Re: [PATCH v22 00/24] Intel SGX foundations

2019-10-02 Thread Jarkko Sakkinen
On Wed, Sep 25, 2019 at 05:32:04PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > On Tue, Sep 24, 2019 at 10:20:09AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > > > I think either can be considered post-upstreaming. > > > > Indeed, as long as the overall API is actually compatible with these > > types of restrictions. > >

Re: [PATCH v22 00/24] Intel SGX foundations

2019-09-25 Thread Jarkko Sakkinen
On Tue, Sep 24, 2019 at 10:20:09AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > > I think either can be considered post-upstreaming. > > Indeed, as long as the overall API is actually compatible with these > types of restrictions. I include LSM changes to the follow up versions of the patch set. This is done

Re: [PATCH v22 00/24] Intel SGX foundations

2019-09-24 Thread Andy Lutomirski
> On Sep 15, 2019, at 10:24 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen > wrote: > > On Sat, Sep 14, 2019 at 08:32:38AM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote: On 9/14/19 6:41 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: The proposed LSM hooks give the granularity to make yes/no decision based on the * The origin of the source of

Re: [PATCH v22 00/24] Intel SGX foundations

2019-09-15 Thread Jarkko Sakkinen
On Sat, Sep 14, 2019 at 08:32:38AM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote: > On 9/14/19 6:41 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > > > The proposed LSM hooks give the granularity to make yes/no decision > > based on the > > > > * The origin of the source of the source for the enclave. > > * The requested permissions

Re: [PATCH v22 00/24] Intel SGX foundations

2019-09-14 Thread Dave Hansen
On 9/14/19 6:41 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > The proposed LSM hooks give the granularity to make yes/no decision > based on the > > * The origin of the source of the source for the enclave. > * The requested permissions for the added or mapped peage. > > The hooks to do these checks are provid

Re: [PATCH v22 00/24] Intel SGX foundations

2019-09-14 Thread Jarkko Sakkinen
On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 01:38:18PM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote: > On 9/3/19 7:26 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > Not having LSM hooks does not cause any risk to other parts of the > > kernel as the device can still be controlled by using DAC permissions. > > The hooks just provide more granularity than

Re: [PATCH v22 00/24] Intel SGX foundations

2019-09-13 Thread Dave Hansen
On 9/3/19 7:26 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > Not having LSM hooks does not cause any risk to other parts of the > kernel as the device can still be controlled by using DAC permissions. > The hooks just provide more granularity than DAC in access decisions. Could we translate the security-speak to e