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Serge,
I spent the evening getting my local build of libcap (building the
libcap/progs/old/setcap and getcap tools) working with the new kernel
support.
It seems there is a basic insecurity bug in the xattr support insofar as
doing the following does
Casey Schaufler wrote:
--- Joshua Brindle <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Casey Schaufler wrote:
Smack provides mandatory access controls based on the label attached
to a task and the label attached to the object it is attempting to
access. Smack labels are deliberately short (1-7 characte
On Tue, 2007-07-17 at 19:59 -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> > > - Speaking of which, are you ok with your MAC model being overridden by
> > > all uid 0 processes? Or do you plan to change securebits and use file
> > > caps?
>
> I've been tracking the file caps closely. I like file capabilities,
>
--- Joshua Brindle <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Casey Schaufler wrote:
> > --- Joshua Brindle <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >
> >
> >> Casey Schaufler wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>> Smack provides mandatory access controls based on the label attached
> >>> to a task and the label attached to the
On Sat, 2007-07-14 at 12:37 -0400, James Morris wrote:
> Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security
> module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the
> overall security architecture.
>
> Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to
Casey Schaufler wrote:
Today's implementation of sshd is a hack, just enough to get
things going. Longer term I expect users to have a list of
labels they can use. sshd currently uses /etc/smack/user,
which contains lines like:
method manic
casey loony
with future support for:
meth
Quoting Andrew Morgan ([EMAIL PROTECTED]):
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>
> Serge,
>
> I spent the evening getting my local build of libcap (building the
> libcap/progs/old/setcap and getcap tools) working with the new kernel
> support.
>
> It seems there is a basic insecuri
On Wed, 2007-07-18 at 12:53 -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> Quoting Andrew Morgan ([EMAIL PROTECTED]):
> > -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
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> >
> > Serge,
> >
> > I spent the evening getting my local build of libcap (building the
> > libcap/progs/old/setcap and getcap tools) work
On Wed, 2007-07-18 at 14:03 -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On Wed, 2007-07-18 at 12:53 -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > Quoting Andrew Morgan ([EMAIL PROTECTED]):
> > > -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
> > > Hash: SHA1
> > >
> > > Serge,
> > >
> > > I spent the evening getting my local build
Quoting Stephen Smalley ([EMAIL PROTECTED]):
> On Wed, 2007-07-18 at 12:53 -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > Quoting Andrew Morgan ([EMAIL PROTECTED]):
> > > -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
> > > Hash: SHA1
> > >
> > > Serge,
> > >
> > > I spent the evening getting my local build of libcap (bu
On Sat, 2007-07-14 at 14:47 -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Smack is the Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel.
>
> Smack implements mandatory access control (MAC) using labels
> attached to tasks and data containers, including files, SVIPC,
> and other tasks. Smack is a kernel based scheme t
--- Stephen Smalley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On Sat, 2007-07-14 at 14:47 -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> > Smack is the Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel.
> >
> > ...
> >
> > A file always gets the Smack label of the task that created it.
> >
> > Smack defines and uses these label
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Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>> For suid, this is handled by remove_suid -> notify_change with
>> ATTR_KILL_SUID/SGID. No equivalent for security xattrs presently.
>
> I assume we're all agreed that we do in fact want to treat
> security.capability xattrs
--- Joshua Brindle <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Casey Schaufler wrote:
> > ...
> >
> > I do have a hackish newsmack command, which I should probably include.
> > All it does is write the new label to /proc/self/attr/current and
> > exec the desired program. That's not good enough for a produ
On Sat, 14 Jul 2007 12:37:01 -0400 (EDT)
James Morris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security
> module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the
> overall security architecture.
>
> Needlessly exported LSM symbol
On Wed, 18 Jul 2007, Andrew Morton wrote:
> > The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed.
>
> I'd like to understand who is (or claims to be) adversely affected by this
> change, and what their complaints (if any) will be.
>
> Because I prefer my flamewars pre- rather than post-m
On Wed, 18 Jul 2007, James Morris wrote:
On Wed, 18 Jul 2007, Andrew Morton wrote:
The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed.
I'd like to understand who is (or claims to be) adversely affected by this
change, and what their complaints (if any) will be.
Because I prefer my
--- Stephen Smalley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On Tue, 2007-07-17 at 19:59 -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> > > > - Speaking of which, are you ok with your MAC model being overridden by
> > > > all uid 0 processes? Or do you plan to change securebits and use file
> > > > caps?
> >
> > I've bee
On Wed, Jul 18, 2007 at 10:42:09PM -0400, James Morris wrote:
> On Wed, 18 Jul 2007, Andrew Morton wrote:
> > aww man, you passed over an opportunity to fix vast amounts of coding style
> > cruftiness.
>
> GregKH-esque :-)
Yeah, sorry, that was when I was young and foolish and liked to bang on
th
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