On Fri, Jun 17, 2016 at 2:02 AM, Ingo Molnar wrote:
>
> * Kees Cook wrote:
>
>> From: Thomas Garnier
>>
>> Minor change that allows early boot physical mapping of PUD level virtual
>> addresses. The current implementation expects the virtual address to be
On Fri, Jun 17, 2016 at 3:26 AM, Ingo Molnar wrote:
>
> * Kees Cook wrote:
>
>> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
>> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
>> @@ -1993,6 +1993,23 @@ config PHYSICAL_ALIGN
>>
>> Don't change this unless you know what you are doing.
>>
>> +config RANDOMIZE_MEMORY
>> + bool "Random
Add vmemmap in the list of randomized memory regions.
The vmemmap region holds a representation of the physical memory (through
a struct page array). An attacker could use this region to disclose the
kernel memory layout (walking the page linked list).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
Signed-off
***Background:
KASLR memory randomization for x86_64 was added when KASLR did not support
hibernation. Now that it does, some changes are needed.
***Problems that needed solving:
Hibernation was failing on reboot with a GP fault when CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY
was enabled. Two issues were identifie
When KASLR memory randomization is used, __PAGE_OFFSET is a global
variable changed during boot. The assembly code was using the variable
as an immediate value to calculate the cr3 physical address. The
physical address was incorrect resulting to a GP fault.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
Correctly setup the temporary mapping for hibernation. Previous
implementation assumed the address was aligned on the PGD level. With
KASLR memory randomization enabled, the address is randomized on the PUD
level. This change supports unaligned address up to PMD.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
On Wed, Jul 27, 2016 at 8:59 AM, Thomas Garnier wrote:
> Add vmemmap in the list of randomized memory regions.
>
> The vmemmap region holds a representation of the physical memory (through
> a struct page array). An attacker could use this region to disclose the
> kernel memory
ALUE);
>> > #ifdef CONFIG_X86
>> > VMCOREINFO_NUMBER(KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE);
>> > + VMCOREINFO_NUMBER(PAGE_OFFSET);
>> > + VMCOREINFO_NUMBER(VMALLOC_START);
>> > + VMCOREINFO_NUMBER(VMEMMAP_START);
>> > #endif
>> > #ifdef CONFI
f that variable is ready to be
>> > written into CR3. Then, the assembly code doesn't have to worry
>> > about converting that value into a physical address and things work
>> > regardless of whether or not CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY is set.
>> >
>> >
t; result (leading to a kernel panic most of the time).
>>>
>>> To fix this problem, rework kernel_ident_mapping_init() to support
>>> unaligned offsets between KVA and PA up to the PMD level and make
>>> set_up_temporary_mappings() use it as approprtiate.
>
Initialize KASLR memory randomization after max_pfn is initialized. Also
ensure the size is rounded up. Could have create problems on machines
with more than 1Tb of memory on certain random addresses.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
Based on next-20160805
---
arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 4
while doing extensive testing of KASLR memory
randomization on different type of hardware.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
Based on next-20160805
---
arch/x86/mm/init.c | 8
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init.c b/arch/x86/mm/init.c
index 6209289..3a27e6a 100644
On Tue, Jun 20, 2017 at 1:18 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 6:12 PM, Thomas Garnier wrote:
>> Ensure the address limit is a user-mode segment before returning to
>> user-mode. Otherwise a process can corrupt kernel-mode memory and
>> elevate privileges
On Wed, Jun 21, 2017 at 1:16 AM, Catalin Marinas
wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 06:12:03PM -0700, Thomas Garnier wrote:
>> Ensure the address limit is a user-mode segment before returning to
>> user-mode. Otherwise a process can corrupt kernel-mode memory and
>>
On Tue, May 9, 2017 at 7:29 AM, Thomas Garnier wrote:
>
> On Tue, May 9, 2017 at 4:10 AM, Greg KH wrote:
> > On Tue, May 09, 2017 at 08:56:19AM +0200, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> >>
> >> * Kees Cook wrote:
> >>
> >> > > There's the
On Thu, May 11, 2017 at 11:58 PM, Ingo Molnar wrote:
>
> * Linus Torvalds wrote:
>
>> On Thu, May 11, 2017 at 4:17 PM, Thomas Garnier wrote:
>> >
>> > Ingo: Do you want the change as-is? Would you like it to be optional?
