On Mon, 18 Apr 2016 12:52:30 -0700 Thomas Garnier wrote:
> I agree, if we had a generic way to pass entropy across boots on all
> architecture that would be amazing. I will let the SLAB maintainers to
> decide on requiring CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM or documenting it.
In our world,
On Mon, 18 Apr 2016 12:52:30 -0700 Thomas Garnier wrote:
> I agree, if we had a generic way to pass entropy across boots on all
> architecture that would be amazing. I will let the SLAB maintainers to
> decide on requiring CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM or documenting it.
In our world, requiring that sort
I agree, if we had a generic way to pass entropy across boots on all
architecture that would be amazing. I will let the SLAB maintainers to
decide on requiring CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM or documenting it.
On Mon, Apr 18, 2016 at 12:36 PM, Laura Abbott wrote:
> On 04/18/2016 08:59
I agree, if we had a generic way to pass entropy across boots on all
architecture that would be amazing. I will let the SLAB maintainers to
decide on requiring CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM or documenting it.
On Mon, Apr 18, 2016 at 12:36 PM, Laura Abbott wrote:
> On 04/18/2016 08:59 AM, Thomas Garnier
On 04/18/2016 08:59 AM, Thomas Garnier wrote:
I will send the next version today. Note that I get_random_bytes_arch
is used because at that stage we have 0 bits of entropy. It seemed
like a better idea to use the arch version that will fallback on
get_random_bytes sub API in the worse case.
On 04/18/2016 08:59 AM, Thomas Garnier wrote:
I will send the next version today. Note that I get_random_bytes_arch
is used because at that stage we have 0 bits of entropy. It seemed
like a better idea to use the arch version that will fallback on
get_random_bytes sub API in the worse case.
I will send the next version today. Note that I get_random_bytes_arch
is used because at that stage we have 0 bits of entropy. It seemed
like a better idea to use the arch version that will fallback on
get_random_bytes sub API in the worse case.
On Fri, Apr 15, 2016 at 3:47 PM, Thomas Garnier
I will send the next version today. Note that I get_random_bytes_arch
is used because at that stage we have 0 bits of entropy. It seemed
like a better idea to use the arch version that will fallback on
get_random_bytes sub API in the worse case.
On Fri, Apr 15, 2016 at 3:47 PM, Thomas Garnier
Thanks for the comments. I will address them in a v2 early next week.
If anyone has other comments, please let me know.
Thomas
On Fri, Apr 15, 2016 at 3:26 PM, Joe Perches wrote:
> On Fri, 2016-04-15 at 15:00 -0700, Andrew Morton wrote:
>> On Fri, 15 Apr 2016 10:25:59 -0700
Thanks for the comments. I will address them in a v2 early next week.
If anyone has other comments, please let me know.
Thomas
On Fri, Apr 15, 2016 at 3:26 PM, Joe Perches wrote:
> On Fri, 2016-04-15 at 15:00 -0700, Andrew Morton wrote:
>> On Fri, 15 Apr 2016 10:25:59 -0700 Thomas Garnier
>>
On Fri, 2016-04-15 at 15:00 -0700, Andrew Morton wrote:
> On Fri, 15 Apr 2016 10:25:59 -0700 Thomas Garnier wrote:
> > Provide an optional config (CONFIG_FREELIST_RANDOM) to randomize the
> > SLAB freelist. The list is randomized during initialization of a new set
> > of
On Fri, 2016-04-15 at 15:00 -0700, Andrew Morton wrote:
> On Fri, 15 Apr 2016 10:25:59 -0700 Thomas Garnier wrote:
> > Provide an optional config (CONFIG_FREELIST_RANDOM) to randomize the
> > SLAB freelist. The list is randomized during initialization of a new set
> > of pages. The order on
On Fri, 15 Apr 2016 10:25:59 -0700 Thomas Garnier wrote:
> Provide an optional config (CONFIG_FREELIST_RANDOM) to randomize the
> SLAB freelist. The list is randomized during initialization of a new set
> of pages. The order on different freelist sizes is pre-computed at
On Fri, 15 Apr 2016 10:25:59 -0700 Thomas Garnier wrote:
> Provide an optional config (CONFIG_FREELIST_RANDOM) to randomize the
> SLAB freelist. The list is randomized during initialization of a new set
> of pages. The order on different freelist sizes is pre-computed at boot
> for performance.
Provide an optional config (CONFIG_FREELIST_RANDOM) to randomize the
SLAB freelist. The list is randomized during initialization of a new set
of pages. The order on different freelist sizes is pre-computed at boot
for performance. This security feature reduces the predictability of the
kernel SLAB
Provide an optional config (CONFIG_FREELIST_RANDOM) to randomize the
SLAB freelist. The list is randomized during initialization of a new set
of pages. The order on different freelist sizes is pre-computed at boot
for performance. This security feature reduces the predictability of the
kernel SLAB
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