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I have a large list (7600 addresses), and when I search for a list of users of
a popular domain (e.g. yahoo.com), I of course get a large result set back -
sometimes more than 50 beginning with a particular letter. On those addresses
with more than
On 04/13/2014 10:48 PM, Conrad G T Yoder wrote:
I have a large list (7600 addresses), and when I search for a list of users
of a popular domain (e.g. yahoo.com), I of course get a large result set back
- sometimes more than 50 beginning with a particular letter. On those
addresses with
It finally occurred to me that this affects routine forwarding too. Even if
you implement SRS on the envelope, the header From is left alone, as per
RFC 5322.
It also affects a message from any of our users who authenticates with our
user and password but prefers to send with a yahoo.com
On 04/14/2014 06:46 AM, Joseph Brennan wrote:
It finally occurred to me that this affects routine forwarding too. Even
if you implement SRS on the envelope, the header From is left alone, as
per RFC 5322.
Not necessarily. If the message is actually from Yahoo, it will be DKIM
signed with
On 04/13/2014 06:03 PM, Jim Popovitch wrote:
On Sun, Apr 13, 2014 at 4:54 PM, Joseph Brennan
bren...@columbia.edu wrote:
Jim Popovitch jim...@gmail.com wrote:
DMARC works off of SPF as well.
Not really.
DMARC checks alignment of *both* DKIM and SPF, if either is broken
DMARC
On Mon, Apr 14, 2014 at 2:33 PM, Joe Sniderman
joseph.snider...@thoroquel.org wrote:
On 04/13/2014 06:03 PM, Jim Popovitch wrote:
On Sun, Apr 13, 2014 at 4:54 PM, Joseph Brennan
bren...@columbia.edu wrote:
Jim Popovitch jim...@gmail.com wrote:
DMARC works off of SPF as well.
Not really.
On Mon, 2014-04-14 at 14:41 -0400, Jim Popovitch wrote:
SPF does not check the From: header line, and that's where the
troubles begin with DMARC.
SPF checks sending IPs (of which your IPs won't match Yahoo's, thus
breaking DMARC)
Either an SPF failure or a DKIM failure will cause a
On Mon, Apr 14, 2014 at 3:16 PM, Lindsay Haisley fmo...@fmp.com wrote:
So what is being said here?
When a yahoo poster sends an email to your list, that email is
reflected to the rest of the other subscribers. Those other
subscribers may or may not check yahoo's dmarc policy before accepting
On Apr 14, 2014, at 5:51 PM, Jim Popovitch jim...@gmail.com wrote:
On Mon, Apr 14, 2014 at 3:16 PM, Lindsay Haisley fmo...@fmp.com wrote:
So what is being said here?
When a yahoo poster sends an email to your list, that email is
reflected to the rest of the other subscribers. Those other
On Mon, Apr 14, 2014 at 7:28 PM, Larry Stone lston...@stonejongleux.com wrote:
On Apr 14, 2014, at 5:51 PM, Jim Popovitch jim...@gmail.com wrote:
On Mon, Apr 14, 2014 at 3:16 PM, Lindsay Haisley fmo...@fmp.com wrote:
So what is being said here?
When a yahoo poster sends an email to your
On Mon, Apr 14, 2014 at 5:54 PM, Jim Popovitch jim...@gmail.com wrote:
The only true ways to handle dmarc messages (imho) are to reject posts
where the poster's domain clearly says to not forward (i.e.
p=reject)... OR... totally wrap the poster's email as an attachment
and change the From: to
On Mon, Apr 14, 2014 at 8:55 PM, Keith Bierman khb...@gmail.com wrote:
While the process of revising the RFC should have been followed, it does
seem that they are trying to solve a real problem.
Bingo! The dmarc folks (many of who are IETF participants) ignored
and performed an end-run around
On 04/14/2014 12:16 PM, Lindsay Haisley wrote:
This is confusing. I have a list using the DN autoharp.org. the
envelope sender is a VERP address with the recipient address embedded,
but the DN is autoharp.org, which passes SPF based on the A record for
it. The From header address is, of
On 4/14/14, 8:55 PM, Keith Bierman wrote:
On Mon, Apr 14, 2014 at 5:54 PM, Jim Popovitch jim...@gmail.com wrote:
The only true ways to handle dmarc messages (imho) are to reject posts
where the poster's domain clearly says to not forward (i.e.
p=reject)... OR... totally wrap the poster's
Keith Bierman writes:
While the process of revising the RFC should have been followed,
No revision of the RFC was made, and Yahoo! followed the RFC in
updating its own DMARC policy. That's where DMARC sucks[tm].
it does seem that they are trying to solve a real problem.
Perhaps.
Mail
On Tue, 2014-04-15 at 12:33 +0900, Stephen J. Turnbull wrote:
Note that Yahoo! has initiated a denial of service attack on millions
of innocent list subscribers. *This is not a one-time problem.* This
will happen again every time a new domain changes its policy to
reject, because even if we
Jim Popovitch writes:
Bingo! The dmarc folks (many of who are IETF participants) ignored
and performed an end-run around the standards process.
Not really. The basic protocols (SPF and DKIM) are RFCs, and that's
really what the IETF process is for. What people (including bloated
corporate
On Mon, 2014-04-14 at 18:51 -0400, Jim Popovitch wrote:
On Mon, Apr 14, 2014 at 3:16 PM, Lindsay Haisley fmo...@fmp.com wrote:
So what is being said here?
When a yahoo poster sends an email to your list, that email is
reflected to the rest of the other subscribers. Those other
subscribers
On Tue, Apr 15, 2014 at 12:13 AM, Stephen J. Turnbull
step...@xemacs.org wrote:
Jim Popovitch writes:
Bingo! The dmarc folks (many of who are IETF participants) ignored
and performed an end-run around the standards process.
Not really. The basic protocols (SPF and DKIM) are RFCs, and
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