Re: [PATCH v4 3/4] x86, boot: Implement ASLR for kernel memory sections (x86_64)

2016-05-12 Thread Thomas Garnier
Sorry about that. I will fix and send a new iteration this afternoon. Thomas On Thu, May 12, 2016 at 9:27 AM, kbuild test robot wrote: > Hi, > > [auto build test ERROR on next-20160512] > [cannot apply to tip/x86/core v4.6-rc7 v4.6-rc6 v4.6-rc5 v4.6-rc7] > [if your patch is

Re: [PATCH v4 3/4] x86, boot: Implement ASLR for kernel memory sections (x86_64)

2016-05-12 Thread Thomas Garnier
Sorry about that. I will fix and send a new iteration this afternoon. Thomas On Thu, May 12, 2016 at 9:27 AM, kbuild test robot wrote: > Hi, > > [auto build test ERROR on next-20160512] > [cannot apply to tip/x86/core v4.6-rc7 v4.6-rc6 v4.6-rc5 v4.6-rc7] > [if your patch is applied to the wrong

Re: [PATCH v4 3/4] x86, boot: Implement ASLR for kernel memory sections (x86_64)

2016-05-12 Thread kbuild test robot
Hi, [auto build test ERROR on next-20160512] [cannot apply to tip/x86/core v4.6-rc7 v4.6-rc6 v4.6-rc5 v4.6-rc7] [if your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, please drop us a note to help improving the system] url:

Re: [PATCH v4 3/4] x86, boot: Implement ASLR for kernel memory sections (x86_64)

2016-05-12 Thread kbuild test robot
Hi, [auto build test ERROR on next-20160512] [cannot apply to tip/x86/core v4.6-rc7 v4.6-rc6 v4.6-rc5 v4.6-rc7] [if your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, please drop us a note to help improving the system] url:

[PATCH v4 3/4] x86, boot: Implement ASLR for kernel memory sections (x86_64)

2016-05-12 Thread Thomas Garnier
Randomizes the virtual address space of kernel memory sections (physical memory mapping, vmalloc & vmemmap) for x86_64. This security feature mitigates exploits relying on predictable kernel addresses. These addresses can be used to disclose the kernel modules base addresses or corrupt specific

[PATCH v4 3/4] x86, boot: Implement ASLR for kernel memory sections (x86_64)

2016-05-12 Thread Thomas Garnier
Randomizes the virtual address space of kernel memory sections (physical memory mapping, vmalloc & vmemmap) for x86_64. This security feature mitigates exploits relying on predictable kernel addresses. These addresses can be used to disclose the kernel modules base addresses or corrupt specific