Pavel Machek wrote:
> To play devil's advocate, does RNG subsystem need to evolve? Its task
> is to get random numbers. Does it fail at the task?
>
> Problem is, random subsystem is hard to verify, and big rewrite is
> likely to cause security problems...
Parts of the problem, though, are dead
Hi!
> > On Wed, Dec 23, 2020 at 3:17 PM Petr Tesarik wrote:
> > > Upfront, let me admit that SUSE has a vested interest in a
> > > FIPS-certifiable Linux kernel.
> >
> > Sorry, but just because you have a "vested interest", or a financial
> > interest, or because you want it does not
Hi!
> > Any updates on that?
> >
> > I don't believe Torsten's concerns are simply about *applying* patches
> > but more about these long periods of radio silence. That kills
>
> Exactly. I could live with replies in the style of "old" Linus like:
> "Your code is crap, because it does X and Y".
On Wed, Dec 23, 2020 at 5:03 PM Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
>
> Hi Peter,
>
> On Wed, Dec 23, 2020 at 5:01 PM Petr Tesarik wrote:
> > I never suggested that this should serve as a supportive argument. I was
> > just trying to be honest about our motivations.
> >
> > I'm a bit sad that this
Hi Peter,
On Wed, Dec 23, 2020 at 5:01 PM Petr Tesarik wrote:
> I never suggested that this should serve as a supportive argument. I was just
> trying to be honest about our motivations.
>
> I'm a bit sad that this discussion has quickly gone back to the choice of
> algorithms and how they can
On Wed, 23 Dec 2020 15:32:55 +0100
"Jason A. Donenfeld" wrote:
> On Wed, Dec 23, 2020 at 3:17 PM Petr Tesarik wrote:
> > Upfront, let me admit that SUSE has a vested interest in a FIPS-certifiable
> > Linux kernel.
>
> Sorry, but just because you have a "vested interest", or a financial
>
On Wed, Dec 23, 2020 at 4:26 PM Stephan Mueller wrote:
>
> Am Mittwoch, dem 23.12.2020 um 15:32 +0100 schrieb Jason A. Donenfeld:
> >
> > I would, however, be interested in a keccak-based construction. But
> > just using the keccak permutation does not automatically make it
> > "SHA-3", so we're
Am Mittwoch, dem 23.12.2020 um 15:32 +0100 schrieb Jason A. Donenfeld:
>
> I would, however, be interested in a keccak-based construction. But
> just using the keccak permutation does not automatically make it
> "SHA-3", so we're back at the same issue again. FIPS is simply not
> interesting for
On Wed, Dec 23, 2020 at 3:17 PM Petr Tesarik wrote:
> Upfront, let me admit that SUSE has a vested interest in a FIPS-certifiable
> Linux kernel.
Sorry, but just because you have a "vested interest", or a financial
interest, or because you want it does not suddenly make it a good
idea. The idea
On Wed, 23 Dec 2020 13:28:51 +0100
Torsten Duwe wrote:
>[...]
> > collaboration and disengage people. More than simply reviewing patches
> > I would expect a maintainer to give directions and drive the
> > community. Asking Jason to review Nicolai's patches was a step towards
> > that, but I
On Fri, 18 Dec 2020 10:25:19 -0300
Marcelo Henrique Cerri wrote:
> Hi, Ted and Jason.
>
> Any updates on that?
>
> I don't believe Torsten's concerns are simply about *applying* patches
> but more about these long periods of radio silence. That kills
Exactly. I could live with replies in the
Hi, Ted and Jason.
Any updates on that?
I don't believe Torsten's concerns are simply about *applying* patches
but more about these long periods of radio silence. That kills
collaboration and disengage people. More than simply reviewing patches
I would expect a maintainer to give directions and
On Mon, Nov 30, 2020 at 5:56 PM Theodore Y. Ts'o wrote:
> patches this cycle. One thing that would help me is if folks
> (especially Jason, if you would) could start with a detailed review of
> Nicolai's patches.
Sure, I'll take a look.
On Mon, Nov 30, 2020 at 04:15:23PM +0100, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> I am willing to maintain random.c and have intentions to have a
> formally verified RNG. I've mentioned this to Ted before.
>
> But I think Ted's reluctance to not accept the recent patches sent to
> this list is mostly
I am willing to maintain random.c and have intentions to have a
formally verified RNG. I've mentioned this to Ted before.
But I think Ted's reluctance to not accept the recent patches sent to
this list is mostly justified, and I have no desire to see us rush
into replacing random.c with something
Hi Linus!
AFAIK it's legit to bother you directly with issues like this one?
I see certifications as the mere messengers here which tell us that
our /dev/random is technologically outdated. Input entropy amounts are
guesstimated in advance, obviously much too conservatively, compiled in
and
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