Introduce xfs_mmaplock_two_inodes_and_break_dax_layout() for dax files
who are going to be deduped. After that, call compare range function
only when files are both DAX or not.
Signed-off-by: Shiyang Ruan
---
fs/xfs/xfs_file.c| 2 +-
fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c | 57 ++
In fsdax mode, WRITE and ZERO on a shared extent need CoW performed. After
CoW, new allocated extents needs to be remapped to the file. So, add an
iomap_end for dax write ops to do the remapping work.
Signed-off-by: Shiyang Ruan
---
fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_util.c | 3 +--
fs/xfs/xfs_file.c | 9 +
Some operations, such as comparing a range of data in two files under
fsdax mode, requires nested iomap_open()/iomap_end() on two file. Thus,
we introduce iomap_apply2() to accept arguments from two files and
iomap_actor2_t for actions on two files.
Signed-off-by: Shiyang Ruan
Reviewed-by: Darri
With dax we cannot deal with readpage() etc. So, we create a dax
comparison funciton which is similar with
vfs_dedupe_file_range_compare().
And introduce dax_remap_file_range_prep() for filesystem use.
Signed-off-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues
Signed-off-by: Shiyang Ruan
---
fs/dax.c | 66 ++
Punch hole on a reflinked file needs dax_copy_edge() too. Otherwise,
data in not aligned area will be not correct. So, add the srcmap to
dax_iomap_zero() and replace memset() as dax_copy_edge().
Signed-off-by: Shiyang Ruan
Reviewed-by: Ritesh Harjani
---
fs/dax.c | 25 ++
We replace the existing entry to the newly allocated one in case of CoW.
Also, we mark the entry as PAGECACHE_TAG_TOWRITE so writeback marks this
entry as writeprotected. This helps us snapshots so new write
pagefaults after snapshots trigger a CoW.
Signed-off-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues
Signed-off-by
In the case where the iomap is a write operation and iomap is not equal
to srcmap after iomap_begin, we consider it is a CoW operation.
The destance extent which iomap indicated is new allocated extent.
So, it is needed to copy the data from srcmap to new allocated extent.
In theory, it is better
This patchset is attempt to add CoW support for fsdax, and take XFS,
which has both reflink and fsdax feature, as an example.
Changes from V5:
- Fix the lock order of xfs_inode in
xfs_mmaplock_two_inodes_and_break_dax_layout()
- move dax_remap_file_range_prep() to fs/dax.c
- change type of len
On Tue, 2021-05-18 at 18:49 -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
> On Tue, May 18, 2021 at 6:33 PM James Bottomley
> wrote:
> > On Tue, 2021-05-18 at 11:24 +0100, Mark Rutland wrote:
> > > On Thu, May 13, 2021 at 09:47:32PM +0300, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> > > > From: Mike Rapoport
> > > >
> > > > It is unsa
On Tue, May 18, 2021 at 05:44:22PM -0700, Andrew Morton wrote:
> On Tue, 18 May 2021 10:20:31 +0300 Mike Rapoport wrote:
>
> > From: Mike Rapoport
> >
> > Introduce "memfd_secret" system call with the ability to create memory
> > areas visible only in the context of the owning process and not m
On Tue, May 18, 2021 at 6:33 PM James Bottomley wrote:
>
> On Tue, 2021-05-18 at 11:24 +0100, Mark Rutland wrote:
> > On Thu, May 13, 2021 at 09:47:32PM +0300, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> > > From: Mike Rapoport
> > >
> > > It is unsafe to allow saving of secretmem areas to the hibernation
> > > snaps
On Tue, 2021-05-18 at 11:24 +0100, Mark Rutland wrote:
> On Thu, May 13, 2021 at 09:47:32PM +0300, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> > From: Mike Rapoport
> >
> > It is unsafe to allow saving of secretmem areas to the hibernation
> > snapshot as they would be visible after the resume and this
> > essentiall
On Tue, 18 May 2021 10:20:31 +0300 Mike Rapoport wrote:
> From: Mike Rapoport
>
> Introduce "memfd_secret" system call with the ability to create memory
> areas visible only in the context of the owning process and not mapped not
> only to other processes but in the kernel page tables as well.
On Tue, May 18, 2021 at 3:26 PM Vishal Verma wrote:
>
> The 'nvdimm' mailing list has moved from lists.01.org to
> lists.linux.dev. Update CONTRIBUTING.md and configure.ac to reflect
> this.
LGTM
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams
The 'nvdimm' mailing list has moved from lists.01.org to
lists.linux.dev. Update CONTRIBUTING.md and configure.ac to reflect
this.
