On Tue, Jun 11, 2024 at 01:20:40AM -0700, Jonathan Calmels wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 10, 2024 at 08:00:57AM GMT, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> >
> > Now, one thing that does occur to me here is that there is a
> > very mild form of sendmail-capabilities vulnerability that
> > could happen here. Unpriv user
On Mon, Jun 10, 2024 at 08:00:57AM GMT, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>
> Now, one thing that does occur to me here is that there is a
> very mild form of sendmail-capabilities vulnerability that
> could happen here. Unpriv user joe can drop CAP_SYS_ADMIN
> from cap_userns, then run a setuid-root progra
On Sun, Jun 09, 2024 at 03:43:34AM -0700, Jonathan Calmels wrote:
> Attackers often rely on user namespaces to get elevated (yet confined)
> privileges in order to target specific subsystems (e.g. [1]). Distributions
> have been pretty adamant that they need a way to configure these, most of
> them
On Mon, Jun 10, 2024 at 01:47:13AM -0700, Jonathan Calmels wrote:
> On Sun, Jun 09, 2024 at 08:50:24PM GMT, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > On Sun, Jun 09, 2024 at 03:43:34AM -0700, Jonathan Calmels wrote:
> > > Attackers often rely on user namespaces to get elevated (yet confined)
> > > privileges in o
On Sun, Jun 09, 2024 at 08:50:24PM GMT, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> On Sun, Jun 09, 2024 at 03:43:34AM -0700, Jonathan Calmels wrote:
> > Attackers often rely on user namespaces to get elevated (yet confined)
> > privileges in order to target specific subsystems (e.g. [1]). Distributions
>
> I'd modi
On Sun, Jun 09, 2024 at 03:43:34AM -0700, Jonathan Calmels wrote:
(Adding amorgan as he doesn't seem to be on cc list)
> Attackers often rely on user namespaces to get elevated (yet confined)
> privileges in order to target specific subsystems (e.g. [1]). Distributions
I'd modify this to say "in
Attackers often rely on user namespaces to get elevated (yet confined)
privileges in order to target specific subsystems (e.g. [1]). Distributions
have been pretty adamant that they need a way to configure these, most of
them carry out-of-tree patches to do so, or plainly refuse to enable them.
As
