Best regards,
Andrew Stewart

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> From: H-Net Staff via H-REVIEW <h-rev...@lists.h-net.org>
> Date: January 31, 2021 at 7:23:31 AM EST
> To: h-rev...@lists.h-net.org
> Cc: H-Net Staff <revh...@mail.h-net.org>
> Subject: H-Net Review [H-Socialisms]:  Golubev on Borenstein, 'Plots against 
> Russia: Conspiracy and Fantasy after Socialism'
> Reply-To: h-rev...@lists.h-net.org
> 
> Eliot Borenstein.  Plots against Russia: Conspiracy and Fantasy after 
> Socialism.  Ithaca  Cornell University Press, 2019.  306 pp.  $24.95 
> (paper), ISBN 978-1-5017-3577-6.
> 
> Reviewed by Alexey Golubev (University of Toronto, Department of 
> History)
> Published on H-Socialisms (January, 2021)
> Commissioned by Gary Roth
> 
> Conspiracy and Fantasy in Russia Today
> 
> That the West and its paid "thugs" and "hirelings" were plotting 
> against the first socialist state was never a conspiracy theory for 
> Soviet leaders and society, but rather a firmly established fact. 
> "Plot" and "plotters" were among the most popular words in public 
> speeches and legal terminology during the Great Purge; they permeated 
> the genres of Soviet political commentary and caricature during the 
> Cold War; and conspiracies of every kind blossomed with Mikhail 
> Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika. By the time the USSR collapsed 
> and Russia emerged as an independent state in December 1991, several 
> generations of its citizens had been thoroughly trained in 
> conspiratorial thinking. This is where Eliot Borenstein's new book 
> starts: it examines the fantasy worlds produced in Russian fiction 
> and political discourse in the past three decades when Russia's fall 
> from a superpower into an economic and political turmoil caused 
> widespread social anxiety and insecurity. In response to this social 
> and political cataclysm, many Russians turned to familiar 
> conspiratorial explanations that placed the roots of their nation's 
> trials in the evil intentions of inherently hostile domestic and 
> foreign forces. 
> 
> Borenstein's book is an inquiry into conspiratorial narratives and 
> their role in political mobilization and cultural imagination in 
> contemporary Russia. He tackles them at several different 
> levels--their incorporation into politics; their particular 
> manifestations (such as the perception of the LGBT+ movement as an 
> assault on the Russian national body); their literary adaptations and 
> reiterations; and their long-lasting effects on the cultural 
> understanding of all political arguments as inherently biased and 
> manipulative. _Plots against Russia: Conspiracy and Fantasy after 
> Socialism _approaches conspiracies across domains and media 
> (politics, journalism, film, fiction), genres (novels, documentaries, 
> op-eds), and objects of conspiratorial thought (America, Jews, the 
> LGBT+ movement, consumer capitalism). 
> 
> Borenstein describes a corpus of conspiratorial narratives that 
> permeate Russian culture and regulate or at least inform the 
> production of political and cultural meanings in situations ranging 
> from official statements in the State Duma through prime-time shows 
> on popular TV channels to videogames. In a way, Russian 
> conspiratorial narratives are like Uber: only a few drive it for a 
> living, yet many rely on it as a regular means of transportation or 
> at least use it occasionally, and even those who refuse or avoid 
> using it cannot but notice its firmly established presence around us. 
> It is the same with conspiracy theories: it is hard to imagine a 
> sentient Russian citizen who, after the war broke out in eastern 
> Ukraine in 2014, has not heard allegations that its "genuine" driving 
> force was western Ukrainian "fascists" backed by Western powers;
> agreeing or disagreeing with them comes as the second step. Karl 
> Popper famously argued that conspiratorial narratives satisfy the 
> public demand for easy explanations in an increasingly complex 
> world.[1] Borenstein's analysis further advances this argument by 
> showing that, in doing so, conspiracies create paranoid political 
> cultures that treat "all information as propaganda" (p. 29). 