Cc: Dan Williams
Signed-off-by: Vishal Verma
---
configure.ac| 2 +-
CONTRIBUTING.md | 7 ---
2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a
On 5/18/2021 10:27 AM, Joao Martins wrote:
On 5/5/21 11:36 PM, Joao Martins wrote:
On 5/5/21 11:20 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
On Wed, May 5, 2021 at 12:50 PM Joao Martins wrote:
On 5/5/21 7:44 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
On Thu, Mar 25, 2021 at 4:10 PM Joao Martins wrote:
diff --git a/include/li
On 5/5/21 11:36 PM, Joao Martins wrote:
> On 5/5/21 11:20 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
>> On Wed, May 5, 2021 at 12:50 PM Joao Martins
>> wrote:
>>> On 5/5/21 7:44 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
On Thu, Mar 25, 2021 at 4:10 PM Joao Martins
wrote:
> diff --git a/include/linux/memremap.h b/incl
On Tue 18-05-21 12:35:36, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> On 18.05.21 12:31, Michal Hocko wrote:
> > On Tue 18-05-21 12:06:42, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> > > On 18.05.21 11:59, Michal Hocko wrote:
> > > > On Sun 16-05-21 10:29:24, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> > > > > On Fri, May 14, 2021 at 11:25:43AM +0200,
On Tue 18-05-21 12:06:42, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> On 18.05.21 11:59, Michal Hocko wrote:
> > On Sun 16-05-21 10:29:24, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> > > On Fri, May 14, 2021 at 11:25:43AM +0200, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> > [...]
> > > > > + if (!page)
> > > > > + return
On Sun 16-05-21 10:29:24, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> On Fri, May 14, 2021 at 11:25:43AM +0200, David Hildenbrand wrote:
[...]
> > > + if (!page)
> > > + return VM_FAULT_OOM;
> > > +
> > > + err = set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(page, 1);
> > > + if (err) {
> > > +
On 18.05.21 12:31, Michal Hocko wrote:
On Tue 18-05-21 12:06:42, David Hildenbrand wrote:
On 18.05.21 11:59, Michal Hocko wrote:
On Sun 16-05-21 10:29:24, Mike Rapoport wrote:
On Fri, May 14, 2021 at 11:25:43AM +0200, David Hildenbrand wrote:
[...]
+ if (!page)
+
On 18.05.21 12:24, Mark Rutland wrote:
On Thu, May 13, 2021 at 09:47:32PM +0300, Mike Rapoport wrote:
From: Mike Rapoport
It is unsafe to allow saving of secretmem areas to the hibernation
snapshot as they would be visible after the resume and this essentially
will defeat the purpose of secret
On Thu, May 13, 2021 at 09:47:32PM +0300, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> From: Mike Rapoport
>
> It is unsafe to allow saving of secretmem areas to the hibernation
> snapshot as they would be visible after the resume and this essentially
> will defeat the purpose of secret memory mappings.
>
> Prevent h
On 18.05.21 11:59, Michal Hocko wrote:
On Sun 16-05-21 10:29:24, Mike Rapoport wrote:
On Fri, May 14, 2021 at 11:25:43AM +0200, David Hildenbrand wrote:
[...]
+ if (!page)
+ return VM_FAULT_OOM;
+
+ err = set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(page, 1)
From: Mike Rapoport
The test verifies that file descriptor created with memfd_secret does not
allow read/write operations, that secret memory mappings respect
RLIMIT_MEMLOCK and that remote accesses with process_vm_read() and
ptrace() to the secret memory fail.
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport
Acke
From: Mike Rapoport
Wire up memfd_secret system call on architectures that define
ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP, namely arm64, risc-v and x86.
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport
Acked-by: Palmer Dabbelt
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand
Acked-by: James Bottom
From: Mike Rapoport
It is unsafe to allow saving of secretmem areas to the hibernation
snapshot as they would be visible after the resume and this essentially
will defeat the purpose of secret memory mappings.
Prevent hibernation whenever there are active secret memory users.
Signed-off-by: Mik
From: Mike Rapoport
Introduce "memfd_secret" system call with the ability to create memory
areas visible only in the context of the owning process and not mapped not
only to other processes but in the kernel page tables as well.
The secretmem feature is off by default and the user must explicitl
From: Mike Rapoport
On arm64, set_direct_map_*() functions may return 0 without actually
changing the linear map. This behaviour can be controlled using kernel
parameters, so we need a way to determine at runtime whether calls to
set_direct_map_invalid_noflush() and set_direct_map_default_noflus
From: Mike Rapoport
ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP and ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY configuration options have
no meaning when CONFIG_MMU is disabled and there is no point to enable
them for the nommu case.
Add an explicit dependency on MMU for these options.
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport
Reported-by: kernel t
From: Mike Rapoport
It will be used by the upcoming secret memory implementation.
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand
Acked-by: James Bottomley
Cc: Alexander Viro
Cc: Andy Lutomirski
Cc: Arnd Bergmann
Cc: Borislav Petkov
Cc: Catalin Marinas
Cc: Christopher Lameter
From: Mike Rapoport
Hi,
@Andrew, this is based on v5.13-rc1, I can rebase whatever way you prefer.
This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor.
The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a
dedicated memfd_secret system call The desired pr
32 matches
Mail list logo
