Re [PATCH] Bluetooth: Fix the vulnerable issue on enc key size

2020-09-27 Thread 陆朱伟
Hi Marcel, > On September 27, 2020 20:05, Marcel Holtmann wrote: > > Hi Alex, > > > When someone attacks the service provider, it creates connection, > > authenticates. Then it requests key size of one byte and it identifies > > the key with brute force methods. > > > > After

Re: [PATCH] Bluetooth: Fix the vulnerable issue on enc key size

2020-09-27 Thread Marcel Holtmann
Hi Alex, > When someone attacks the service provider, it creates connection, > authenticates. Then it requests key size of one byte and it identifies > the key with brute force methods. > > After l2cap info req/resp exchange is complete. the attacker sends l2cap > connect

Re: [PATCH] Bluetooth: Fix the vulnerable issue on enc key size

2020-09-26 Thread 陆朱伟
Hi Marcel, > On 26 September 2020 at 1:34, Marcel Holtmann wrote: > > Hi Alex, > > >>> When someone attacks the service provider, it creates connection, > >>> authenticates. Then it requests key size of one byte and it identifies > >>> the key with brute force methods. > >>> > >>> After l2cap in

Re: [PATCH] Bluetooth: Fix the vulnerable issue on enc key size

2020-09-25 Thread Marcel Holtmann
Hi Alex, >>> When someone attacks the service provider, it creates connection, >>> authenticates. Then it requests key size of one byte and it identifies >>> the key with brute force methods. >>> >>> After l2cap info req/resp exchange is complete. the attacker sends l2cap >>> connect with specifi

Re: [PATCH] Bluetooth: Fix the vulnerable issue on enc key size

2020-09-20 Thread 陆朱伟
Hi Marcel, > On September 20, 2020 14:10, Marcel Holtmann wrote: > > Hi Alex, > > > When someone attacks the service provider, it creates connection, > > authenticates. Then it requests key size of one byte and it identifies > > the key with brute force methods. > > > > After l2cap info req/resp

Re: [PATCH] Bluetooth: Fix the vulnerable issue on enc key size

2020-09-19 Thread Marcel Holtmann
Hi Alex, > When someone attacks the service provider, it creates connection, > authenticates. Then it requests key size of one byte and it identifies > the key with brute force methods. > > After l2cap info req/resp exchange is complete. the attacker sends l2cap > connect with specific PSM. > >