[PATCH 04/24] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down

2018-04-11 Thread David Howells
If the kernel is locked down, require that all modules have valid
signatures that we can verify or that IMA can validate the file.

I have adjusted the errors generated:

 (1) If there's no signature (ENODATA) or we can't check it (ENOPKG,
 ENOKEY), then:

 (a) If signatures are enforced then EKEYREJECTED is returned.

 (b) If IMA will have validated the image, return 0 (okay).

 (c) If there's no signature or we can't check it, but the kernel is
 locked down then EPERM is returned (this is then consistent with
 other lockdown cases).

 (2) If the signature is unparseable (EBADMSG, EINVAL), the signature fails
 the check (EKEYREJECTED) or a system error occurs (eg. ENOMEM), we
 return the error we got.

Note that the X.509 code doesn't check for key expiry as the RTC might not
be valid or might not have been transferred to the kernel's clock yet.

Signed-off-by: David Howells 
Reviewed-by: Jiri Bohac 
cc: "Lee, Chun-Yi" 
cc: James Morris 
---

 kernel/module.c |   56 ++-
 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index a6e43a5806a1..9c1709a05037 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@
 #include 
 #include 
 #include 
+#include 
 #include 
 #include "module-internal.h"
 
@@ -2761,10 +2762,12 @@ static inline void kmemleak_load_module(const struct 
module *mod,
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
-static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
+static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags,
+   bool can_do_ima_check)
 {
-   int err = -ENOKEY;
+   int err = -ENODATA;
const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
+   const char *reason;
const void *mod = info->hdr;
 
/*
@@ -2779,19 +2782,46 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int 
flags)
err = mod_verify_sig(mod, >len);
}
 
-   if (!err) {
+   switch (err) {
+   case 0:
info->sig_ok = true;
return 0;
-   }
 
-   /* Not having a signature is only an error if we're strict. */
-   if (err == -ENOKEY && !sig_enforce)
-   err = 0;
+   /* We don't permit modules to be loaded into trusted kernels
+* without a valid signature on them, but if we're not
+* enforcing, certain errors are non-fatal.
+*/
+   case -ENODATA:
+   reason = "Loading of unsigned module";
+   goto decide;
+   case -ENOPKG:
+   reason = "Loading of module with unsupported crypto";
+   goto decide;
+   case -ENOKEY:
+   reason = "Loading of module with unavailable key";
+   decide:
+   if (sig_enforce) {
+   pr_notice("%s is rejected\n", reason);
+   return -EKEYREJECTED;
+   }
 
-   return err;
+   if (can_do_ima_check && is_ima_appraise_enabled())
+   return 0;
+   if (kernel_is_locked_down(reason))
+   return -EPERM;
+   return 0;
+
+   /* All other errors are fatal, including nomem, unparseable
+* signatures and signature check failures - even if signatures
+* aren't required.
+*/
+   default:
+   return err;
+   }
 }
 #else /* !CONFIG_MODULE_SIG */
-static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
+static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags,
+   bool can_do_ima_check)
 {
return 0;
 }
@@ -3651,13 +3681,13 @@ static int unknown_module_param_cb(char *param, char 
*val, const char *modname,
 /* Allocate and load the module: note that size of section 0 is always
zero, and we rely on this for optional sections. */
 static int load_module(struct load_info *info, const char __user *uargs,
-  int flags)
+  int flags, bool can_do_ima_check)
 {
struct module *mod;
long err;
char *after_dashes;
 
-   err = module_sig_check(info, flags);
+   err = module_sig_check(info, flags, can_do_ima_check);
if (err)
goto free_copy;
 
@@ -3846,7 +3876,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(init_module, void __user *, umod,
if (err)
return err;
 
-   return load_module(, uargs, 0);
+   return load_module(, uargs, 0, false);
 }
 
 SYSCALL_DEFINE3(finit_module, int, fd, const char __user *, uargs, int, flags)
@@ -3873,7 +3903,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(finit_module, int, fd, const char __user 
*, uargs, int, flags)
info.hdr = hdr;
info.len = size;
 
-   return load_module(, uargs, flags);
+   return 

[PATCH 04/24] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down

2018-04-11 Thread David Howells
If the kernel is locked down, require that all modules have valid
signatures that we can verify or that IMA can validate the file.

