality and
integrity attacks. Towards this goal, the TDX architecture helps enforce
the enabling of memory
On 4/6/21 12:44 AM, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> On 02.04.21 17:26, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
>> TDX architecture aims to provide resiliency against confidentiality and
>> integrity attacks. Towards this goal, the TDX architecture helps enforce
>> the enabling of memory integrity for all TD-private m
On Tue, Apr 06, 2021 at 09:44:07AM +0200, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> On 02.04.21 17:26, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> > TDX architecture aims to provide resiliency against confidentiality and
> > integrity attacks. Towards this goal, the TDX architecture helps enforce
> > the enabling of memory integ
On 02.04.21 17:26, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
TDX architecture aims to provide resiliency against confidentiality and
integrity attacks. Towards this goal, the TDX architecture helps enforce
the enabling of memory integrity for all TD-private memory.
The CPU memory controller computes the integri
TDX architecture aims to provide resiliency against confidentiality and
integrity attacks. Towards this goal, the TDX architecture helps enforce
the enabling of memory integrity for all TD-private memory.
The CPU memory controller computes the integrity check value (MAC) for
the data (cache line)
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