Re: [PATCH v5 00/12] spectre variant1 mitigations for tip/x86/pti

2018-01-27 Thread Dan Williams
[ adding lkml ] I had inadvertently dropped lkml when sending this to Thomas. Archive here: https://marc.info/?l=linux-wireless&m=151704026325010&w=2 https://marc.info/?l=linux-arch&m=151704027225013&w=2 https://marc.info/?l=linux-arch&m=151704027225014&w=2 https://marc.info/?l=linux-arch&m=15170

Re: [PATCH v5 00/12] spectre variant1 mitigations for tip/x86/pti

2018-01-27 Thread Linus Torvalds
On Fri, Jan 26, 2018 at 11:55 PM, Dan Williams wrote: > > Here's another spin of the spectre-v1 mitigations for 4.16. I see nothing really objectionable here. And unlike Spectre-v2 and Meltdown, I expect Spectre-v1 to be with us for a long time. It's not a "CPU did a bad job with checking the ca

[PATCH v5 00/12] spectre variant1 mitigations for tip/x86/pti

2018-01-27 Thread Dan Williams
Hi Thomas, Here's another spin of the spectre-v1 mitigations for 4.16. Changes since v4.1: [1] * Tweak the sanitization scheme yet again to make it even simpler. Now, instead of 'array_ptr' to get a sanitized pointer to an array element, just provide an array index sanitization helper 'array_