I have adjusted the errors generated:

 (1) If there's no signature (ENODATA) or we can't check it (ENOPKG,
 ENOKEY), then:

 (a) If signatures are enforced then EKEYREJECTED is returned.

 (b) If IMA will have validated the image, return 0 (okay).

 (c) If there's no signature or we can't check it, but the kernel is
 locked down then EPERM is returned (this is then consistent with
 other lockdown cases).

 (2) If the signature is unparseable (EBADMSG, EINVAL), the signature fails
 the check (EKEYREJECTED) or a system error occurs (eg. ENOMEM), we
 return the error we got.

Note that the X.509 code doesn't check for key expiry as the RTC might not
be valid or might not have been transferred to the kernel's clock yet.

Signed-off-by: David Howells 
Reviewed-by: Jiri Bohac 
cc: "Lee, Chun-Yi" 
cc: James Morris 
---

 kernel/module.c |   56 ++-
 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index a6e43a5806a1..9c1709a05037 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@
 #include 
 #include 
 #include 
+#include 
 #include 
 #include "module-internal.h"
 
@@ -2761,10 +2762,12 @@ static inline void kmemleak_load_module(const struct 
module *mod,
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
-static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
+static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags,
+   bool can_do_ima_check)
 {
-   int err = -ENOKEY;
+   int err = -ENODATA;
const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
+   const char *reason;
const void *mod = info->hdr;
 
/*
@@ -2779,19 +2782,46 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int 
flags)
err = mod_verify_sig(mod, >len);
}
 
-   if (!err) {
+   switch (err) {
+   case 0:
info->sig_ok = true;
return 0;
-   }
 
-   /* Not having a signature is only an error if we're strict. */
-   if (err == -ENOKEY && !sig_enforce)
-   err = 0;
+   /* We don't permit modules to be loaded into trusted kernels
+* without a valid signature on them, but if we're not
+* enforcing, certain errors are non-fatal.
+*/
+   case -ENODATA:
+   reason = "Loading of unsigned module";
+   goto decide;
+   case -ENOPKG:
+   reason = "Loading of module with unsupported crypto";
+   goto decide;
+   case -ENOKEY:
+   reason = "Loading of module with unavailable key";
+   decide:
+   if (sig_enforce) {
+   pr_notice("%s is rejected\n", reason);
+   return -EKEYREJECTED;
+   }
 
-   return err;
+   if (can_do_ima_check && is_ima_appraise_enabled())
+   return 0;
+   if (kernel_is_locked_down(reason))
+   return -EPERM;
+   return 0;
+
+   /* All other errors are fatal, including nomem, unparseable
+* signatures and signature check failures - even if signatures
+* aren't required.
+*/
+   default:
+   return err;
+   }
 }
 #else /* !CONFIG_MODULE_SIG */
-static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
+static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags,
+   bool can_do_ima_check)
 {
return 0;
 }
@@ -3651,13 +3681,13 @@ static int unknown_module_param_cb(char *param, char 
*val, const char *modname,
 /* Allocate and load the module: note that size of section 0 is always
zero, and we rely on this for optional sections. */
 static int load_module(struct load_info *info, const char __user *uargs,
-  int flags)
+  int flags, bool can_do_ima_check)
 {
struct module *mod;
long err;
char *after_dashes;
 
-   err = module_sig_check(info, flags);
+   err = module_sig_check(info, flags, can_do_ima_check);
if (err)
goto free_copy;
 
@@ -3846,7 +3876,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(init_module, void __user *, umod,
if (err)
return err;
 
