> Jonathan M. Slivko
> Uh... they have. It's called a Snapgear card :)
Same as the 3com card, this is not for the consumer market. First, the
consumer is generally afraid of opening the PC. Second, it costs many
times more than a Linksys or other el-cheapo external box.
Michel.
> Chris Woodfield wrote:
> I stand corrected, they're out there. I'm advised that
> 3com has a on-NIC firewall product as well.
> However, at $299 and $329 respectively, I don't anticipate
> wide adoption in the consumer market...
No danger, as it is not worth jack as a standalone product; requir
On Tue, 11 May 2004, David Krause wrote:
: http://www.ietf.org/ietf/IPR/cisco-ipr-draft-ietf-tcpm-tcpsecure.txt
The same document that fully ignores that port number randomness will
severely limit the risk of susceptibility to such an attack? S**t, the only
mention of port numbers at all is in
Hello all.
Danny and I will be moderating (facilitating) the upcoming nsp-security BoF
at NANOG. Below is the agenda.
==
NSP Security BOF
Monday Evening, May 24, 2004
Chairs: Merike Kaeo & Danny McPherson
AGENDA:
Barry Dykes/Viawest: DOS/Secu
On May 12, 2004, at 2:41 PM, Mark Johnson wrote:
What if sessions were attacked without MD5 in place. We would just see
session resets. As these happen anyway frequently at peering points is
there
any straightforward way to determine if the vulnerability caused the
reset?
Depends on why it happ
Hi,
> What would a Cisco log if the IP's for the BGP sessions were
> attacked & MD5
> was in place ?
What if sessions were attacked without MD5 in place. We would just see
session resets. As these happen anyway frequently at peering points is there
any straightforward way to determine if the vu
Christopher McCrory <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> I think this is a violation of the SpamCop TOS. Somewhere in there is
> says something like, Don't report stuff you asked for like mailing
> lists, newsletters, etc.
>
> I can't find the link now :(, but I remember seeing it in there
> somewher
