On Tue, 2017-04-18 at 16:30 +0100, David Howells wrote:
> Ben Hutchings wrote:
>
> > So it's generally not going to be OK to turn off debugfs. There will
> > probably need to be a distinction between believed-safe and unsafe
> > directories/files.
>
> Any suggestion on
On Tue, 2017-04-18 at 16:30 +0100, David Howells wrote:
> Ben Hutchings wrote:
>
> > So it's generally not going to be OK to turn off debugfs. There will
> > probably need to be a distinction between believed-safe and unsafe
> > directories/files.
>
> Any suggestion on how to mark this
Ben Hutchings wrote:
> > Shouldn't this now appear under /sys/kernel/tracing/ ?
>
> True, but old tracing scripts didn't go away.
Conversion to a symlink would fix that.
David
Ben Hutchings wrote:
> > Shouldn't this now appear under /sys/kernel/tracing/ ?
>
> True, but old tracing scripts didn't go away.
Conversion to a symlink would fix that.
David
Ben Hutchings wrote:
> So it's generally not going to be OK to turn off debugfs. There will
> probably need to be a distinction between believed-safe and unsafe
> directories/files.
Any suggestion on how to mark this distinction? I'd prefer not to modify
every read/write
Ben Hutchings wrote:
> So it's generally not going to be OK to turn off debugfs. There will
> probably need to be a distinction between believed-safe and unsafe
> directories/files.
Any suggestion on how to mark this distinction? I'd prefer not to modify
every read/write op associated with a
On Tue, 2017-04-18 at 15:55 +0100, David Howells wrote:
> Ben Hutchings wrote:
>
> > - tracing (now tracefs, but it's expected to appear under debugfs)
>
> Shouldn't this now appear under /sys/kernel/tracing/ ?
True, but old tracing scripts didn't go away.
Ben.
--
Ben
On Tue, 2017-04-18 at 15:55 +0100, David Howells wrote:
> Ben Hutchings wrote:
>
> > - tracing (now tracefs, but it's expected to appear under debugfs)
>
> Shouldn't this now appear under /sys/kernel/tracing/ ?
True, but old tracing scripts didn't go away.
Ben.
--
Ben Hutchings
The world is
Ben Hutchings wrote:
> - tracing (now tracefs, but it's expected to appear under debugfs)
Shouldn't this now appear under /sys/kernel/tracing/ ?
David
Ben Hutchings wrote:
> - tracing (now tracefs, but it's expected to appear under debugfs)
Shouldn't this now appear under /sys/kernel/tracing/ ?
David
On Tue, 2017-04-18 at 09:06 +0300, Andy Shevchenko wrote:
> > On Mon, Apr 10, 2017 at 4:16 PM, David Howells wrote:
> > > > Andy Shevchenko wrote:
> >
> > > > > It looks a bit fragile when responsility of whatever reasons kernel
> > > > > can't
On Tue, 2017-04-18 at 09:06 +0300, Andy Shevchenko wrote:
> > On Mon, Apr 10, 2017 at 4:16 PM, David Howells wrote:
> > > > Andy Shevchenko wrote:
> >
> > > > > It looks a bit fragile when responsility of whatever reasons kernel
> > > > > can't serve become a driver burden.
> > > > > Can we fix
On Mon, Apr 10, 2017 at 4:16 PM, David Howells wrote:
> Andy Shevchenko wrote:
>
>> >> It looks a bit fragile when responsility of whatever reasons kernel
>> >> can't serve become a driver burden.
>> >> Can we fix this in debugfs framework instead?
On Mon, Apr 10, 2017 at 4:16 PM, David Howells wrote:
> Andy Shevchenko wrote:
>
>> >> It looks a bit fragile when responsility of whatever reasons kernel
>> >> can't serve become a driver burden.
>> >> Can we fix this in debugfs framework instead?
>> >
>> > Fix it with debugfs how? We can't
Andy Shevchenko wrote:
> >> It looks a bit fragile when responsility of whatever reasons kernel
> >> can't serve become a driver burden.
> >> Can we fix this in debugfs framework instead?
> >
> > Fix it with debugfs how? We can't offload the decision to userspace.
>
Andy Shevchenko wrote:
> >> It looks a bit fragile when responsility of whatever reasons kernel
> >> can't serve become a driver burden.
> >> Can we fix this in debugfs framework instead?
> >
> > Fix it with debugfs how? We can't offload the decision to userspace.
>
> I mean to do at least
On Fri, Apr 7, 2017 at 3:50 PM, David Howells wrote:
> Andy Shevchenko wrote:
>
>> > From: Matthew Garrett
>> >
>> > We have no way of validating what all of the Asus WMI methods do on a given
>> > machine - and there's
On Fri, Apr 7, 2017 at 3:50 PM, David Howells wrote:
> Andy Shevchenko wrote:
>
>> > From: Matthew Garrett
>> >
>> > We have no way of validating what all of the Asus WMI methods do on a given
>> > machine - and there's a risk that some will allow hardware state to be
>> > manipulated in such a
Andy Shevchenko wrote:
> > From: Matthew Garrett
> >
> > We have no way of validating what all of the Asus WMI methods do on a given
> > machine - and there's a risk that some will allow hardware state to be
> > manipulated in such a way
Andy Shevchenko wrote:
> > From: Matthew Garrett
> >
> > We have no way of validating what all of the Asus WMI methods do on a given
> > machine - and there's a risk that some will allow hardware state to be
> > manipulated in such a way that arbitrary code can be executed in the
> > kernel,
On Wed, Apr 5, 2017 at 11:16 PM, David Howells wrote:
> From: Matthew Garrett
>
> We have no way of validating what all of the Asus WMI methods do on a given
> machine - and there's a risk that some will allow hardware state to be
> manipulated in
On Wed, Apr 5, 2017 at 11:16 PM, David Howells wrote:
> From: Matthew Garrett
>
> We have no way of validating what all of the Asus WMI methods do on a given
> machine - and there's a risk that some will allow hardware state to be
> manipulated in such a way that arbitrary code can be executed
From: Matthew Garrett
We have no way of validating what all of the Asus WMI methods do on a given
machine - and there's a risk that some will allow hardware state to be
manipulated in such a way that arbitrary code can be executed in the
kernel, circumventing module
From: Matthew Garrett
We have no way of validating what all of the Asus WMI methods do on a given
machine - and there's a risk that some will allow hardware state to be
manipulated in such a way that arbitrary code can be executed in the
kernel, circumventing module loading restrictions.
From: Matthew Garrett
We have no way of validating what all of the Asus WMI methods do on a given
machine - and there's a risk that some will allow hardware state to be
manipulated in such a way that arbitrary code can be executed in the
kernel, circumventing module
From: Matthew Garrett
We have no way of validating what all of the Asus WMI methods do on a given
machine - and there's a risk that some will allow hardware state to be
manipulated in such a way that arbitrary code can be executed in the
kernel, circumventing module loading restrictions.
26 matches
Mail list logo