-   return load_module(, uargs, 0);
+   return load_module(, uargs, 0, false);
 }
 
 SYSCALL_DEFINE3(finit_module, int, fd, const char __user *, uargs, int, flags)
@@ -3873,7 +3903,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(finit_module, int, fd, const char __user 
*, uargs, int, flags)
info.hdr = hdr;
info.len = size;
 
-   return load_module(, uargs, flags);
+   return load_module(, uargs, flags, true);
 }
 
 static inline int within(unsigned long addr, 

[PATCH 04/24] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down

2017-04-05 Thread David Howells
If the kernel is locked down, require that all modules have valid
signatures that we can verify.

Signed-off-by: David Howells 
---

 kernel/module.c |2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index 7eba6dea4f41..3331f2eb9b93 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -2756,7 +2756,7 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int 
flags)
}
 
/* Not having a signature is only an error if we're strict. */
-   if (err == -ENOKEY && !sig_enforce)
+   if (err == -ENOKEY && !sig_enforce && !kernel_is_locked_down())
err = 0;
 
return err;



[PATCH 04/24] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down

2017-04-05 Thread David Howells
If the kernel is locked down, require that all modules have valid
signatures that we can verify.

Signed-off-by: David Howells 
---

 kernel/module.c |2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index 7eba6dea4f41..3331f2eb9b93 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -2756,7 +2756,7 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int 
flags)
}
 
/* Not having a signature is only an error if we're strict. */
-   if (err == -ENOKEY && !sig_enforce)
+   if (err == -ENOKEY && !sig_enforce && !kernel_is_locked_down())
err = 0;
 
return err;



[PATCH 04/24] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down

2017-04-05 Thread David Howells
If the kernel is locked down, require that all modules have valid
signatures that we can verify.

Signed-off-by: David Howells 
---

 kernel/module.c |2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index 7eba6dea4f41..3331f2eb9b93 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -2756,7 +2756,7 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int 
flags)
}
 
/* Not having a signature is only an error if we're strict. */
-   if (err == -ENOKEY && !sig_enforce)
+   if (err == -ENOKEY && !sig_enforce && !kernel_is_locked_down())
err = 0;
 
return err;



[PATCH 04/24] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down

2017-04-05 Thread David Howells
If the kernel is locked down, require that all modules have valid
signatures that we can verify.

Signed-off-by: David Howells 
---

 kernel/module.c |2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index 7eba6dea4f41..3331f2eb9b93 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -2756,7 +2756,7 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int 
flags)
}
 
/* Not having a signature is only an error if we're strict. */
-   if (err == -ENOKEY && !sig_enforce)
+   if (err == -ENOKEY && !sig_enforce && !kernel_is_locked_down())
err = 0;
 
return err;



[PATCH 04/24] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down

2017-04-05 Thread David Howells
If the kernel is locked down, require that all modules have valid
signatures that we can verify.

Signed-off-by: David Howells 
---

 kernel/module.c |2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index 7eba6dea4f41..3331f2eb9b93 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -2756,7 +2756,7 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int 
flags)
}
 
/* Not having a signature is only an error if we're strict. */
-   if (err == -ENOKEY && !sig_enforce)
+   if (err == -ENOKEY && !sig_enforce && !kernel_is_locked_down())
err = 0;
 
return err;



[PATCH 04/24] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down

2017-04-05 Thread David Howells
If the kernel is locked down, require that all modules have valid
signatures that we can verify.

Signed-off-by: David Howells 
---

 kernel/module.c |2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index 7eba6dea4f41..3331f2eb9b93 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -2756,7 +2756,7 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int 
flags)
}
 
/* Not having a signature is only an error if we're strict. */
-   if (err == -ENOKEY && !sig_enforce)
+   if (err == -ENOKEY && !sig_enforce && !kernel_is_locked_down())
err = 0;
 
return err;