>> > What do you think?
>&
Add a new _ASM_MOVABS macro to fetch a symbol address. It will be used
to replace "_ASM_MOV $, %dst" code construct that are not compatible
with PIE.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/a
.
Position Independent Executable (PIE) support will allow to extend the
KASLR randomization range 0x8000.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 16 ++--
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S b/arch
Change the assembly code to use only relative references of symbols for the
kernel to be PIE compatible.
Position Independent Executable (PIE) support will allow to extend the
KASLR randomization range 0x8000.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
Acked-by: Pavel Machek
Acked-by: Rafael J
Change the assembly code to use only relative references of symbols for the
kernel to be PIE compatible.
Position Independent Executable (PIE) support will allow to extend the
KASLR randomization range 0x8000.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
if PIE is enabled, switch the paravirt assembly constraints to be
compatible. The %c/i constrains generate smaller code so is kept by
default.
Position Independent Executable (PIE) support will allow to extend the
KASLR randomization range 0x8000.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
ition Independent Executable (PIE) support will allow to extend the
KASLR randomization range 0x8000.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 6 ++
arch/x86/kernel/head64.c | 3 +++
2 files changed, 9 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/k
/end of sections). In this case,
older versions of GCC will remove the comparison if the symbols are
hidden. This issue exists at least on gcc 4.9 and before.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
arch/x86/boot/boot.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h | 2 +-
arch/x86
Provide an option to have a PROVIDE_HIDDEN (linker script) entry for
each weak symbol. This option solves an error in x86_64 where the linker
optimizes PIE generated code to be non-PIE because --emit-relocs was used
instead of -pie (to reduce dynamic relocations).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
randomization range 0x8000.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 8 ++--
arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c | 6 --
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 4 ++--
3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b
and the
global variable stack cookie is used. If a specific stack mode was
selected (regular or strong) and the compiler does not support selecting
the segment register, an error is emitted.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 12
arch/x86
-0.1%)
- PIE enabled: average -0.4% to +0.4%.
[1] https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=82303
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
merge pie
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 8
arch/x86/Makefile | 45 -
2 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 1 deletion
top 2G and 32-bit
integers are not enough.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
arch/x86/tools/relocs.c| 60 +++---
arch/x86/tools/relocs.h| 4 +--
arch/x86/tools/relocs_common.c | 15 ++---
3 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff
-bytes as before.
Position Independent Executable (PIE) support will allow to extend the
KASLR randomization range 0x8000.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c | 51 +-
scripts/recordmcount.c | 79 +++-
2
three PUD pages.
The relocation table uses 64-bit integers generated with the updated
relocation tool with the large-reloc option.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 21 +
arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile| 5 +
arch/x86/boot
The GOT is changed during early boot when relocations are applied. Make
it read-only directly. This table exists only for PIE binary.
Position Independent Executable (PIE) support will allow to extend the
KASLR randomization range 0x8000.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
include
Adapt module loading to support PIE relocations. Generate dynamic GOT if
a symbol requires it but no entry exists in the kernel GOT.
Position Independent Executable (PIE) support will allow to extend the
KASLR randomization range 0x8000.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
arch/x86
Change the relocation tool to correctly handle relocations generated by
-fPIE option:
- Add relocation for each entry of the .got section given the linker does not
generate R_X86_64_GLOB_DAT on a simple link.
- Ignore R_X86_64_GOTPCREL.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
arch/x86/tools
Change the assembly code to use only relative references of symbols for the
kernel to be PIE compatible.
Position Independent Executable (PIE) support will allow to extend the
KASLR randomization range 0x8000.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
Acked-by: Pavel Machek
Acked-by: Rafael J
Change assembly to use the new _ASM_MOVABS macro instead of _ASM_MOV for
the assembly to be PIE compatible.
