Existe outro artigo, de Timm Lampert (não o conheço pessoalmente), que vai na mesma linha, mas cujo liame está mais fácil de encontrar e abrir.
http://www2.cms.hu-berlin.de/newlogic/webMathematica/Logic/wittandgoedel_final_coll.pdf “ According to some scholars, such as Rodych and Steiner, Wittgenstein objects to Go ̈del’s undecidability proof of his formula G, arguing that given a proof of G, one could relinquish the meta-mathematical in- terpretation of G instead of relinquishing the assumption that Principia Mathematica (PM) is correct (or ω-consistent). Most scholars agree that such an objection, be it Wittgenstein’s or not, rests on an inadequate understanding of Go ̈del’s proof. In this paper, I argue that there is a pos- sible reading of such an objection that is, in fact, reasonable and related to Go ̈del’s proof.“ O de Francesco Berto encontra-se no sítio Academia.edu. > On 22 Oct 2019, at 23:26, Antonio Marmo <marmo.t...@gmail.com> wrote: > > The Gödel Paradox and Wittgenstein's Reasons -- Você está recebendo esta mensagem porque se inscreveu no grupo "LOGICA-L" dos Grupos do Google. Para cancelar inscrição nesse grupo e parar de receber e-mails dele, envie um e-mail para logica-l+unsubscr...@dimap.ufrn.br. Para ver esta discussão na web, acesse https://groups.google.com/a/dimap.ufrn.br/d/msgid/logica-l/53E4C98E-EEB5-4034-A335-C72DB04D3DA5%40gmail.com.
