Re: chrome basics

NB should read ... I want to allow users to install safe zipped files rvj [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote in message news:[EMAIL PROTECTED] After all these years I'm still uneasy about Mozilla security so can anyone clarify ?? I want to allow users to install to safe zipped files My basic

chrome basics

After all these years I'm still uneasy about Mozilla security so can anyone clarify ?? I want to allow users to install to safe zipped files My basic understanding is that all chrome references implicitly support privileged operations Therefore I want to allow the installation of chrome-like

identification of computer system

Im not sure if this is the right newsgroup but can anyone clarify if there is to system level data in the BIOS etc ? In particular I want to ensure compatibility ideally by make and model and possible makers serial number which I believe normally is in BIOS (if provided) The most basic check I

security novice :signed chrome? (revisited)

OK dumb question but is it potentially possible to have signed chrome which could be authenticated when Mozilla starts up? I know that signing is primary used for file transfer verfication but I am more interested in preventing tampering at the local workstation (i.e. tampering/ replacement of

Re: window.opendialog security

s:[EMAIL PROTECTED]... openDialog allows a nasty exploit, which is why it can't be called from content. You should be able to do whatever you need to do using open() instead. -Mitch rvj wrote: It seems that openDialog in a remote xul file is thrown out by the xul parser Howev

Re: window.opendialog security

PPS Im also a little unclear as to what is meant by 'calling from content' in this context I understood that the purpose the 'chrome' flag was to open the window as a chrome file rather than content. PPS Assuming a remote xul is opened using something like http://host/remote.xul why is this

Re: window.opendialog security

PS I notice that it does not ask me for privs rather than inform me of what I have (I assume that is just a scripting option) rvj [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote in message a9hjiu$[EMAIL PROTECTED]">news:a9hjiu$[EMAIL PROTECTED]... Thanks - the online Mozcalc example is the first remote xul

Re: window.opendialog security

PATH Given that relative installed chrome directory references are supported such as content, install, path, /main/calculator I assume that absolute http address path can be specified content, install, path, http://host/main/calculator Is this true? rvj [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote

Re: window.opendialog security

It seems that openDialog in a remote xul file is thrown out by the xul parser However if I just use window.open, the new window is created I noticed this when using the reload button on the remote xul. It generates XML Parsing Error: unclosed token Location: http://host/remote.xul Line Number

Re: window.opendialog security

OK as requested - provide a valid xul file url for another.xul and try with window.open and window.openDialog PS I notice that I seems necessary to flush cache between tests Axel Hecht [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote in message [EMAIL PROTECTED]">news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]... Could you put up a testcase?

window.opendialog security

If a xul fiile is open via the file protocol should it be able to create windows using window.openDialog ? If this is a security precaution then what is it supposed to be protecting? function opendialog() { var x= window.openDialog( clone.xul, name,chrome ); }

Re: setting event.screenX/screenY ?

simple test case begin 666 titlebar.xul M/#]X;6P@=F5RVEO;CTB,2XP(C\^(#PA+2T@+2HM($UO94Z($A434P@+2HM M(TM/@T*#0H\=VEN9]W(ED/2)T:71L96)AB(@UL;G,Z:'1M;#TB:'1T M#HO+W=W=RYW,RYOFO5%(O4D5#+6AT;6PT,(-B @UL;G,ZF1F/2)H M='1P.B\O=W=W+GS+F]R9R\Q.3DY+S R+S(R+7)D9BUS6YT87@M;G,C(@T*

Re: setting event.screenX/screenY ?

Thanks but what about chrome and XUL scripts ? Surely chrome and XUL scripts count as being a local script? Im using XUL + chrome script so I had expected netscape.security.PrivilegeManager.enablePrivilege(UniversalBrowserWrite) to work in the same way as

Re: JARs as secure containers for read only code and data?

Belated - many thanks for reply I had been thinking along the lines of a totally chrome driven application shell. I had assumed access to DLLs within JARS possible, but impractical for preformance reasons. i.e. a single external DLL which redirects access to the appropriate DLL within one or

Re: JARs as secure containers for read only code and data?

PS .. a new JARS directory structure just for read only stuff ?? a) components b) utilities c) skins d) locales e) packages f) plugins