> 
> _Plots against Russia _has many brilliant observations about Russian 
> conspiracy cultures, and it is unsurprising that it received the 2020 
> Wayne S. Vucinich Book Prize, a top award in the field of Russian, 
> Eurasian, and East European studies sponsored by the Association for 
> Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies and the Stanford 
> University Center for Russian and East European Studies. In the first 
> three chapters, Borenstein examines how conspiratorial narratives 
> define Russia as an imaginary object of desire by hostile forces, a 
> common trope since the rise of modern nationalism with its tendency 
> to feminize nations. In modern Russia, the current political 
> establishment readily employs the apocalyptic tropes produced by mass 
> media and popular culture to advance its anti-Western agenda. That 
> this impetus comes from the media is one of the most compelling 
> arguments of _Plots against Russia_: unlike the scholars who see a 
> direct input from the Kremlin behind the spread of conspiracy 
> theories in Russian society, Borenstein accentuates the priority of
> popular forms of political imagination over their centralized 
> production.[2] In this picture, Putin himself is just another 
> consumer--rather than a direct producer--of conspiratorial 
> narratives, their acolyte rather than a shrewd manipulator. 
> 
> Borenstein's monograph provides an in-depth analysis of the power of 
> conspiratorial narratives to recruit audiences by providing them with 
> easy explanations and a powerful yet elusive image of external and 
> internal enemies, with the enemy acting as a shifting signifier 
> that--depending on the circumstances--can refer to Jews, America, the 
> LGBT+ movement, and so forth. Chapter 4, in particular, looks at how 
> homophobia turned into an ideological weapon around 2013 with 
> accusations that a "gay lobby" manipulates domestic and international 
> politics, acting as a displacement of Russia's growing confrontation 
> with western European and North American political establishments. By 
> rebranding Europe as "Gayropa," Russian political commentators 
> created a feeling of anxiety about the future of the Russian national 
> body. This anxiety was simultaneously projected onto Ukraine as 
> Russia's "younger sister" and onto actual children: by claiming that 
> both are endangered by "gender propaganda" (a term used in the 
> Russian-language media to refer to feminist and LGBT+ activism), 
> conspiratorial narratives mobilized their audiences as nationalist 
> subjects. 
> 
> Conspiratorial narratives, through their authors and consumers, are 
> very well aware that they exist in the state of a permanent 
> discursive struggle, and in chapter 5 Borenstein examines the 
> metaphor of "zombification," a rhetorical tool that these narratives 
> deploy against other audiences to strip them of subjectivity and the 
> right to independent judgement. Unlike the original zombie metaphor 
> that implies the work of forces outside of the individual's control, 
> zombification is a process allegedly run by a manipulative force, 
> turning people into mindless creatures.[3] This logic, in turn, 
> renders one's opponent's arguments as a priori having no value and 
> sense--a situation that Borenstein examines, in particular, through 
> the 2012 anti-Putin protests but which also characterizes the current 
> political polarization in the United States (I wrote this review 
> after the 2020 US presidential election but before Joe Biden was 
> inaugurated, when my newsfeeds on Facebook and Twitter were rife with 
> conspiracy theories as never before--and I have previously lived in 
> Russia). In chapter 6, Borenstein turns to the current conflict in 
> Ukraine to explain how the conspiratorial rhetoric and mind-set fuel 
> the mutual mistrust between pro-Russia and pro-Ukraine supporters. 
> 
> Borenstein's approach--the construction of the research object from 
> various contexts, or, in his own words, following "multiple rabbits 
> spread throughout numerous interconnected warrens"--allows him to 
> offer a general theory of conspiracy (p. 52). Since conspiratorial 
> narratives examined in _Plots against Russia _are not limited to any 
> particular medium, genre, or intellectual domain, Borenstein argues 
> that they can be productively analyzed in terms of the Lacanian 
> Real-Symbolic-Imaginary triad. Borenstein places conspiracy theories
> and most of their narratives in the domain of the Imaginary, going so 
> far as to interpret the conspiratorial narratives about Russia as 
> "symptoms of a disease of the Imaginary." An exception is made for 
> fictional narratives that, he argues, "oscillate between the 
> Imaginary and the Symbolic, thereby reflecting the tension between 
> ideology and artistry" (p. 20). Fiction thus occupies a higher 
> position in this taxonomy of conspiratorial narratives, with 
> political conspiracy theories drawing inspiration, imagery, and 
> entire plots from it, which leads Borenstein to conclude that 
> "conspiracy belongs first to art, then to ideology" (p. 41). 
