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(This article is pretty informative. I think I'll read his "Libya's
Fragmentation: Structure and Process in Violent Conflict", written last
year. Especially since it has this epigraph from Karl Marx: "Force is
the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one".)
Washington Post, April 10, 2019 at 3:00 p.m. EDT
Think Libya’s warring factions are only in it for the money? Think again.
By Wolfram Lacher
Libya is a week into its third civil war since 2011. The trigger was an
attempt by Khalifa Hifter, the warlord who controls eastern Libya, to
seize the capital, Tripoli — and power — by force. Since he formed his
own army command in the east in 2014, Hifter had grown stronger over the
years with the help of foreign support. Now, he apparently believed he
was strong enough to break off ongoing negotiations over the formation
of an interim government and create new facts on the ground by force.
Hifter’s initial plan was to get a small force into Tripoli before his
opponents could react, prompting some local armed groups and security
officials to defect to him. This would have placed the onus on his
adversaries to initiate hostilities in densely populated areas. Local
and international pressure would have forced them into a cease-fire, and
Hifter could have converted his foothold in Tripoli into political power
at a United Nations-led National Conference scheduled for this month.
American troops in Libya moved out of country as violence escalates near
capital
But this plan failed in the operation’s first 24 hours. Instead of
dividing armed groups in western Libya, Hifter’s attack united them
against him. He misjudged the motivations driving the militias and the
scope for opportunistic side-switching once their mobilization was
underway. Hifter now needs to throw all he has at Tripoli or face
disastrous consequences.
Western governments, waiting to see whether Hifter would be able to
strike deals with local armed groups and get into Tripoli, were slow in
responding to the offensive against Libya’s most populous region.
Despite the fact that Hifter was solely responsible for the escalation,
early statements by Western powers and the U.N. Security Council called
on “all sides” to stop hostilities. As the failure of Hifter’s initial
plan of attack became clear, the U.S. position hardened. But France,
which has supported Hifter for years, continues to protect him at the
European Union level and in the U.N. Security Council (where Hifter can
also count on the support of Russia).
What motivates Libya’s armed groups?
I’ve been researching Libya’s armed groups since 2011, gradually getting
to know them and the social setting they come from during dozens of
visits over the years. The bulk of the forces that have mobilized to
fight Hifter do not usually take part in the struggles over power
Tripoli has seen since Moammar Gaddafi’s demise. Many armed groups
formed on the basis of local communities back in the 2011 war against
Gaddafi. After his fall, most of their fighters went back to civilian
life, parking their fighting vehicles in their garages and keeping their
weapons at home; heavy weapons were often stored under collective
oversight or in the compounds of commanders. Many received salaries and
other funds as state-sanctioned units, but only a fraction did actual
work in these units.
Most of these groups last mobilized in 2014, when Libya’s second civil
war erupted. But even then, in places such as the Amazigh towns, only a
small proportion of forces joined the fight, remaining unconvinced of
its aims. As that second war died down, most grew disillusioned with the
narratives that had justified the killing. Among leaders and fighters of
armed groups, the sentiment spread that politicians had used them for
their narrow ends. In western Libyan cities that had previously been
largely united in the support of one side or another in the conflict,
political divisions resurfaced and multiplied over the following years.
When armed groups from Misrata mobilized in 2016 to wrest neighboring
Sirte from the Islamic State in a bloody, grinding battle, all fighters
and commanders I spoke to told me that this would be their last war.
Resentment of armed groups in Tripoli
Over the past three years, most members of such armed groups watched
with disgust as militias tussled over control of state institutions in
Tripoli. A handful of militias established a virtual cartel that oversaw
the pillage of state coffers, to the benefit of a small circle of
politicians, businessmen and militia leaders. But few were prepared to
confront these militias. Last year, some politicians and militia leaders
from western Libyan cities tried for months to mobilize support for an
offensive against the Tripoli militias.
When an armed group from Tarhouna finally launched this offensive in
August 2018, very few forces from Misrata and Zintan — let alone from
other cities — joined the attack. During my visits in 2018 and early
this year to Misrata, Zintan and the Amazigh towns, commanders and
community leaders consistently rejected a new war. As one brigade leader
from Misrata told me in February: “Yes, some businessmen want to
mobilize forces to go to Tripoli. But Misrata will no longer let itself
be instrumentalized for political purposes”.
Meanwhile, initial hostile attitudes toward Hifter softened among many
in western Libyan cities. Army officers from the west led negotiations
with Hifter’s representatives over the unification of command
structures. Hifter’s envoys reached out to militia commanders in the
west to broker deals that would allow Hifter to gain a foothold in
Tripoli. An increasing number of commanders said they were willing to
accept Hifter if he submitted to civilian oversight.
This was the context in which Western diplomats and intelligence, as
well as Hifter himself, gauged his chances of taking over Tripoli. His
plan counted on divisions among western Libyan armed groups and on the
proven opportunism of the militias that had dominated the scene for the
past three years. By that time, Libya’s conflicts were almost
exclusively analyzed through the prism of the war economy, and its
actors were seen as purely driven by profit maximization. As a result,
diplomats and policymakers often reacted dismissively to cautioning that
forces deeply embedded in local communities would not easily hand over
power to a military dictator.
Contrary to such expectations, Hifter’s attack on Tripoli has united
rival factions in western Libya and has led to the largest mobilization
of forces since 2011. Some militias involved may be defending their
fiefdoms, but the bulk of these forces answered communal calls to arms
in response to an acute — and existential — threat.
These forces are mostly made up of civilians, and they lack centralized
command structures. It took time for them to mobilize, to prepare their
vehicles and equipment and to deploy. But now that they are mobilized
and united, they have fundamentally transformed the balance of power
that existed before this war, which had allowed Hifter to believe he had
a chance at taking over Tripoli. These forces are united in one goal
only: expelling Hifter’s forces from western Libya and beyond the
positions they held before the attack so they would never threaten
Tripoli again.
This is not to dismiss material interests. Of course, the spoils of war
also motivate fighters, and one shudders at the possible future uses of
weaponry looted from Hifter’s forces. When the battle is over, the
winners will want to cash in on their victory — politically and
financially. The current unity against Hifter will then dissolve into
rivalries over the rewards. And those disgusted by the struggle over
Libya’s oil wealth will go home again.
Wolfram Lacher is a senior associate of the German Institute for
International and Security Affairs. He works on Libya, the Sahel,
violent conflict and armed groups.
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