ptrace and setuid problem

No, not a new security hole (exactly), more of a philosophy question: If I exec a setuid program under ptrace, I can read the image via PEEKDATA requests. Could (or should) that be considered a security hole? Come to think of it, should any executable with no read access (setuid or not) be debugga

Re: ptrace and setuid problem

Tom Horsley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > If I exec a setuid program under ptrace, I can read the image via > PEEKDATA requests. Only CAP_SYS_PTRACE capable processes get suid/sgid semantics under ptrace, or can attach to a privileged processes. Andreas. -- Andreas Schwab, SuSE Labs, [EMAIL PR

Re: ptrace and setuid problem

Andreas Schwab wrote: Tom Horsley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: If I exec a setuid program under ptrace, I can read the image via PEEKDATA requests. Only CAP_SYS_PTRACE capable processes get suid/sgid semantics under ptrace, or can attach to a privileged processes. Andreas. I realize the p