Position Independent Executable (PIE) support will allow to extend the
KASLR randomization range 0x8000.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
arch/x86/include/asm/pm-trace.h | 2
ff8000.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 9 ++---
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
index cfd29ee8c3da..25b5842a4646 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/process
Change the assembly code to use only relative references of symbols for the
kernel to be PIE compatible.
Position Independent Executable (PIE) support will allow to extend the
KASLR randomization range 0x8000.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S
Replace the %c constraint with %P. The %c is incompatible with PIE
because it implies an immediate value whereas %P reference a symbol.
Position Independent Executable (PIE) support will allow to extend the
KASLR randomization range 0x8000.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
arch
Replace the %c constraint with %P. The %c is incompatible with PIE
because it implies an immediate value whereas %P reference a symbol.
Position Independent Executable (PIE) support will allow to extend the
KASLR randomization range 0x8000.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
arch
On Mon, Jun 25, 2018 at 4:51 PM Randy Dunlap wrote:
>
> On 06/25/18 15:39, Thomas Garnier wrote:
> > Adapt module loading to support PIE relocations. Generate dynamic GOT if
> > a symbol requires it but no entry exists in the kernel GOT.
>
> Hi,
>
> This patch desc
Change the assembly code to use only relative references of symbols for the
kernel to be PIE compatible.
Position Independent Executable (PIE) support will allow to extend the
KASLR randomization range 0x8000.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
Acked-by: Pavel Machek
---
arch/x86
Change the assembly code to use only relative references of symbols for the
kernel to be PIE compatible.
Position Independent Executable (PIE) support will allow to extend the
KASLR randomization range 0x8000.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
Provide an option to have a PROVIDE_HIDDEN (linker script) entry for
each weak symbol. This option solves an error in x86_64 where the linker
optimizes PIE generated code to be non-PIE because --emit-relocs was used
instead of -pie (to reduce dynamic relocations).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
/end of sections). In this case,
older versions of GCC will remove the comparison if the symbols are
hidden. This issue exists at least on gcc 4.9 and before.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
arch/x86/boot/boot.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h | 2 +-
arch/x86
Executable (PIE) support will allow to extend the
KASLR randomization range 0x8000.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
arch/x86/entry/calling.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S| 4 ++--
arch/x86/include/asm/percpu.h| 25 +++--
arch/x86/include/asm
-0.1%)
- PIE enabled: average -0.4% to +0.4%.
[1] https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=82303
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
merge pie
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 8
arch/x86/Makefile | 45 -
2 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 1 deletion
three PUD pages.
The relocation table uses 64-bit integers generated with the updated
relocation tool with the large-reloc option.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 21 +
arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile| 5 +
arch/x86/boot
randomization range 0x8000.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 8 ++--
arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c | 6 --
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 4 ++--
3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b
top 2G and 32-bit
integers are not enough.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
arch/x86/tools/relocs.c| 60 +++---
arch/x86/tools/relocs.h| 4 +--
arch/x86/tools/relocs_common.c | 15 ++---
3 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff
The GOT is changed during early boot when relocations are applied. Make
it read-only directly. This table exists only for PIE binary.
Position Independent Executable (PIE) support will allow to extend the
KASLR randomization range 0x8000.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
include
and the
global variable stack cookie is used. If a specific stack mode was
selected (regular or strong) and the compiler does not support selecting
the segment register, an error is emitted.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 12
arch/x86
Adapt module loading to support PIE relocations. Generate dynamic GOT if
a symbol requires it but no entry exists in the kernel GOT.
Position Independent Executable (PIE) support will allow to extend the
KASLR randomization range 0x8000.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
arch/x86
randomization range.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt | 3 +++
arch/x86/Kconfig| 4
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h | 6 ++
arch/x86/kernel/head64.c| 5 -
arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c | 3
5-bytes as before.
