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(Although I now what the NA...stands for I have to ask)
>> From the initial discussions in Sweden around the new electronic
>> communications act, it seems as if the operators are obliged to
>> provide
>> tapping free of charge. If this turns out t
>
> > My results vary from 15 minuts to 1 hour.
>
> Mine too. So nmap sucks if you want to quickly identify daemons running on
> strange ports. No big deal. This discussion wasn't about nmap to start
with.
> The point of the discussion was wether it made sense to run services on
> non-standard por
>
> Wasn't it established that they did infact not leak it but just routed it
> inside their own network?
Sorry, shouldn't have said "leaked".
Aaron Thomas [1/23/2004 8:28 AM] :
Sender Permitted From (http://spf.pobox.com/) attempts to eliminate Joe
Dropping from domain.com by doing a look up on a TXT record similar to
[...]
As this project is fairly new, there aren't many large domains making use of
it, and the tools available aren't m
There is a package that is being developed right now that basically will
squelch emails received from some domain.com address if the sending IP
address isn't in the list of permitted addresses.
Sender Permitted From (http://spf.pobox.com/) attempts to eliminate Joe
Dropping from domain.com by do
On Thu, 22 Jan 2004, Brett Watson wrote:
> I was just having a hard time believing AT&T was leaking 10/8 and that
> any other large provider was accepting it so wanted to verify.
Wasn't it established that they did infact not leak it but just routed it
inside their own network?
//tlund
Edward Gray wrote:
To protect ourselves from delayed mail, we have implemented several
system wide rules to block Autoreplies and Undeliverable messages from
being sent to the large providers. Unfortunately, this has resulted in
many complaints from customers (since it's all or nothing). We have so
+++ Jason Slagle [22/01/04 19:13 -0500]:
> > The point of the discussion was wether it made sense to run services on
> > non-standard ports to deter cr4x0rs. And I feel it doesn't.
> I've sat here and watched this discussion and kept my thoughts to myself
> because I'm thinking "Maybe I'm missin
> Mine too. So nmap sucks if you want to quickly identify daemons running on
> strange ports. No big deal. This discussion wasn't about nmap to start with.
> The point of the discussion was wether it made sense to run services on
> non-standard ports to deter cr4x0rs. And I feel it doesn't.
I've
> RFC1918 addresses are unpredictable on any network other than your own.
> You shouldn't make assumptions about them. Anyone may use them for any
> purpose on their network. If you send packets into their network using
> RFC1918 addresses, you get whatever you get. If you require certaintity
> i
On Thu, 22 Jan 2004, Brett Watson wrote:
> The customer installed a "network mapping tool" today and suddenly
> discovered they were seeing RFC1918 addresses in the map (hundreds of them)
> that were *not* part of the customer's internal network. It turns out that
> from what we can tell, insight
On Thu, 22 Jan 2004, Brett Watson wrote:
> > The router at route-server.ip.att.net shows about 25 10.0.0.0/8
> > prefixes, most showing up over 4 weeks ago.
>
> Odd. I didn't see this when looking at at&t's looking glass via web
> browser. I was looking for some smaller prefixes though and didn
As probably many of you have already experienced, we have been hit
with mailbombs with forged Hotmail (or other large provider) addresses
recently.
This has resulted in the large provider throttling our mail flow which
forces messages to be placed into our local queue for retry at a later
time. T
On Jan 22, 2004, at 5:53 PM, Brett Watson wrote:
The router at route-server.ip.att.net shows about 25 10.0.0.0/8
prefixes, most showing up over 4 weeks ago.
Odd. I didn't see this when looking at at&t's looking glass via web
browser. I was looking for some smaller prefixes though and didn't
+++ Alexei Roudnev [22/01/04 09:05 -0800]:
> My results vary from 15 minuts to 1 hour.
Mine too. So nmap sucks if you want to quickly identify daemons running on
strange ports. No big deal. This discussion wasn't about nmap to start with.
The point of the discussion was wether it made sense to r
>
> The router at route-server.ip.att.net shows about 25 10.0.0.0/8
> prefixes, most showing up over 4 weeks ago.
Odd. I didn't see this when looking at at&t's looking glass via web
browser. I was looking for some smaller prefixes though and didn't just
look for 10/8 :-/
-b
Once upon a time, Stephen Fisher <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> said:
> The router at route-server.ip.att.net shows about 25 10.0.0.0/8
> prefixes, most showing up over 4 weeks ago.