> 
> What is missing in this explanation is the connection between the 
> Lacanian triad and the paranoid subject position, a key category of 
> the book (discussed in chapter 1), which is expressed--in fact, which 
> comes into the social being--through conspiratorial narratives. The 
> difference between "serious" (nonfictional) and "playful" (fictional) 
> narratives is not that the former belong only to the Imaginary, while 
> the latter "oscillate" between the Imaginary and the Symbolic: all 
> narratives cross this border as they have to follow the structure of 
> language in order to be meaningful.[4] However, since the Imaginary 
> and the Symbolic are radically incommensurate, the narrative movement 
> between them creates _lack_, a key category in Lacan's works: the 
> symbolic structure of the language is always inadequate to express 
> imaginary desires (hence the idea of the _objet petite a_, an 
> unattainable object of desire: no matter how many conspiracies a 
> conspiracy theorist reveals, there are more to invent and uncover). 
> The appeal of "serious" conspiracy theories is that they seek to 
> address this lack through their explanations: to show how the world 
> "really" works. For Borenstein it automatically turns their authors 
> into impostors who falsely claim that they "have themselves bypassed 
> the deceptions of the Imaginary and truly reached the Symbolic" (p. 
> 20). For Lacan, however, paranoia was about confusing the Symbolic 
> and the Real orders when the resulting disorder is resolved through a 
> creation of delusions: a process so quintessential to human knowledge 
> that, in a commentary on _Écrits_, Jacques-Alain Miller spoke of 
> "the paranoiac subject of scientific civilization."[5] This is what 
> makes "serious" conspiracy theories not only quintessentially 
> paranoiac but also extremely popular: their narratives are easily 
> recognizable, because paranoiac structures are embedded in the very 
> process of knowing. A consistent application of Lacan's theory would 
> render paranoid reasoning as an inevitable byproduct of human 
> knowledge rather than "a disease of the Imaginary."[6] 
> 
> If we accept this Lacanian proposition, it puts into question the key 
> argument of _Plots against Russia _that "conspiracy belongs first to 
> art, then to ideology." Borenstein argues that conspiratorial 
> narratives are commonly emplotted as melodrama, a narrative form that 
> is characterized by endless repetitions, a Manichean worldview, and a 
> focus on revelation. However, these criteria also satisfy the 
> definition of epic poetry: for example, before Elias Lönnrot, 
> _Kalevala _existed as an unorganized and hence repetitive collection 
> of Karelian folk songs with a Manichean worldview (Kalevala vs. 
> Pohjola) and revelations of the antagonists' evil plans that J. R. R. 
> Tolkien developed to the extreme in his works about Middle Earth that 
> were inspired by _Kalevala _and other European epic traditions. 
> Neither is conspiracy strange to the comedy genre, as the famous 
> 1960s trilogy of Fantômas movies directed by André Hunebelle 
> suggests. The difference between conspiratorial and 
> non-conspiratorial narratives seems to be not so much in the form, 
> but rather in the political and epistemological aspects of writing. 
> Media narratives definitely fuel conspiratorial forms of political 
> imagination, but, perhaps, _The Short Course of the VKP(b) _still 
> lurks somewhere behind the freshly minted and ostensibly bad science 
> fiction narratives of Comrade Stalin fighting against foreign and 
> extraterrestrial conspiracies.[7] The paranoid subject position in 
> Russian culture has a complicated genealogy that is impossible to 
> reduce solely to media narratives.[8] 
> 
> _Plots against Russia _is not the first work to address the question 
> of a complicated relationship between fictional and nonfictional 
> narratives in the production of conspiracy theories in Russia, and 
> therefore it is all the more surprising that the book lacks a 
> dialogue with scholars from Russia and other post-Soviet states who 
> have previously studied conspiracy theories and related literary 
> forms and genres. When Borenstein expresses in the preface his 
> concern that it might look like orientalizing to study conspiracies 
> in Russian fiction and media, he justifies the choice of this 
> research subject by arguing that conspiracy theories have come to 
> occupy a central place in Russian culture and thus warrant a thorough 
> examination. It is by virtue of this very centrality of conspiracy 
> theories in Russian culture that Russian scholars are just as 
> fascinated with this phenomenon as Borenstein. Ilya Yablokov has 
> written extensively on conspiracy theories in Russian political 
> culture since the early 2010s,[9] while their incorporation into mass 
> culture has been addressed by Daria Slesareva, whose dissertation, 
> "The Poetics of the Conspiracy Novel," examines some of the same 
> works as _Plots against Russia_,[10] as well as by such prominent 
> anthropologists and literary scholars as Aleksandr Panchenko, 
> Konstantin Bogdanov, Sergei Shtyrkov, Zhanna Kormina, and some 
> others.[11] This scholarship represents important perspectives on the 
> question of conspiracy cultures in Russia and is particularly 
> attentive to their historical genealogies and global connections. 
