Re: [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)

2016-05-10 Thread Borislav Petkov
On Tue, May 10, 2016 at 01:23:35PM +0200, Paolo Bonzini wrote: > It can send plaintext packets that will be stored encrypted in memory. > (Of course the hypervisor can do that too if it has access to the guest > network). And then what? You need to find out where exactly (which pages) got the pac

Re: [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)

2016-05-10 Thread Paolo Bonzini
On 09/05/2016 23:08, Tom Lendacky wrote: > On 05/09/2016 10:13 AM, Paolo Bonzini wrote: >> >> >> On 02/05/2016 20:31, Andy Lutomirski wrote: >>> And did the SEV implementation remember to encrypt the guest register >>> state? Because, if not, everything of importance will leak out >>> through th

Re: [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)

2016-05-09 Thread Tom Lendacky
On 05/09/2016 10:13 AM, Paolo Bonzini wrote: > > > On 02/05/2016 20:31, Andy Lutomirski wrote: >> And did the SEV implementation remember to encrypt the guest register >> state? Because, if not, everything of importance will leak out >> through the VMCB and/or GPRs. > > No, it doesn't. And SEV

Re: [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)

2016-05-09 Thread Paolo Bonzini
On 02/05/2016 20:31, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > And did the SEV implementation remember to encrypt the guest register > state? Because, if not, everything of importance will leak out > through the VMCB and/or GPRs. No, it doesn't. And SEV is very limited unless you paravirtualize everything. Fo

Re: [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)

2016-05-03 Thread Tom Lendacky
On 04/30/2016 01:13 AM, Elliott, Robert (Persistent Memory) wrote: >> -Original Message- >> From: linux-kernel-ow...@vger.kernel.org [mailto:linux-kernel- >> ow...@vger.kernel.org] On Behalf Of Tom Lendacky >> Sent: Tuesday, April 26, 2016 5:56 PM >> Subject: [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secur

Re: [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)

2016-05-02 Thread Andy Lutomirski
On Wed, Apr 27, 2016 at 1:10 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote: > On 04/27/2016 09:39 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote: >> On Tue, Apr 26, 2016 at 3:55 PM, Tom Lendacky >> wrote: >>> This RFC patch series provides support for AMD's new Secure Memory >>> Encryption (SME) feature. >>> >>> SME can be used to mark in

RE: [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)

2016-04-29 Thread Elliott, Robert (Persistent Memory)
> -Original Message- > From: linux-kernel-ow...@vger.kernel.org [mailto:linux-kernel- > ow...@vger.kernel.org] On Behalf Of Tom Lendacky > Sent: Tuesday, April 26, 2016 5:56 PM > Subject: [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) > > This RFC patch series provides support fo

Re: [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)

2016-04-27 Thread Tom Lendacky
On 04/27/2016 09:39 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > On Tue, Apr 26, 2016 at 3:55 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote: >> This RFC patch series provides support for AMD's new Secure Memory >> Encryption (SME) feature. >> >> SME can be used to mark individual pages of memory as encrypted through the >> page tables.

Re: [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)

2016-04-27 Thread Pavel Machek
On Wed 2016-04-27 16:39:51, Borislav Petkov wrote: > On Wed, Apr 27, 2016 at 04:30:45PM +0200, Pavel Machek wrote: > > That does not answer the question. "Why would I want SME on my > > system?". > > Because your question wasn't formulated properly. Here's some text from > the 0th mail which you c

Re: [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)

2016-04-27 Thread Pavel Machek
On Wed 2016-04-27 16:39:51, Borislav Petkov wrote: > On Wed, Apr 27, 2016 at 04:30:45PM +0200, Pavel Machek wrote: > > That does not answer the question. "Why would I want SME on my > > system?". > > Because your question wasn't formulated properly. Here's some text from > the 0th mail which you c

Re: [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)

2016-04-27 Thread Andy Lutomirski
On Tue, Apr 26, 2016 at 3:55 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote: > This RFC patch series provides support for AMD's new Secure Memory > Encryption (SME) feature. > > SME can be used to mark individual pages of memory as encrypted through the > page tables. A page of memory that is marked encrypted will be aut

Re: [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)

2016-04-27 Thread Borislav Petkov
On Wed, Apr 27, 2016 at 04:30:45PM +0200, Pavel Machek wrote: > That does not answer the question. "Why would I want SME on my > system?". Because your question wasn't formulated properly. Here's some text from the 0th mail which you could've found on your own: "The following links provide additi

Re: [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)

2016-04-27 Thread Pavel Machek
On Wed 2016-04-27 16:05:20, Borislav Petkov wrote: > On Tue, Mar 22, 2016 at 02:00:58PM +0100, Pavel Machek wrote: > > Why would I want SME on my system? My system seems to work without it. > > Your system doesn't have it and SME is default off. That does not answer the question. "Why would I wan

Re: [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)

2016-04-27 Thread Tom Lendacky
On 03/22/2016 08:00 AM, Pavel Machek wrote: > Hi! > >> This RFC patch series provides support for AMD's new Secure Memory >> Encryption (SME) feature. >> >> SME can be used to mark individual pages of memory as encrypted through the >> page tables. A page of memory that is marked encrypted will be

Re: [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)

2016-04-27 Thread Borislav Petkov
On Tue, Mar 22, 2016 at 02:00:58PM +0100, Pavel Machek wrote: > Why would I want SME on my system? My system seems to work without it. Your system doesn't have it and SME is default off. -- Regards/Gruss, Boris. ECO tip #101: Trim your mails when you reply.

Re: [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)

2016-04-27 Thread Pavel Machek
Hi! > This RFC patch series provides support for AMD's new Secure Memory > Encryption (SME) feature. > > SME can be used to mark individual pages of memory as encrypted through the > page tables. A page of memory that is marked encrypted will be automatically > decrypted when read from DRAM and w