This report has been generated at Fri Nov 7 21:48:36 2003 AEST.
The report analyses the BGP Routing Table of an AS4637 (Reach) router
and generates a report on aggregation potential within the table.
Check http://www.cidr-report.org/as4637 for a current version of this report.
Recent Table
On Fri, 07 Nov 2003 22:00:01 +1100, [EMAIL PROTECTED] said:
The report analyses the BGP Routing Table of an AS4637 (Reach) router
...
Possible Bogus Routes
10.127.32.0/24 AS25186 TRANSIT-VPN-AS France Telecom Transpac's
Transit VPN network
10.129.113.0/24
AS209 1097 532 56551.5% ASN-QWEST Qwest
It's worth pointing out that Qwest had such a huge jump this week
because they are moving from AS2908 to AS209 in their 14 state ILEC area.
Thanks,
Adam Debus
Linux Certified Professional, Linux Certified Administrator #447641
Almost half of all student computers on Dartmouth's campus have been
infected by the Nachi/Welchia worm. If student's do not fix their
computers by November 11 (nearly four months after Microsoft released the
original patch), Dartmouth will turn off the student's network access.
On my active bogons list I'm also seeing
223.0.0.0/8 ## AS65333 : IANA-RSVD2 : Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
223.0.0.0 - 223.255.255.255 ## Bogon (unallocated) ip range
Would that be some kind of experiment?
On Fri, 7 Nov 2003 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Fri, 07 Nov 2003
I posted earlier mentioning that I was using uRPF to facilitate a
blackhole routing system on our campus. I went off to lunch and came back
to 38 private emails from people asking how I'm doing it. Rather than
respond individually, I figured I'd post an informal synopsis here.
First, I'm a
FWIW, I presented a paper at LISA last week that described almost an
identical configuration. Slides and paper are available from
http://www.net.cmu.edu/pres/lisa03
-Kevin
--On Friday, November 07, 2003 1:19 PM -0600 Robert A. Hayden
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
uRPF was designed primarily to
On Fri, 7 Nov 2003, Robert A. Hayden wrote:
[snip]
One final note. This system is pretty useless for modem pools, VPN
concentrators, and many DHCP implementations. The dynamic IP nature of
these setups means you will just kill legitimate traffic next time someone
gets the IP. You can
I have just read this on the register and followed it up on usenet:
http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/69/33858.html
William - there may be legal recourse here - What I think Belkin has just
done is provided precedent for anyone trying to beat any Online Case by
their saying it was the router... and then the ISP would have to prove
that there was no problem in the routers and that they were not rewriting
the
The router would grab a random HTTP connection
every eight hours and redirect it to Belkin's (push)
advertised web page.
In response criticism, a Belkin product manager came
forward this week to confirm the behaviour was
designed into the products...
Do they not realize that this has a
At 2:37 PM -0800 11/7/03, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
bad requests and just decided that every 8 hours it would be ok to
replace your original webrequest (from any computer connected through that
router) with one going to their own server advertising their product/service.
It appears that they've
At 11:42 PM 11/7/2003, Kee Hinckley wrote:
It appears that they've learned their lesson. This is tacked at the
bottom of the front page at Belkin.
Important message from Belkin:
We at Belkin apologize for the recent trouble our customers have
experienced with the wireless router/browser
DS Date: Sat, 08 Nov 2003 00:16:11 -0500
DS From: Dave Stewart
DS Imagine that... they listened to the community.
I hate to imagine a Verisign/Belkin hybrid router. (Would that
mean that a random, HTTP request to valid FQHN would work once
every eight hours? Firmware release only after ICANN
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