On Wednesday 23 March 2011, John Calixto wrote:
>
> On Wed, 23 Mar 2011, Michał Mirosław wrote:
> > When you grant write access to a device to some user, you should
> > expect that it is all you are granting. There shouldn't be any hidden
> > doors that, for example, if underlying device is SD car
On Wed, 23 Mar 2011, Michał Mirosław wrote:
> When you grant write access to a device to some user, you should
> expect that it is all you are granting. There shouldn't be any hidden
> doors that, for example, if underlying device is SD card then you can
> destroy it by this ioctl(). Not counting w
W dniu 22 marca 2011 23:31 użytkownik John Calixto
napisał:
> On Tue, 22 Mar 2011, Michał Mirosław wrote:
>> >> It is not that unusual on "normal systems" to give write access to
>> >> some partition or device to unprivileged users. Database volumes are
>> >> one example.
>> > Are you talking abou
On Tue, 22 Mar 2011, Michał Mirosław wrote:
> >> In this case, a process having access to one partition can disrupt
> >> other partitions on the same card even if it has no access to them in
> >> any other way.
> > This is true, but I can already wreak havoc on partitions for any block
> > device b
W dniu 21 marca 2011 19:37 użytkownik John Calixto
napisał:
> On Sat, 19 Mar 2011, Michał Mirosław wrote:
>> W dniu 18 marca 2011 20:26 użytkownik Arnd Bergmann napisał:
>> > On Friday 18 March 2011 18:56:53 Michał Mirosław wrote:
>> >> If that's going to be used by possibly unprivileged userspac
On Sat, 19 Mar 2011, Michał Mirosław wrote:
> W dniu 18 marca 2011 20:26 użytkownik Arnd Bergmann napisał:
> > On Friday 18 March 2011 18:56:53 Michał Mirosław wrote:
> >> If that's going to be used by possibly unprivileged userspace process,
> >> then this passthrough should filter and validate a
On Saturday 19 March 2011, Michał Mirosław wrote:
> W dniu 18 marca 2011 20:26 użytkownik Arnd Bergmann napisał:
> > On Friday 18 March 2011 18:56:53 Michał Mirosław wrote:
> >> If that's going to be used by possibly unprivileged userspace process,
> >> then this passthrough should filter and vali
W dniu 18 marca 2011 20:26 użytkownik Arnd Bergmann napisał:
> On Friday 18 March 2011 18:56:53 Michał Mirosław wrote:
>> If that's going to be used by possibly unprivileged userspace process,
>> then this passthrough should filter and validate all commands it
>> passes to hardware. If there is a
Hi,
On Sat, Mar 19 2011, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
> Chris, do you prefer to leave the new export as EXPORT_SYMBOL
> along wiht the others or to use EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL?
Let's just use EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL() for all new exports, and leave the
older ones as they are.
Thanks,
- Chris.
--
Chris Ball <
On Saturday 19 March 2011, John Calixto wrote:
> > > -static int mmc_app_cmd(struct mmc_host *host, struct mmc_card *card)
> > > +int mmc_app_cmd(struct mmc_host *host, struct mmc_card *card)
> > > {
> > > int err;
> > > struct mmc_command cmd;
> > > @@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ static int m
Hello Arnd,
I need some clarification on the last bit of your initial feedback below:
On Thu, 17 Mar 2011, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
> On Thursday 17 March 2011 19:28:55 John Calixto wrote:
> > diff --git a/drivers/mmc/core/sd_ops.c b/drivers/mmc/core/sd_ops.c
> > index 797cdb5..0453dcd 100644
> >
On Friday 18 March 2011 18:56:53 Michał Mirosław wrote:
> If that's going to be used by possibly unprivileged userspace process,
> then this passthrough should filter and validate all commands it
> passes to hardware. If there is a possibility of some command sequence
> to generate undefined or oth
On Friday 18 March 2011 18:32:41 John Calixto wrote:
> I started down that route, but part of the problem with putting any more
> than a simple passthrough in kernel space is that the CPRM algorithms
> live in the next highest logic layer, and 4C licensees are not allowed
> to reveal those algorith
2011/3/18 John Calixto :
>> -Original Message-
>> From: Arnd Bergmann [mailto:a...@arndb.de]
>> Sent: Thursday, March 17, 2011 2:56 PM
>> To: John Calixto
>> Cc: linux-mmc@vger.kernel.org; c...@laptop.org
>> Subject: Re: [PATCH resend] mmc: Added io
Hello Arnd,
> -Original Message-
> From: Arnd Bergmann [mailto:a...@arndb.de]
> Sent: Thursday, March 17, 2011 2:56 PM
> To: John Calixto
> Cc: linux-mmc@vger.kernel.org; c...@laptop.org
> Subject: Re: [PATCH resend] mmc: Added ioctl to let userspace apps send ACMDs
On Thursday 17 March 2011 19:28:55 John Calixto wrote:
> Part 3 of the SD Specification (SD Card Association; www.sdcard.org) describes
> how to use the security function of an SD card using application specific
> commands in conjunction with CPRM algorithms and keys licensed from the 4C
> Entity (
On Thu, Mar 17, 2011 at 11:28:55AM -0700, John Calixto wrote:
> Part 3 of the SD Specification (SD Card Association; www.sdcard.org) describes
> how to use the security function of an SD card using application specific
> commands in conjunction with CPRM algorithms and keys licensed from the 4C
> E
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