Re: [PATCH v2 3/4] x86, boot: Implement ASLR for kernel memory sections (x86_64)

2016-05-03 Thread Thomas Garnier
I don't see much difference. I will update the commits on next iteration with the following: Kernbench shows almost no difference (-+ less than 1%): Before: Average Optimal load -j 12 Run (std deviation): Elapsed Time 102.63 (1.2695) User Time 1034.89 (1.18115) System Time 87.056 (0.456416)

Re: [PATCH v2 3/4] x86, boot: Implement ASLR for kernel memory sections (x86_64)

2016-05-03 Thread Thomas Garnier
I don't see much difference. I will update the commits on next iteration with the following: Kernbench shows almost no difference (-+ less than 1%): Before: Average Optimal load -j 12 Run (std deviation): Elapsed Time 102.63 (1.2695) User Time 1034.89 (1.18115) System Time 87.056 (0.456416)

Re: [PATCH v2 3/4] x86, boot: Implement ASLR for kernel memory sections (x86_64)

2016-05-02 Thread Dave Hansen
On 05/02/2016 02:41 PM, Thomas Garnier wrote: > -#define __PAGE_OFFSET _AC(0x8800, UL) > +#define __PAGE_OFFSET_BASE _AC(0x8800, UL) > +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY > +#define __PAGE_OFFSET page_offset_base > +#else > +#define __PAGE_OFFSET

Re: [PATCH v2 3/4] x86, boot: Implement ASLR for kernel memory sections (x86_64)

2016-05-02 Thread Dave Hansen
On 05/02/2016 02:41 PM, Thomas Garnier wrote: > -#define __PAGE_OFFSET _AC(0x8800, UL) > +#define __PAGE_OFFSET_BASE _AC(0x8800, UL) > +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY > +#define __PAGE_OFFSET page_offset_base > +#else > +#define __PAGE_OFFSET

[PATCH v2 3/4] x86, boot: Implement ASLR for kernel memory sections (x86_64)

2016-05-02 Thread Thomas Garnier
Randomizes the virtual address space of kernel memory sections (physical memory mapping, vmalloc & vmemmap) for x86_64. This security feature mitigates exploits relying on predictable kernel addresses. These addresses can be used to disclose the kernel modules base addresses or corrupt specific

[PATCH v2 3/4] x86, boot: Implement ASLR for kernel memory sections (x86_64)

2016-05-02 Thread Thomas Garnier
Randomizes the virtual address space of kernel memory sections (physical memory mapping, vmalloc & vmemmap) for x86_64. This security feature mitigates exploits relying on predictable kernel addresses. These addresses can be used to disclose the kernel modules base addresses or corrupt specific