On Mon, Apr 14, 2014 at 8:56 AM, Thomas Hellstrom wrote:
> On 04/14/2014 02:41 PM, One Thousand Gnomes wrote:
>>> throw out all GPU memory on master drop and block ioctls requiring
>>> authentication until master becomes active again.
>> If you have a per driver method then the driver can
On 04/14/2014 02:41 PM, One Thousand Gnomes wrote:
>> throw out all GPU memory on master drop and block ioctls requiring
>> authentication until master becomes active again.
> If you have a per driver method then the driver can implement whatever is
> optimal (possibly including throwing it all
> throw out all GPU memory on master drop and block ioctls requiring
> authentication until master becomes active again.
If you have a per driver method then the driver can implement whatever is
optimal (possibly including throwing it all out).
> -1: The driver allows an authenticated client to
throw out all GPU memory on master drop and block ioctls requiring
authentication until master becomes active again.
If you have a per driver method then the driver can implement whatever is
optimal (possibly including throwing it all out).
-1: The driver allows an authenticated client to
On 04/14/2014 02:41 PM, One Thousand Gnomes wrote:
throw out all GPU memory on master drop and block ioctls requiring
authentication until master becomes active again.
If you have a per driver method then the driver can implement whatever is
optimal (possibly including throwing it all out).
On Mon, Apr 14, 2014 at 8:56 AM, Thomas Hellstrom thellst...@vmware.com wrote:
On 04/14/2014 02:41 PM, One Thousand Gnomes wrote:
throw out all GPU memory on master drop and block ioctls requiring
authentication until master becomes active again.
If you have a per driver method then the driver
On Fri, Apr 11, 2014 at 5:15 PM, Thomas Hellstrom wrote:
> On 04/11/2014 10:31 PM, David Herrmann wrote:
>> Hi
>>
>> On Fri, Apr 11, 2014 at 2:42 PM, Thomas Hellstrom
>> wrote:
>>> as was discussed a while ago, there are some serious security flaws with
>>> the current drm master model, that
On 04/11/2014 10:31 PM, David Herrmann wrote:
> Hi
>
> On Fri, Apr 11, 2014 at 2:42 PM, Thomas Hellstrom
> wrote:
>> as was discussed a while ago, there are some serious security flaws with
>> the current drm master model, that allows a
>> user that had previous access or current access to an X
Hi
On Fri, Apr 11, 2014 at 2:42 PM, Thomas Hellstrom wrote:
> as was discussed a while ago, there are some serious security flaws with
> the current drm master model, that allows a
> user that had previous access or current access to an X server terminal
> to access the GPU memory of the active
Hi,
as was discussed a while ago, there are some serious security flaws with
the current drm master model, that allows a
user that had previous access or current access to an X server terminal
to access the GPU memory of the active X server, without being
authenticated to the X server and thereby
Hi,
as was discussed a while ago, there are some serious security flaws with
the current drm master model, that allows a
user that had previous access or current access to an X server terminal
to access the GPU memory of the active X server, without being
authenticated to the X server and thereby
Hi
On Fri, Apr 11, 2014 at 2:42 PM, Thomas Hellstrom thellst...@vmware.com wrote:
as was discussed a while ago, there are some serious security flaws with
the current drm master model, that allows a
user that had previous access or current access to an X server terminal
to access the GPU
On 04/11/2014 10:31 PM, David Herrmann wrote:
Hi
On Fri, Apr 11, 2014 at 2:42 PM, Thomas Hellstrom thellst...@vmware.com
wrote:
as was discussed a while ago, there are some serious security flaws with
the current drm master model, that allows a
user that had previous access or current
On Fri, Apr 11, 2014 at 5:15 PM, Thomas Hellstrom thellst...@vmware.com wrote:
On 04/11/2014 10:31 PM, David Herrmann wrote:
Hi
On Fri, Apr 11, 2014 at 2:42 PM, Thomas Hellstrom thellst...@vmware.com
wrote:
as was discussed a while ago, there are some serious security flaws with
the
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