On 7/18/19 2:44 PM, Thiago Jung Bauermann wrote:
>
> Lendacky, Thomas writes:
>
>> On 7/17/19 10:28 PM, Thiago Jung Bauermann wrote:
>>> Hello,
>>>
>>> This version is mostly about splitting up patch 2/3 into three separate
>>> patches, as sugg
On 7/17/19 10:28 PM, Thiago Jung Bauermann wrote:
> Hello,
>
> This version is mostly about splitting up patch 2/3 into three separate
> patches, as suggested by Christoph Hellwig. Two other changes are a fix in
> patch 1 which wasn't selecting ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT for s390 spotted by
> Janani and
On 7/17/19 10:28 PM, Thiago Jung Bauermann wrote:
> Secure Encrypted Virtualization is an x86-specific feature, so it shouldn't
> appear in generic kernel code because it forces non-x86 architectures to
> define the sev_active() function, which doesn't make a lot of sense.
>
> To solve this proble
On 7/17/19 10:28 PM, Thiago Jung Bauermann wrote:
> Now that generic code doesn't reference them, move sme_active() and
> sme_me_mask to x86's .
>
> Also remove the export for sme_active() since it's only used in files that
> won't be built as modules. sme_me_mask on the other hand is used in
> ar
On 7/17/19 10:28 PM, Thiago Jung Bauermann wrote:
> sme_active() is an x86-specific function so it's better not to call it from
> generic code. Christoph Hellwig mentioned that "There is no reason why we
> should have a special debug printk just for one specific reason why there
> is a requirement
On 7/17/19 10:28 PM, Thiago Jung Bauermann wrote:
> sme_active() is an x86-specific function so it's better not to call it from
> generic code.
>
> There's no need to mention which memory encryption feature is active, so
> just use a more generic message. Besides, other architectures will have
> d
On 7/15/19 9:30 AM, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 15, 2019 at 04:03:17PM +0200, Halil Pasic wrote:
>>> I thought about that but couldn't put my finger on a general concept.
>>> Is it "guest with memory inaccessible to the host"?
>>>
>>
>> Well, force_dma_unencrypted() is a much better name
On 12/16/2018 05:41 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> On 12/15/2018 04:55 AM, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
>> The mail seems to be so oddly encoded so that git-am fails on it. Can
>> you resend as plain text?
>
> Hmmm... not sure what happened with that, but yeah, looking at the message
> source shows someth
The dma_direct_supported() function intends to check the DMA mask against
specific values. However, the phys_to_dma() function includes the SME
encryption mask, which defeats the intended purpose of the check. This
results in drivers that support less than 48-bit DMA (SME encryption mask
is bit 47)
On 12/15/2018 04:55 AM, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
> The mail seems to be so oddly encoded so that git-am fails on it. Can
> you resend as plain text?
Hmmm... not sure what happened with that, but yeah, looking at the message
source shows something strange went on. Let me take a look and I'll try t
The dma_direct_supported() function intends to check the DMA mask against
specific values. However, the phys_to_dma() function includes the SME
encryption mask, which defeats the intended purpose of the check. This
results in drivers that support less than 48-bit DMA (SME encryption mask
is bit 47)
On 10/04/2018 10:13 AM, Alexander Duyck wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 4, 2018 at 4:25 AM Robin Murphy wrote:
>>
>> On 04/10/18 00:48, Alexander Duyck wrote:
>>> It appears that in commit 9d7a224b463e ("dma-direct: always allow dma mask
>>> <= physiscal memory size") the logic of the test was changed from a
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