Position Independent Executable (PIE) support will allow to extend the
KASLR randomization range 0x8000.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
arch/x86/include/asm/ftrace.h | 4 --
arch/x86/include/asm/sections.h | 4 ++
arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c| 42
Change the relocation tool to correctly handle relocations generated by
-fPIE option:
- Add relocation for each entry of the .got section given the linker does not
generate R_X86_64_GLOB_DAT on a simple link.
- Ignore R_X86_64_GOTPCREL.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
arch/x86/tools
Change the assembly code to use only relative references of symbols for the
kernel to be PIE compatible.
Position Independent Executable (PIE) support will allow to extend the
KASLR randomization range 0x8000.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
Acked-by: Pavel Machek
---
arch/x86/power
ff8000.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 9 ++---
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
index e28add6b791f..7ae9fb91f7b5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/process
ition Independent Executable (PIE) support will allow to extend the
KASLR randomization range 0x8000.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 6 ++
arch/x86/kernel/head64.c | 3 +++
2 files changed, 9 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/k
Change assembly to use the new _ASM_MOVABS macro instead of _ASM_MOV for
the assembly to be PIE compatible.
Position Independent Executable (PIE) support will allow to extend the
KASLR randomization range 0x8000.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
arch/x86/include/asm/pm-trace.h | 2
.
Position Independent Executable (PIE) support will allow to extend the
KASLR randomization range 0x8000.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 16 ++--
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S b/arch
Replace the %c constraint with %P. The %c is incompatible with PIE
because it implies an immediate value whereas %P reference a symbol.
Position Independent Executable (PIE) support will allow to extend the
KASLR randomization range 0x8000.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
arch
Replace the %c constraint with %P. The %c is incompatible with PIE
because it implies an immediate value whereas %P reference a symbol.
Position Independent Executable (PIE) support will allow to extend the
KASLR randomization range 0x8000.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
arch
Change the assembly code to use only relative references of symbols for the
kernel to be PIE compatible.
Position Independent Executable (PIE) support will allow to extend the
KASLR randomization range 0x8000.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
arch/x86/crypto/aes-x86_64-asm_64.S
Change the assembly code to use only relative references of symbols for the
kernel to be PIE compatible.
Position Independent Executable (PIE) support will allow to extend the
KASLR randomization range 0x8000.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S
Add a new _ASM_MOVABS macro to fetch a symbol address. It will be used
to replace "_ASM_MOV $, %dst" code construct that are not compatible
with PIE.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/a
On Mon, Jun 4, 2018 at 1:16 PM Steven Rostedt wrote:
>
> On Tue, 29 May 2018 15:15:22 -0700
> Thomas Garnier wrote:
>
> > When using -fPIE/PIC with function tracing, the compiler generates a
> > call through the GOT (call *__fentry__@GOTPCREL). This instruction
> >
On Mon, Jun 4, 2018 at 2:44 PM Steven Rostedt wrote:
>
> On Mon, 4 Jun 2018 14:06:03 -0700
> Thomas Garnier wrote:
>
> > On Mon, Jun 4, 2018 at 1:16 PM Steven Rostedt wrote:
> > >
> > > On Tue, 29 May 2018 15:15:22 -0700
> > > Thomas Garnier w
On Tue, Jun 5, 2018 at 9:56 AM Thomas Garnier wrote:
>
> On Mon, Jun 4, 2018 at 2:44 PM Steven Rostedt wrote:
> >
> > On Mon, 4 Jun 2018 14:06:03 -0700
> > Thomas Garnier wrote:
> >
> > > On Mon, Jun 4, 2018 at 1:16 PM Steven Rostedt wrote:
> > &
On Wed, Feb 6, 2019 at 11:56 AM Sean Christopherson
wrote:
>
> On Thu, Jan 31, 2019 at 11:24:26AM -0800, Thomas Garnier wrote:
> > Change the assembly code to use only relative references of symbols for the
> > kernel to be PIE compatible. The new __ASM_MOVABS macro is used to
&
On Fri, Feb 1, 2019 at 9:13 AM Thomas Garnier wrote:
>
> On Thu, Jan 31, 2019 at 6:31 PM Christopher Lameter wrote:
> >
> > On Thu, 31 Jan 2019, Thomas Garnier wrote:
> >
> > > The per-cpu symbols are in a section that is zero based to create
> > >
I am not super familiar with the sysfs setup here but the random
sequence should work as expected. One minor comment below.
