On 5/14/25 00:32, Reshetova, Elena wrote:
>> This was the recent discussion I am aware we had on this matter:
>> https://lkml.org/lkml/2024/2/5/1595
>> The measurements were done for older platform (skylake), but I am not
>> aware of any architectural changes since that time to improve this.
> And
> > >>> +static bool sgx_has_eupdatesvn;
> > >>
> > >> We have CPUID "caches" of sorts. Why open code this?
> > >
> > > You mean X86_FEATURE_*?
> >
> > Yes.
> >
> > > SGX CPUID is only defined in SGX code currently (btw, I am not sure
> > > why they are made special) so it doesn’t support this.
> >
> On Wed, May 07, 2025 at 02:14:00PM +0300, Elena Reshetova wrote:
>
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c
> b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c
> > index 7f8d1e11dbee..669e44d61f9f 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c
> > @@ -19,6
> >>> +static bool sgx_has_eupdatesvn;
> >>
> >> We have CPUID "caches" of sorts. Why open code this?
> >
> > You mean X86_FEATURE_*?
>
> Yes.
>
> > SGX CPUID is only defined in SGX code currently (btw, I am not sure
> > why they are made special) so it doesn’t support this.
>
> It's only used i
On Wed, May 07, 2025 at 02:14:00PM +0300, Elena Reshetova wrote:
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c
> b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c
> index 7f8d1e11dbee..669e44d61f9f 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c
> @@ -19,6 +19,10 @@
Thank you very much for your detailed review, Dave!
Responses inline below.
> On 5/7/25 04:14, Elena Reshetova wrote:
> > In case an SGX vulnerability is discovered and TCB recovery
> > for SGX is triggered, Intel specifies a process that must be
> > followed for a given vulnerability. Steps to
On 5/8/25 07:07, Reshetova, Elena wrote:
...
>> Actually, I think I wrote changelogs for this once upon a time. Could
>> you please go dig those up and use them?
>
> Could you please suggest where can I find them? Was it for the previous
> submission done by Cathy?
Yes. There were also some long
On 5/7/25 04:14, Elena Reshetova wrote:
> In case an SGX vulnerability is discovered and TCB recovery
> for SGX is triggered, Intel specifies a process that must be
> followed for a given vulnerability. Steps to mitigate can vary
> based on vulnerability type, affected components, etc.
> In some ca
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