Re: [Muscle] .Net remoting channel, muscle://

2005-03-01 Thread Michael Bender
Anders Rundgren wrote: You are absolutely right! The question is then: Will it happen? How and why? That is of course impossible to know at this stage but I can imagine that there will be operators that will market untangled subscriptions. Actually the whole phone market is in a giant

Re: [Muscle] .Net remoting channel, muscle://

2005-03-01 Thread Anders Rundgren
] on behalf of Anders Rundgren Sent: Sun 2/27/2005 4:05 PM To: MUSCLE Cc: Subject: Re: [Muscle] .Net remoting channel, muscle:// Another, somewhat related thought experiment: http://web.telia.com/~u18116613/TheUniversalAccessControlCard.pdf Anders R - Original Message - From: Peter

Re: [Muscle] .Net remoting channel, muscle://

2005-02-28 Thread Peter Williams
[EMAIL PROTECTED] To: MUSCLE muscle@lists.musclecard.com Sent: Sunday, February 27, 2005 1:05 PM Subject: Re: [Muscle] .Net remoting channel, muscle:// Another, somewhat related thought experiment: http://web.telia.com/~u18116613/TheUniversalAccessControlCard.pdf Anders R

Re: [Muscle] .Net remoting channel, muscle://

2005-02-28 Thread Michael Bender
Scott Guthery wrote: 1) The telecoms -- including Telia I''ll wager -- regularly download SIM applets with Cardholder PIN authorization so not only is there no user in the loop but the operators can read and send back to themselves whatever you put on your phone or in your SIM without you ever

Re: [Muscle] .Net remoting channel, muscle://

2005-02-27 Thread Anders Rundgren
Another, somewhat related thought experiment: http://web.telia.com/~u18116613/TheUniversalAccessControlCard.pdf Anders R - Original Message - From: Peter Williams [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: MuscleCard Mailing List muscle@lists.musclecard.com Sent: Sunday, February 27, 2005 05:14 Subject:

[Muscle] .Net remoting channel, muscle://

2005-02-25 Thread Peter Williams
Now that we - in our enterprise - have finally have got critical mass to delivery our USB smartcard products (wireless bus and wired bus tokens) featuring muscle cardedge instances in GP security domains, we have finally got around to architecting the system security model we were seeking to