Re: [PATCH v3 3/4] x86, boot: Implement ASLR for kernel memory sections (x86_64)

2016-05-10 Thread Thomas Garnier
On Tue, May 10, 2016 at 11:53 AM, Kees Cook wrote: > On Tue, May 3, 2016 at 12:31 PM, Thomas Garnier wrote: >> Randomizes the virtual address space of kernel memory sections (physical >> memory mapping, vmalloc & vmemmap) for x86_64. This security

Re: [PATCH v3 3/4] x86, boot: Implement ASLR for kernel memory sections (x86_64)

2016-05-10 Thread Thomas Garnier
On Tue, May 10, 2016 at 11:53 AM, Kees Cook wrote: > On Tue, May 3, 2016 at 12:31 PM, Thomas Garnier wrote: >> Randomizes the virtual address space of kernel memory sections (physical >> memory mapping, vmalloc & vmemmap) for x86_64. This security feature >> mitigates exploits relying on

Re: [PATCH v3 3/4] x86, boot: Implement ASLR for kernel memory sections (x86_64)

2016-05-10 Thread Kees Cook
On Tue, May 3, 2016 at 12:31 PM, Thomas Garnier wrote: > Randomizes the virtual address space of kernel memory sections (physical > memory mapping, vmalloc & vmemmap) for x86_64. This security feature > mitigates exploits relying on predictable kernel addresses. These >

Re: [PATCH v3 3/4] x86, boot: Implement ASLR for kernel memory sections (x86_64)

2016-05-10 Thread Kees Cook
On Tue, May 3, 2016 at 12:31 PM, Thomas Garnier wrote: > Randomizes the virtual address space of kernel memory sections (physical > memory mapping, vmalloc & vmemmap) for x86_64. This security feature > mitigates exploits relying on predictable kernel addresses. These > addresses can be used to

[PATCH v3 3/4] x86, boot: Implement ASLR for kernel memory sections (x86_64)

2016-05-03 Thread Thomas Garnier
Randomizes the virtual address space of kernel memory sections (physical memory mapping, vmalloc & vmemmap) for x86_64. This security feature mitigates exploits relying on predictable kernel addresses. These addresses can be used to disclose the kernel modules base addresses or corrupt specific

[PATCH v3 3/4] x86, boot: Implement ASLR for kernel memory sections (x86_64)

2016-05-03 Thread Thomas Garnier
Randomizes the virtual address space of kernel memory sections (physical memory mapping, vmalloc & vmemmap) for x86_64. This security feature mitigates exploits relying on predictable kernel addresses. These addresses can be used to disclose the kernel modules base addresses or corrupt specific