Reviewed-by: Thomas Garnier
On Wed, Aug 19, 2020 at 1:26 PM Andrew Morton wrote:
>
>
> (cc Thomas and linux-mm)
>
> On Sat, 8 Aug 2020 13:50:
5 cycles
1 times kmalloc(32)/kfree -> 115 cycles
1 times kmalloc(64)/kfree -> 120 cycles
1 times kmalloc(128)/kfree -> 127 cycles
1 times kmalloc(256)/kfree -> 119 cycles
1 times kmalloc(512)/kfree -> 112 cycles
1 times kmalloc(1024)/kfree -> 112 cycles
100
This is RFC v1 for KASLR memory implementation on x86_64. It was reviewed
early by Kees Cook.
***Background:
The current implementation of KASLR randomizes only the base address of
the kernel and its modules. Research was published showing that static
memory can be overwitten to elevate privileges
to ensure each CPU can
start with a PGD aligned virtual address (for realmode).
x86/dump_pagetable was updated to correctly display each section.
Updated documentation on x86_64 memory layout accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
Based on next-20160413
---
Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm
CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG is not used, no space is reserved increasing the
entropy available.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
Based on next-20160413
---
arch/x86/Kconfig| 15 +++
arch/x86/mm/kaslr.c | 14 --
2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig
Minor change that allows early boot physical mapping of PUD level virtual
addresses. This change prepares usage of different virtual addresses for
KASLR memory randomization. It has no impact on default usage.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
Based on next-20160413
---
arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
Move the KASLR entropy functions in x86/libray to be used in early
kernel boot for KASLR memory randomization.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
Based on next-20160413
---
arch/x86/boot/compressed/aslr.c | 76 +++
arch/x86/include/asm/kaslr.h| 6
Thanks for the comments. I will address them in a v2 early next week.
If anyone has other comments, please let me know.
Thomas
On Fri, Apr 15, 2016 at 3:26 PM, Joe Perches wrote:
> On Fri, 2016-04-15 at 15:00 -0700, Andrew Morton wrote:
>> On Fri, 15 Apr 2016 10:25:59 -0700 Thoma
Any feedback on this patch proposal?
Thanks,
Thomas
On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 9:39 AM, Thomas Garnier wrote:
> This is PATCH v1 for KASLR memory implementation on x86_64. Minor changes
> were done based on RFC v1 comments.
>
> ***Background:
> The current implementation of KASLR
Move the KASLR entropy functions in x86/libray to be used in early
kernel boot for KASLR memory randomization.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
Based on next-20160502
---
arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c | 76 +++---
arch/x86/include/asm/kaslr.h | 6
Minor change that allows early boot physical mapping of PUD level virtual
addresses. This change prepares usage of different virtual addresses for
KASLR memory randomization. It has no impact on default usage.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
Based on next-20160502
---
arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
This is PATCH v2 for KASLR memory implementation for x86_64. Edit commit
based on recents testing against the KASLR bypass exploits & rebase on
next-20160502.
***Background:
The current implementation of KASLR randomizes only the base address of
the kernel and its modules. Research was published s
splay each section.
