Re: US-Asia Peering

2003-01-09 Thread Paul Vixie
what a morass of confusion. on the one hand we have a metro peering fabric, which as linx, exchangepoint, paix, and lots of others have shown, is good. on another hand we have a metro peering fabric, which as mfs and ames showed, can be really bad. because we have a lot of hands we also have exc

Re: Trends in network operator security

2003-01-09 Thread Christopher L. Morrow
On Thu, 9 Jan 2003, Sean Donelan wrote: > > On Thu, 9 Jan 2003, Pete Kruckenberg wrote: > > Would be nice to see all tier-X service providers provide > > more (working) knobs and response teams to help their > > customers and peers track, diagnose and defend and protect > > themselves against se

Re: US-Asia Peering

2003-01-09 Thread Bill Woodcock
On Fri, 10 Jan 2003, Stephen J. Wilcox wrote: > Theres an increasing number of "psuedo-wire" connections tho, you could regard > these L2 extensions an extension of the switch as a whole making it > international. > Where the same pseudo wire provider connects to say LINX, AM

Re: Trends in network operator security

2003-01-09 Thread David Lesher
Unnamed Administration sources reported that John Fraizer said: > > Does anyone know the answers to the following: > > (1) Why was this datacenter unmanned? Why are CO's unmanned Saturday nights? ISP's? Could the cost of manpower having anything to do with it? > (2) If it was manned, how did

Re: US-Asia Peering

2003-01-09 Thread William B. Norton
At 08:14 PM 1/9/2003 -0800, Randy Bush wrote: > Well, first I think we need to agree that there are two different cases here: > 1) interconnecting IXes operated by the same party, vs. > 2) interconnecting IXes operated by different parties. > > In the first case an IX operator can shoot himse

Re: US-Asia Peering

2003-01-09 Thread Stephen Stuart
> Well, first I think we need to agree that there are two different cases here: > 1) interconnecting IXes operated by the same party, vs. > 2) interconnecting IXes operated by different parties. PAIX has successful implementations of both of these (I count our metro strategy as an instance of t

Re: US-Asia Peering

2003-01-09 Thread Randy Bush
> Well, first I think we need to agree that there are two different cases here: > 1) interconnecting IXes operated by the same party, vs. > 2) interconnecting IXes operated by different parties. > > In the first case an IX operator can shoot himself in the foot, but there > is only one gun and

RE: frame relay to atm conversion tool?

2003-01-09 Thread Peter E. Fry
On 9 Jan 2003 at 17:45, Swaminathan, Sekar wrote: > Instead of Frame Relay frames, you have to look at the > payload which is usually IP packets. Here is the formula > that I would use: [...] Specifying an "average packet size" is rough: I've observed that on an "average Internet connection"

Re: US-Asia Peering

2003-01-09 Thread William B. Norton
At 06:07 PM 1/9/2003 -0800, Randy Bush wrote: > Where the same pseudo wire provider connects to say LINX, AMSIX, > DECIX your only a little way off having an interconnection of > multiple IXs, its possible this will occur by accident .. and l2 networks scale s well, and are so well known fo

Re: US-Asia Peering

2003-01-09 Thread Randy Bush
> Where the same pseudo wire provider connects to say LINX, AMSIX, > DECIX your only a little way off having an interconnection of > multiple IXs, its possible this will occur by accident .. and l2 networks scale s well, and are so well known for being reliable. is no one worried about storm

Re: US-Asia Peering

2003-01-09 Thread Stephen J. Wilcox
On Thu, 9 Jan 2003, Bill Woodcock wrote: > > > The LINX consists of a handful > > of distributed and interconnected switches such that customers are able to > > choose which site they want for colo. Likewise for the AMS-IX and a handful > > of other dominant European exchanges.

Re: US-Asia Peering

2003-01-09 Thread Bill Woodcock
> The LINX consists of a handful > of distributed and interconnected switches such that customers are able to > choose which site they want for colo. Likewise for the AMS-IX and a handful > of other dominant European exchanges. Correct. Within the metro area. That is, as has be

Re: US-Asia Peering

2003-01-09 Thread William B. Norton
At 10:35 AM 1/3/2003 -0800, Bill Woodcock wrote: > clearly, interconnecting their exchange points to create a richly- > connected Internet 'core' is a natural progression if their > customers don't complain too loudly. > not that it's a bad long-term plan... Actually, it

RE: frame relay to atm conversion tool?

