On 5/22/20 9:08 PM, Thiago Jung Bauermann wrote:
Hello Prakhar,
Prakhar Srivastava writes:
On 5/12/20 4:05 PM, Rob Herring wrote:
On Wed, May 06, 2020 at 10:50:04PM -0700, Prakhar Srivastava wrote:
Hi Mark,
Please don't top post.
This patch set currently only address the Pure DT
Hello Prakhar,
Prakhar Srivastava writes:
> On 5/12/20 4:05 PM, Rob Herring wrote:
>> On Wed, May 06, 2020 at 10:50:04PM -0700, Prakhar Srivastava wrote:
>>> Hi Mark,
>>
>> Please don't top post.
>>
>>> This patch set currently only address the Pure DT implementation.
>>> EFI and ACPI
On 5/12/20 4:05 PM, Rob Herring wrote:
On Wed, May 06, 2020 at 10:50:04PM -0700, Prakhar Srivastava wrote:
Hi Mark,
Please don't top post.
This patch set currently only address the Pure DT implementation.
EFI and ACPI implementations will be posted in subsequent patchsets.
The logs are
On Wed, May 06, 2020 at 10:50:04PM -0700, Prakhar Srivastava wrote:
> Hi Mark,
Please don't top post.
> This patch set currently only address the Pure DT implementation.
> EFI and ACPI implementations will be posted in subsequent patchsets.
>
> The logs are intended to be carried over the kexec
Hi Mark,
This patch set currently only address the Pure DT implementation.
EFI and ACPI implementations will be posted in subsequent patchsets.
The logs are intended to be carried over the kexec and once read the
logs are no longer needed and in prior conversation with James(
Hi Prakhar,
On Mon, May 04, 2020 at 01:38:27PM -0700, Prakhar Srivastava wrote:
> IMA during kexec(kexec file load) verifies the kernel signature and measures
> the signature of the kernel. The signature in the logs can be used to verfiy
> the
> authenticity of the kernel. The logs don not get
IMA during kexec(kexec file load) verifies the kernel signature and measures
the signature of the kernel. The signature in the logs can be used to verfiy
the
authenticity of the kernel. The logs don not get carried over kexec and thus
remote attesation cannot verify the signature of the running
