Re: [mailop] deprecating rc4 & ssl3

2016-05-17 Thread Brandon Long via mailop
All of our mx hostnames are in the SAN for the cert, so any mx hostname should be fine. There is no change to that with this change. Brandon On May 17, 2016 8:53 AM, "Jeremy Harris" wrote: > On 17/05/16 00:07, Brandon Long via mailop wrote: > > As an FYI, this seems unlikely

Re: [mailop] deprecating rc4 & ssl3

2016-05-17 Thread Jeremy Harris
On 17/05/16 00:07, Brandon Long via mailop wrote: > As an FYI, this seems unlikely to affect most of you as the number of > services we see using these is pretty small: > > http://googleappsupdates.blogspot.com/2016/05/disabling-support-for-sslv3-and-rc4-for.html Specifically for SMTP, what SNI

Re: [mailop] deprecating rc4 & ssl3

2016-05-17 Thread Ted Cooper
On 18/05/16 00:27, Al Iverson wrote: > Hey Brandon, can you explain regarding IMAP & POP being disabled? My > employer does a ton of automated email processing using Google apps > and Gmail accounts, using IMAP and POP (with SSL). Are IMAP and POP3 > being retired permanently? I suspect the IMAP

Re: [mailop] deprecating rc4 & ssl3

2016-05-17 Thread Brandon Long via mailop
Sorry, I meant that ssl3 and rc4 will be disabled for imap and pop around the same time as it is for smtp. We have no plans to turn down those services. And to answer another question off list, yes, rc4 will be disabled for all tls versions as well, this is both being disabled separately.

Re: [mailop] deprecating rc4 & ssl3

2016-05-17 Thread Al Iverson
On Mon, May 16, 2016 at 6:07 PM, Brandon Long via mailop wrote: > > It's harder for those with broken mail clients using smtp-msa, there is no > fall back to unencrypted for those clients, they will be unable to send mail > via msa when these protocols are disabled. IMAP & POP

Re: [mailop] deprecating rc4 & ssl3

2016-05-16 Thread Carl Byington
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 On Mon, 2016-05-16 at 16:07 -0700, Brandon Long via mailop wrote: > The numbers are small enough that we're not doing any mitigation, > there is no fall back on ssl negotiation failure, there is no > whitelist of hosts we will allow these protocols