> 
> _Plots against Russia _is an important contribution to studies of 
> contemporary Russian politics and culture, but its importance extends 
> beyond the field of Russian studies. The book offers important 
> insights into the work of conspiracy cultures and ideologies in the 
> modern world in general, and it is particularly useful for our 
> understanding of conspiracy thinking (or, rather, writing) in 
> contemporary America, where Republican zealots regularly label the 
> Democratic Party as an "internal enemy." After all, it was written 
> between 2014 and 2018, the period that saw a revival of both 
> conspiracy theories and conspiracy revelations as hyperpopular genres 
> in American mass media. As an American scholar writing about 
> conspiracy theories at an time when conspiracies have become hugely 
> important in American popular and intellectual culture alike, 
> Borenstein is uniquely positioned to reveal, dissect, and explain the 
> work of conspiratorial narratives. Yet this positionality also 
> represents a risk of a metonymical slippage when "plots against 
> Russia" become important primarily because they resonate with the 
> American public concerns in the era of Donald Trump. This is where a 
> dialogue with Russian scholars, with their very different 
> perspectives and concerns, would be very helpful. For a book that 
> became a foundational text in studies of conspiracies in Russian 
> culture immediately after publication, it is very regrettable that no 
> such dialogue is established in _Plots against Russia_. 
> 
> Notes 
> 
> [1]. Karl Popper, _Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of 
> Scientific Knowledge_ (London: Routledge, 2002), 166. 
> 
> [2]. Ilya Yablokov, _Fortress Russia: Conspiracy Theories in the 
> Post-Soviet World_ (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018), 135-45. 
> 
> [3]. David McNally, _Monsters of the Market: Zombies, Vampires and 
> Global Capitalism_ (Leiden: Brill, 2011). 
> 
> [4]. See, for example, Jacques Lacan, "The Agency of the Letter in 
> the Unconscious or Reason Since Freud," in _Écrits: A Selection_, 
> trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Routledge, 2001), 111-36. 
> 
> [5]. Lacan, _Écrits_, 251. 
> 
> [6]. Jacques Lacan, _Seminar III: The Psychoses. 1955-1956 _(New 
> York: W. W. Norton, 1997), 39-40; Jerry Aline Flieger, "The Listening 
> Eye: Postmodernism, Paranoia, and the Hypervisible," _Diacritics _26, 
> no. 1 (1996): 103-6. 
> 
> [7]. Vladimir Peremolotov, _Zviozdnye voiny tovarishcha Stalina 
> _(Moscow: Eksmo, 2012). The cover image features Joseph Stalin 
> piloting a futuristic combat spacecraft while smoking a pipe. 
> 
> [8]. See, e.g., a detailed analysis of the circulation of 
> conspiratorial narratives between their producers, media, and 
> consumers in chapter 1 of Serguei Oushakine, _The Patriotism of 
> Despair: Nation, War, and Loss in Russia _(Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
> University Press, 2011), 15-78. 
> 
> [9]. Yablokov's research produced multiple Russian-language articles 
> and culminated in a recently published English-language monograph on 
> this topic: Ilya Yablokov, _Fortress Russia: Conspiracy Theories in 
> the Post-Soviet World_ (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018). 
> 
> [10]. Daria Slesareva, "Poetika konspirologicheskogo romana" (PhD 
> diss., Samara State University, 2014). 
> 
> [11]. A. A. Panchenko and K. A. Bogdanov, "Teorii zagovora, istoriia 
> kul'tury i russkaia literature," _Russkaia literatura_ 4 (2015): 
> 8-13, and "Teorii zagovora v sovremennoi Rossii," special issue, 
> _Antropologicheskii forum_ 27 (2015): 89-202. 
> 
> Citation: Alexey Golubev. Review of Borenstein, Eliot, _Plots against 
> Russia: Conspiracy and Fantasy after Socialism_. H-Socialisms, H-Net 
> Reviews. January, 2021.
> URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=55391
> 
> This work is licensed under a Creative Commons 
> Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States 
> License.
> 
> 


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