Re: [PATCH] powerpc/ptrace: Mitigate potential Spectre v1

2019-01-29 Thread Gustavo A. R. Silva
Hi Breno, On 1/29/19 10:38 AM, Breno Leitao wrote: > Hi Gustavo, > > On 1/24/19 3:25 PM, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote: >> >> >> On 1/24/19 8:01 AM, Breno Leitao wrote: >>> 'regno' is directly controlled by user space, hence leading to a potential >>> exploitation of the Spectre variant 1

Re: [PATCH] powerpc/ptrace: Mitigate potential Spectre v1

2019-01-29 Thread Breno Leitao
Hi Gustavo, On 1/24/19 3:25 PM, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote: > > > On 1/24/19 8:01 AM, Breno Leitao wrote: >> 'regno' is directly controlled by user space, hence leading to a potential >> exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. >> >> On PTRACE_SETREGS and PTRACE_GETREGS requests,

Re: [PATCH] powerpc/ptrace: Mitigate potential Spectre v1

2019-01-24 Thread Gustavo A. R. Silva
On 1/24/19 8:01 AM, Breno Leitao wrote: > 'regno' is directly controlled by user space, hence leading to a potential > exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. > > On PTRACE_SETREGS and PTRACE_GETREGS requests, user space passes the > register number that would be read or written.

[PATCH] powerpc/ptrace: Mitigate potential Spectre v1

2019-01-24 Thread Breno Leitao
'regno' is directly controlled by user space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. On PTRACE_SETREGS and PTRACE_GETREGS requests, user space passes the register number that would be read or written. This register number is called 'regno' which is part