Stephen Sprunk wrote:
>
> FIBs did not exist (in production routers) at the time MPLS aka tag switching
> was invented. The problem was that the day's cache-based routers could not
> handle the growing number of destinations on the Internet and crumbled under the
> load of creating and aging cac
On Fri, 20 Sep 2002, Joe Abley wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 20, 2002 at 06:40:56PM -0700, Vadim Antonov wrote:
>
> This is all obvious stuff, of course. However, the derived rule of
> thumb "long traceroute bad, short traceroute good" is the kind of
> thing that can induce marketing people to require
On Fri, 20 Sep 2002, Stephen Sprunk wrote:
> If you think you can make a gigabit router with PC parts, feel free.
You may be surprised to learn that BBN folks did practically that
(different CPU) with their 50 Gbps box (MGR). They had OC-48C line cards
and used Alpha 21164 CPU with pretty smal
On Sat, 21 Sep 2002, Iljitsch van Beijnum wrote:
> Anyway, in our efforts to see security weaknesses everywhere, we might be
> going too far. For instance, nearly all our current protocols are
> completely vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack. If someone digs up a
> fiber, intercepts packets
> I'm waiting for one of the professional security consulting firms
> to issue their weekly press release screaming "Network Operator
> Meeting Fails Security Test."
>
> The wireless networks at NANOG meetings never follow what the
> security professionals say are mandatory, essential security
>
On Sat, Sep 21, 2002 at 05:46:27PM -0400, Sean Donelan wrote:
>
> I'm waiting for one of the professional security consulting firms to issue
> their weekly press release screaming "Network Operator Meeting Fails
> Security Test."
>
> The wireless networks at NANOG meetings never follow what the
> bank's customers. Banks rarely check the signature on a check. Is
> security just perception?
Yes.
And I would expect that those people who cared about things
assumed the wireless network was insecure (just like internet)
and had secured their hardware and were using secure connection
pro
On Saturday, 2002-09-21 at 17:46 AST, Sean Donelan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
> I'm waiting for one of the professional security consulting firms to
issue
> their weekly press release screaming "Network Operator Meeting Fails
> Security Test."
>
> The wireless networks at NANOG meetings never
> Date: Sat, 21 Sep 2002 17:46:27 -0400 (EDT)
> From: Sean Donelan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
>
> On Sat, 21 Sep 2002, Iljitsch van Beijnum wrote:
> > Anyway, in our efforts to see security weaknesses everywhere, we might be
> > going too far. For instance, nearly all our
Terminal Rooms are no different then an internet cafe, you are using an
untrusted system to access an untrusted network, and should be treated as
such.
The wireless network, is just an untrusted network, send over it what you
would send over such a network. There is honor among thieves, but none
On Sat, 21 Sep 2002, Sean Donelan wrote:
...
> Are network operators really that clueless about security, or perhaps we
> need to step back and re-think. What are we really trying to protect?
This is often something that gets forgotten.. people are so hyped up about
network security they can
>I agre security is sadly lacking, but it is probably impossible to
>implement in a conference environment.
Look this is a very simple issue. Sean's first post really pointed out that it's "bad
form" for a set of operators to run an insecure network. I would believe that it's
"good form" to
> I like your cheque example, again I pick on credit cards.. the banks get so
> paranoid on internet shopping and yet its very common for fraud to occur because
> of who sees your card when you're out shopping at the local store...
Actually, you are not correct. The credit card companies are not
On Sat, 21 Sep 2002, Martin J. Levy wrote:
> >I agre security is sadly lacking, but it is probably impossible to
> >implement in a conference environment.
>
> Look this is a very simple issue. Sean's first post really pointed out
> that it's "bad form" for a set of operators to run an insecure n
At 08:46 PM 9/21/2002 -0400, Sean Donelan wrote:
>Is the Nanog confernce network really insecure for its purpose?
...
>I don't see much of a need to rely on a volunteer network operator to
>provide what I think is the appropriate level of security for my
>communications.
exactly.
seems like the
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