They do not appear to be announcing those routes to customers however
(at least not this customer), but setting a static route
On Thu, 22 Jan 2004, Matthew S. Hallacy wrote:
> ATTBB (Now Comcast) uses ATT.net for connectivity, Comcast has to reach
> all their cable modems across the USA from their outsourced tech support
> centers, thus, att.net routes 10/8 across their network.
Okay, that's fine. However why are the
On Thu, Jan 22, 2004 at 03:21:01PM -0700, Brett Watson wrote:
>
> First, yes I know I should call AT&T but I want to know if anyone else sees
> this problem:
[snip]
[random destinations chosen, first few hops removed on purpose]
traceroute to 10.150.5.1 (10.150.5.1), 30 hops max, 38 byte packe
The router at route-server.ip.att.net shows about 25 10.0.0.0/8
prefixes, most showing up over 4 weeks ago.
--- ken emery <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On Thu, 22 Jan 2004, Brett Watson wrote:
> > So I just wanted to see if anyone that is defaulting to AT&T is
> > seeing this same problem just t
On Thu, 22 Jan 2004, Brett Watson wrote:
>
> First, yes I know I should call AT&T but I want to know if anyone else sees
> this problem:
>
> I have a customer that is multi-homed to AT&T and WCOM. They accept
> "default" via BGP from both providers and announce a handful of prefixes to
> both pr
First, yes I know I should call AT&T but I want to know if anyone else sees
this problem:
I have a customer that is multi-homed to AT&T and WCOM. They accept
"default" via BGP from both providers and announce a handful of prefixes to
both providers.
Given that they receive default, it's just th
My results vary from 15 minuts to 1 hour.
After reading NANOG for a few years now and I have found the information
here to be very helpful. After sharing the wealth of information I have
found here with some of the members of the MIS department here, they
asked if there might be some similar organizations with a focus on
Microsoft system
I started such scan 10 - 20 minutes ago; it did not completed yet, so I do
not have exact time (it is DSL -> 100 Mbit link + firewall).
But you results shows just what I am saying - 99% of all attacks was caused
by automated tools, and non-standard ports effectively blocks all such
attacks. I ag
On Thu, 22 Jan 2004, Patrick W.Gilmore wrote:
> In any case, no matter how many resources or black boxes you have, you
> cannot guarantee good performance on the 'Net. Too many people
> involved over which you have no control. Even if you had control, BGP
> is not the right tool to exert such co
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Friends,
Those of you who treat routing to the root DNS servers in a special
way, can you please verify that you treat the routing to
i.root-servers.net (the NORDUnet/Autonomica server administrated from
Stockholm) the way you intend.
Prefix: 192.36.14
On Jan 21, 2004, at 4:20 PM, vijay gill wrote:
On Wed, Jan 21, 2004 at 09:05:46PM +, Paul Vixie wrote:
My questions are these:
"Is sub-optimal routing caused by BGP so pervasive it needs to be
addressed?"
that depends on your isp, and whether their routing policies (openness
or cl
On Wed, Jan 21, 2004 at 09:04:40AM -0800, Alexei Roudnev wrote:
>
> Please, do it:
>
> time nmap -p 0-65535 $target
>
> You will be surprised (and nmap will not report applications; to test a
> response, multiply time at 5 ). And you will have approx. 40% of packets
> lost.
>
> Practically, nm
Hello,
> I am trying to determine for myself the relevance of Intelligent
> Routing Devices like Sockeye, Route Science etc. I am not trying to
> determine who does it better, but rather if the concept of optimizing
> routes is addressing a significant problem in terms of improved
> traffic perf
>
> Yes. But making a bomber "stealth" means designing it to be difficult
> to detect by an opponent. It doesn't mean painting "I am Not a
> Bomber, I Am The Ice Cream Man" on the side and hoping nobody takes a
> second glance at it.
This works as well. 6 years ago we set up faked telnet service
I saw such scanners 6 years ago (amazingly, they could not determine very
old OS and very oold services...).
But, just again, no one use it in automated scans over the Internet. As I
was saying, port camuphlaging works as a very first line of defense - it
cuts 99% of all attacks and akllow you to
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