On Wed, 2 Mar 2005 22:15:48 -0500 (EST), Greg Boehnlein wrote:
So, set your Rate-Limiting of SIP traffic to 1 packet per second for the
network that YOU control and then offer your VoIP subscribers a different
QOS profile at a higher cost.
Bingo, problem solved. The economy will work itself
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
On 2005-03-03, at 10.27, Geoff Huston wrote:
On 2005-03-02, at 19.38, James A. T. Rice wrote:
This seems to suggest that you are just picking ASns at random to
inject into the paths, and that you don't have a set of ASs which
you
have
Vonage style VoIP is unflatteringly but
accurately called parasitic, it sits on top of someone else's network
connection without supporting that connection at all, competing with
any other IP traffic on the connection, with traffic going back to a
switch wherever the VoIP company is.
One
If you do not own the end-to-end network
infrastructure, there is no way to guarantee any
preferential handling of any particular subset of
traffic.
There is a way to guarantee end-to-end QoS even
if you don't own all networks along the way. That
is for a 3rd party organization to impose a
To diverge from VoIP, an interesting situation will present itself
in the future. Verizon is installing FTTH. Data offerings
in their present service area are: 5, 15, and 30Mbps downstream.
http://www22.verizon.com/fiosforhome/channels/fios/root/package.asp
These speeds would support
* [EMAIL PROTECTED] [Wed 02 Mar 2005, 19:24 CET]:
A question to ponder - what would happen to your network , from both a
technical and financial perspective if all of your customers circuit
switched voice traffic suddenly became ip?
Jack all, as I expect the amount of Internet traffic to be
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
Hi there,
Just wondering if there is any way I could use a scanner (I have a home
grown script for this) that would go thru the DNS registries from some
public source, scan for keywords in the domain name.
Anything that is available only to ISP's and
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
Hi there,
Just wondering if there are any pool of public accessible (read-only)
snmp enabled devices that one can access for testing purposes (such as
snmpwalk, polling devices via oid/mib, graphing chart..etc)?
I'm looking for a pool of devices that I
On 2 Mar 2005, at 22:30, David Schwartz wrote:
Please just clarify the following point: do you intend to advertise
paths
containing AS numbers belonging to other entities on the public
Internet
without the permission of the owners of those AS numbers? You admit
that you
don't know what the
On Thu, 2005-03-03 at 20:27 +1100, Geoff Huston wrote:
On 2005-03-02, at 19.38, James A. T. Rice wrote:
This seems to suggest that you are just picking ASns at random to
inject into the paths, and that you don't have a set of ASs which you
have the assignees permission to use.
Would't this
On 2 Mar 2005, at 22:30, David Schwartz wrote:
Please just clarify the following point: do you intend to
advertise paths
containing AS numbers belonging to other entities on the public Internet
without the permission of the owners of those AS numbers? You admit that you
don't know what the
I am probably telling you what you already know, but for the ones who
don't know it yet:
Secure BGP (S-BGP):
http://www.ir.bbn.com/projects/s-bgp/
http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0306/pdf/bellovinsbgp.pdf
http://www.nwfusion.com/details/6484.html?def
and of course the sister by amongst
On Thu, 2005-03-03 at 13:51 -0500, Blaine Christian wrote:
And, of course, the RPSEC working group draft that is supposed to target the
BGP requirements for those proposed systems is...
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-rpsec-bgpsecrec-01.txt
The folks who worked on S-BGP and
Just a reminder to fill out the NANOG program survey!
The survey can be reached via the Community Survey link on
http://www.nanog.org/surveys.html
We need _your_ input to help improve the quality of NANOG
meeting content.
