On 5/21/05, Ian G [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Saturday 21 May 2005 00:41, Julien Pierre wrote:
Ian G wrote:
But OCSP/CRL can not help in case of *root* cert compromission. There's nothing above it to sign the validity information. Can't it revoke itself?
Revocation checks cannot be done at
On 5/13/05, Jaqui Greenlees [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Gervase Markham wrote:
Jaqui Greenlees wrote:
yes. I remove all ca's, and rebuild the list only for those SITES
where I trust the site owners ( not cert authority at all, as they
only issue certs for money. it has to be for sites not
On 5/12/05, Ian G [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
You
surely don't believe all those stories about
m of n copies distributed in hardened bunkers...
With all due respect I believe the thinks I can confirm even when you
know better. Would you say I am picky about being sure that things are
false.
On 5/10/05, Duane [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Gervase Markham wrote:
At the moment, I've been asked not to say who has been invited apart
from us and Comodo (the organisers). I assume I will be able to, either
closer to the time or afterwards.
Why should something that will potentially
On 4/20/05, Frank Hecker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I thought this was interesting:
http://media.timewarner.com/media/newmedia/cb_press_view.cfm?release_num=55254369
The basic summary: AOL will try to block AOL members' attempts to
connect to phishing sites, using a blacklist of suspected
