Re: the "Turing Attack" (was: Sabotaged PaXtest)

2005-02-11 Thread Mika Bostrom
[Posted only on LKML, this has become humour.] On Thu, Feb 10, 2005 at 09:03:00PM +0100, David Weinehall wrote: > On Thu, Feb 10, 2005 at 04:21:49PM +0100, Ingo Molnar wrote: > > > > * Jakob Oestergaard <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > PaX cannot be a 'little bit pregnant'. (you might argue t

Re: the "Turing Attack" (was: Sabotaged PaXtest)

2005-02-10 Thread David Weinehall
On Thu, Feb 10, 2005 at 04:21:49PM +0100, Ingo Molnar wrote: > > * Jakob Oestergaard <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > On Thu, Feb 10, 2005 at 02:43:14PM +0100, Ingo Molnar wrote: > > > > > > * [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > > > > the bigger problem is however that you're o

Re: the "Turing Attack" (was: Sabotaged PaXtest)

2005-02-10 Thread Ingo Molnar
* Jakob Oestergaard <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > On Thu, Feb 10, 2005 at 02:43:14PM +0100, Ingo Molnar wrote: > > > > * [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > > the bigger problem is however that you're once again fixing the > > > symptoms, instead of the underlying problem - not

Re: the "Turing Attack" (was: Sabotaged PaXtest)

2005-02-10 Thread Jakob Oestergaard
On Thu, Feb 10, 2005 at 02:43:14PM +0100, Ingo Molnar wrote: > > * [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > the bigger problem is however that you're once again fixing the > > symptoms, instead of the underlying problem - not the correct > > approach/mindset. > > i'll change my approac

Re: the "Turing Attack" (was: Sabotaged PaXtest)

2005-02-10 Thread Ingo Molnar
* [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > the bigger problem is however that you're once again fixing the > symptoms, instead of the underlying problem - not the correct > approach/mindset. i'll change my approach/mindset when it is proven that "the underlying problem" can be solved. (in

Re: the "Turing Attack" (was: Sabotaged PaXtest)

2005-02-08 Thread H. Peter Anvin
Followup to: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> By author:Ingo Molnar <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> In newsgroup: linux.dev.kernel > > This, on the face of it, seems like a ridiculous possibility as the > chances of that are reverse proportional to the number of bits necessary > to implement the simplest Turing Machi

Re: the "Turing Attack" (was: Sabotaged PaXtest)

2005-02-08 Thread Ingo Molnar
* Ingo Molnar <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > http://pax.grsecurity.net/docs/pax-future.txt > >To understand the future direction of PaX, let's summarize what we >achieve currently. The goal is to prevent/detect exploiting of >software bugs that allow arbitrary read/write access to th

the "Turing Attack" (was: Sabotaged PaXtest)

2005-02-08 Thread Ingo Molnar
* [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > btw., do you consider PaX as a 100% sure solution against 'code > > injection' attacks (meaning that the attacker wants to execute an > > arbitrary piece of code, and assuming the attacked application has a > > stack overflow)? I.e. does PaX avoi