On Mon, Apr 30, 2018 at 7:06 PM, Randy Dunlap wrote:
> On 04/30/2018 10:01 AM, Linus Torvalds wrote:
>> On Mon, Apr 30, 2018 at 9:57 AM Linus Torvalds <
>> torva...@linux-foundation.org> wrote:
>>
>>> Although in *practice* we'd have tons of entropy on any modern development
>>> CPU too, since any
On Mon, Apr 30, 2018 at 05:12:05PM +, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 30, 2018 at 10:06 AM Randy Dunlap wrote:
> > On 04/30/2018 10:01 AM, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> > >
> > > No kernel command line needed in practice any more. That's assuming any
> > > kernel developer will have an IvyBridge
On Mon, Apr 30, 2018 at 12:16:45PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 30, 2018 at 12:00 PM, Linus Torvalds
> wrote:
> > On Mon, Apr 30, 2018 at 11:38 AM Kees Cook wrote:
> >
> >> Something like this? (Untested.)
> >
> > Looks workable.
> >
> >> + /* If we have hw RNG, start hashing immed
On Mon, Apr 30, 2018 at 1:01 PM Linus Torvalds <
torva...@linux-foundation.org> wrote:
> But if there are no actual users of get_random_bytes_arch(), maybe we can
> just remove the fallback to the non-arch code, and add that return value
> (and the __must_check()).
Hmm. It is exported, so maybe t
On Mon, Apr 30, 2018 at 12:16 PM Kees Cook wrote:
> I just noticed: there are _no_ users of get_random_bytes_arch() ...
> didn't we once use it to feed entropy to the CRNG?
We use arch_get_random_long() for that. See "crng_initialize()".
But if there are no actual users of get_random_bytes_arch
On Mon, Apr 30, 2018 at 12:00 PM, Linus Torvalds
wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 30, 2018 at 11:38 AM Kees Cook wrote:
>
>> Something like this? (Untested.)
>
> Looks workable.
>
>> + /* If we have hw RNG, start hashing immediately. */
>> + if (arch_has_random()) {
>> + get_random_
On Mon, Apr 30, 2018 at 11:38 AM Kees Cook wrote:
> Something like this? (Untested.)
Looks workable.
> + /* If we have hw RNG, start hashing immediately. */
> + if (arch_has_random()) {
> + get_random_bytes_arch(&ptr_key, sizeof(ptr_key));
> + ptr_key_rea
On Mon, Apr 30, 2018 at 10:01 AM, Linus Torvalds
wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 30, 2018 at 9:57 AM Linus Torvalds <
> torva...@linux-foundation.org> wrote:
>
>> Although in *practice* we'd have tons of entropy on any modern development
>> CPU too, since any new hardware will have the hardware random number
On Mon, Apr 30, 2018 at 10:06 AM Randy Dunlap wrote:
> On 04/30/2018 10:01 AM, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> >
> > No kernel command line needed in practice any more. That's assuming any
> > kernel developer will have an IvyBridge or newer.
> any paid kernel developer :)
I suspect a lot of hobbyists t
On 04/30/2018 10:01 AM, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 30, 2018 at 9:57 AM Linus Torvalds <
> torva...@linux-foundation.org> wrote:
>
>> Although in *practice* we'd have tons of entropy on any modern development
>> CPU too, since any new hardware will have the hardware random number
>> genera
On Mon, Apr 30, 2018 at 9:57 AM Linus Torvalds <
torva...@linux-foundation.org> wrote:
> Although in *practice* we'd have tons of entropy on any modern development
> CPU too, since any new hardware will have the hardware random number
> generation. Some overly cautious person might not trust it, o
On Mon, Apr 30, 2018 at 9:41 AM Steven Rostedt wrote:
> >
> > And if we really want a command line option, can we make that still hash
> > the pointer, just force the entropy early. That way kernel developers
that
> > test that command line option are still testing the *hashing*, they just
> > ar
On Mon, 30 Apr 2018 16:31:52 +
Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 30, 2018 at 9:11 AM Kees Cook wrote:
>
> > I (or other folks?) had proposed this before, but, AIUI, Linus remains
> > opposed.
>
> Yeah, I hate this, because it will make people paper over their problems by
> just booting
On Mon, Apr 30, 2018 at 9:11 AM Kees Cook wrote:
> I (or other folks?) had proposed this before, but, AIUI, Linus remains
> opposed.
Yeah, I hate this, because it will make people paper over their problems by
just booting with that option.
I think it should just be fixed.
Is there really any r
On Mon, Apr 30, 2018 at 8:50 AM, Anna-Maria Gleixner
wrote:
> Hi,
>
> I stumbled over an issue with hashed pointers and tracing.
>
> I'm using trace points for examination and on error the trace buffers
> are dumped. The error occurs when entropy has not been set up, so the
> pointers are not hash
Hi,
I stumbled over an issue with hashed pointers and tracing.
I'm using trace points for examination and on error the trace buffers
are dumped. The error occurs when entropy has not been set up, so the
pointers are not hashed and only (ptrval) is printed instead. The
pointers are required to di
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