2003-01-09 Thread Swaminathan, Sekar
Instead of Frame Relay frames, you have to look at the payload which is usually IP packets. Here is the formula that I would use: BW = IP bandwidth in bits per second (bps) PS = average IP packet size; typically 256 bytes AO = AAL5 Overhead = 8 bytes OH = overhead factor Ceilin

Re: hotmail problem

2003-01-09 Thread David Diaz
Im finding it reachable at the moment. But MSN messenger just started having problems again. 18:29. Let's see if it disappears quickly this time. They may be cutting something over. David At 14:22 -0800 1/9/03, Matt Thoene wrote: On Thursday, January 9, 2003 @ 2:11:02 PM [-0700], Oscar Vald

Re: hotmail problem

2003-01-09 Thread Matt Thoene
On Thursday, January 9, 2003 @ 2:11:02 PM [-0700], Oscar Valdez wrote: > some problem with www.hotmail.com right now??? > the page doesnt open. I believe the problem is not at the destination but somewhere in between... 8 gar1-p360.stwwa.ip.att.net (12.123.203.169) 30.418 ms 30.371 ms 30.32

hotmail problem

2003-01-09 Thread Oscar Valdez
some problem with www.hotmail.com right now??? the page doesnt open.   -- Oscar

frame relay to atm conversion tool?

2003-01-09 Thread Brennan_Murphy
I'm trying to locate a tool (eg, spreadsheet) to convert throughput on a frame circuit to an ATM circuit. So, for example if you have a 512k CIR with burst to 1024k and 80% of the time you get your burst bandwidth and you want to convert that link to ATM, what corresponding SCR/PCR/MBS values woul

RE: Weird networking issue.

2003-01-09 Thread Proctor, Chris (EPIK.ORL)
In the real world, auto-negotiation on fiber vs. auto-negotiation on copper have been two different animals. Most of the compatibility issues result from 10/100 auto-negotiation on copper as this was the first major deployment of the technique in Ethernet devices. Most devices engineered recentl

Re: Trends in network operator security

2003-01-09 Thread batz
On Wed, 8 Jan 2003, Sean Donelan wrote: :Its 2003 and everyone is making their predictions. What trends are :network operators seeing for Internet security? - Backdoors will be found in every major OS after they have been shipped on disk. - More reports of trojaned packages. - Resurgance

NYT on Thing.net

2003-01-09 Thread batz
I realize that this is skirting the edge of operational, but I think it is notable that Verios security policy and incident response allowed for an entire ISP to be disconnected at their discretion. I suppose that any ISP can turn off a connection they deem a threat to the rest of their oper

Re: Trends in network operator security

2003-01-09 Thread Richard Irving
> They took the _medical records_ of _half a million_ US _soldiers_ and > their families. > > Regardless of the identity-theft aspect, it's hard to imagine them not > seeing a lucrative aftermarket for that batch of data. And just think, courtesy the USA "Patriot" act, next time it won't just

Re: Trends in network operator security

2003-01-09 Thread Bill Woodcock
On Thu, 9 Jan 2003, David Lesher wrote: > Don't recall if NANOG mentioned it, but mid-December someone broke > into a DOD-contractor HMO's server farm; and stole all the drives. > It was clearly an organized identity theft. They got 500,000 > names, medical records and SSNs.

Verio yesterday

2003-01-09 Thread Peter Salus
Verio appears to have had a number of problems yesterday: We noticed a tremendous packet loss spike and a loss in "reachability" to various sites. Verio states that it had issues [!] with www1501 and that "customers in Boca Raton" may have experienced delays. Anyone know what happened? Pet

Re: Trends in network operator security

2003-01-09 Thread Sean Donelan
On Thu, 9 Jan 2003, Pete Kruckenberg wrote: > Would be nice to see all tier-X service providers provide > more (working) knobs and response teams to help their > customers and peers track, diagnose and defend and protect > themselves against security attacks. Symantec charges between $1,000-$2,00

Re: Trends in network operator security

2003-01-09 Thread Pete Kruckenberg
On Thu, 9 Jan 2003, Sean Donelan wrote: > On Wed, 8 Jan 2003 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > Arent these more the attack trends of tier-3 providers and not network > > operators. > > Maybe. I don't see too many tier-1 network operators > attacking other tier-1 network operators. The trend I > conti

Re: Trends in network operator security

2003-01-09 Thread David Lesher
Unnamed Administration sources reported that Sean Donelan said: > There are lots of interesting problems, but I don't know if 2003 is > the year. DOS is just too much fun. > > Route hijacks/bogus origins > Compromised infrastructure > MLPS alteration > Authentication attacks >

MSN IM Outage last week.

2003-01-09 Thread Al Rowland
If you haven't seen it regarding last weeks outage: Microsoft: Human Error Was The Cause Of Five-Hour Instant Message Outage The service went out due to configuration errors when setting up new routers that were -- ironically enough -- installed to make the service more reliable. http://updat

Re: Trends in network operator security

2003-01-09 Thread Sean Donelan
On Wed, 8 Jan 2003 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > Arent these more the attack trends of tier-3 providers and not network > operators. Maybe. I don't see too many tier-1 network operators attacking other tier-1 network operators. The trend I continue to see affecting network operators is customer sec