Updated documentation on x86_64 memory layout accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
Based on next-20160502
---
Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt | 4 +
arch/x86/Kconfig| 15
arch/x86/include/asm/kaslr.h| 12 +++
ar
CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG is not used, no space is reserved increasing the
entropy available.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
Based on next-20160502
---
arch/x86/Kconfig| 15 +++
arch/x86/mm/kaslr.c | 14 --
2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig
On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 2:58 PM, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 05/02/2016 02:41 PM, Thomas Garnier wrote:
>> Minor change that allows early boot physical mapping of PUD level virtual
>> addresses. This change prepares usage of different virtual addresses for
>> KASLR memory ran
n Mon, May 2, 2016 at 3:00 PM, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 05/02/2016 02:41 PM, Thomas Garnier wrote:
>> -#define __PAGE_OFFSET _AC(0x8800, UL)
>> +#define __PAGE_OFFSET_BASE _AC(0x8800, UL)
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY
s 97681.6 (1031.11)
Hackbench shows 0% difference on average (hackbench 90
repeated 10 times):
attemp,before,after
1,0.076,0.069
2,0.072,0.069
3,0.066,0.066
4,0.066,0.068
5,0.066,0.067
6,0.066,0.069
7,0.067,0.066
8,0.063,0.067
9,0.067,0.065
10,0.068,0.071
average,0.0677,0.0677
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
This is PATCH v3 for KASLR memory implementation for x86_64.
Recent changes:
Add performance information on commit.
Add details on PUD alignment.
Add information on testing against the KASLR bypass exploit.
Rebase on next-20160502.
***Background:
The current implementation of KASL
.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
Based on next-20160502
---
arch/x86/mm/init_64.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
index 89d9747..6adfbce 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
@@ -526,10
CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG is not used, no space is reserved increasing the
entropy available.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
Based on next-20160502
---
arch/x86/Kconfig| 15 +++
arch/x86/mm/kaslr.c | 14 --
2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig
Move the KASLR entropy functions in x86/libray to be used in early
kernel boot for KASLR memory randomization.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
Based on next-20160502
---
arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c | 76 +++---
arch/x86/include/asm/kaslr.h | 6
On Tue, May 10, 2016 at 11:24 AM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Tue, May 3, 2016 at 12:31 PM, Thomas Garnier wrote:
>> Add a new option (CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY_PHYSICAL_PADDING) to define
>> the padding used for the physical memory mapping section when KASLR
>> memory is enabled
On Tue, May 10, 2016 at 12:05 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Tue, May 3, 2016 at 12:31 PM, Thomas Garnier wrote:
>> Move the KASLR entropy functions in x86/libray to be used in early
>> kernel boot for KASLR memory randomization.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
>&
On Tue, May 10, 2016 at 11:53 AM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Tue, May 3, 2016 at 12:31 PM, Thomas Garnier wrote:
>> Randomizes the virtual address space of kernel memory sections (physical
>> memory mapping, vmalloc & vmemmap) for x86_64. This security feature
>> miti
On Thu, May 19, 2016 at 7:15 PM, Joonsoo Kim wrote:
> 2016-05-20 5:20 GMT+09:00 Thomas Garnier :
>> I ran the test given by Joonsoo and it gave me these minimum cycles
>> per size across 20 usage:
>
> I can't understand what you did here. Maybe, it's due to my poor
This is RFC v2 for the SLUB Freelist randomization. The patch is now based
on the Linux master branch (as the based SLAB patch was merged).
Changes since RFC v1:
- Redone slab_test testing to decide best entropy approach on new page
creation.
- Moved to use get_random_int as best approach to
functions are changed to align with the SLUB
implementation, now using get_random_* functions.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
Based on 0e01df100b6bf22a1de61b66657502a6454153c5
---
include/linux/slab_def.h | 11 +++-
mm/slab.c| 68
Time 102.47 (0.562732)
User Time 1045.3 (1.34263)
System Time 88.311 (0.342554)
Percent CPU 1105.8 (6.49444)
Context Switches 189081 (2355.78)
Sleeps 99231.5 (800.358)
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
Based on 0e01df100b6bf22a1de61b66657502a6454153c5
---
include/linux/slub_def.h | 8 +++
This is RFC v1 for the SLUB Freelist randomization.
***Background:
This proposal follows the previous SLAB Freelist patch submitted to next.
It resuses parts of previous implementation and keep a similar approach.
The kernel heap allocators are using a sequential freelist making their
allocation
-by: Thomas Garnier
---
Based on next-20160517
---
include/linux/slab_def.h | 11 +++-
mm/slab.c| 66 +---
mm/slab.h| 16
mm/slab_common.c | 50
4 files changed
1 - 100 of 457 matches
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