Steve
On Wed, Mar 02, 2005 at 09:46:05AM -0600, Church, Chuck wrote:
Another thing for an ISP considering blocking VoIP is the fact that
you're cutting off people's access to 911. That alone has got to have
some tough legal ramifications. I can tell you that if my ISP started
blocking my Vonage,
On 2 Mar 2005, at 22:30, David Schwartz wrote:
Please just clarify the following point: do you intend to advertise
paths
containing AS numbers belonging to other entities on the public
Internet
without the permission of the owners of those AS numbers? You admit
that you
don't
On Wed, 2 Mar 2005 12:39:45 -0500
Thor Lancelot Simon [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Wed, Mar 02, 2005 at 09:46:05AM -0600, Church, Chuck wrote:
Another thing for an ISP considering blocking VoIP is the fact that
you're cutting off people's access to 911. That alone has got to have
some tough
James A. T. Rice wrote:
You appear to be trying to take advantage of a side effect of this
behaviour, in order to see what other ASn transitive adjacancies are
available that would not normally be used, by inserting the ASns of
transit AS's that would normally be used, into the as path you are
When that happens, if VOIP access to 911/112 is still problematic, we
can expect standards for it to be mandated by governments - and they
WILL do it - there is nothing politicians hate more than an avoidable
fatality where the blame can be attributed to their failure to act.
So what is
David Schwartz wrote:
Prepending announcements with remote AS numbers has been a well-known
technique for preventing prefixes from propagating to particular ASes
for a long time.
And therefore such use would not be considered experimental. We are
talking
about experimenting with routes that
* [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Thor Lancelot Simon) [Thu 03 Mar 2005, 23:01 CET]:
On Wed, Mar 02, 2005 at 09:46:05AM -0600, Church, Chuck wrote:
Another thing for an ISP considering blocking VoIP is the fact that
you're cutting off people's access to 911. That alone has got to have
some tough legal
* [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Lorenzo Colitti) [Fri 04 Mar 2005, 00:09 CET]:
David Schwartz wrote:
Every piece of BGP documentation I have ever seen says that this
attribute documents the ASes that the route has actually passed
through.
I think the above paragraph of RFC 1771 disagrees with you.
..and apparently this is happening more and more.
There was actually a story in USA Today a couple of
days ago where a family tried calling 911 on their
VoIP service during a burglary only to be told by
a recorded message that they must dial 911 from
another phone...
David Schwartz wrote:
Prepending announcements with remote AS numbers has been a well-known
technique for preventing prefixes from propagating to particular ASes
for a long time.
And therefore such use would not be considered
experimental. We are talking
about experimenting with
On Thu, Mar 03, 2005 at 02:28:43PM -0800, David Schwartz wrote:
[ snip ]
Every piece of BGP documentation I have ever seen says that this
attribute
documents the ASes that the route has actually passed through.
Do I need to get permission from Sprint before I include 1239:100 as
On Mar 3, 2005, at 7:22 PM, James wrote:
You certainly need their permission before you can advertise routes
that
falsely came to have passed through their network!
What kind of specific _technical_ issue do I create by prepending
another ASN
on AS_PATHs I advertise, without such owner's
David Schwartz wrote:
They are experimental in that yes, we are experimenting with a new
technique for topology discovery which to our knowledge has not been
proposed before.
So you do not know what affect your announcements will have.
We don't know the effectiveness of the technique. That
CNET News.com is reporting that:
A North Carolina telecommunications company accused
of deliberately blocking Internet phone traffic has
reached a deal with federal regulators to halt the
controversial practice.
Niels Bakker wrote:
Every piece of BGP documentation I have ever seen says that this
attribute documents the ASes that the route has actually passed
through.
I think the above paragraph of RFC 1771 disagrees with you.
Please quote properly; the context was AS_path, not AS_set.
David Schwartz was
On Thu, Mar 03, 2005 at 07:40:53PM -0500, Matthew Crocker wrote:
[ snip ]
Oh, I don't know, increasing the size of an already bloated global
routing table;
possibly crashing routers which are already starving
for FIB RAM?
Probably not FIB, may be the BGP RIB for the most people that
* [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Lorenzo Colitti) [Fri 04 Mar 2005, 02:09 CET]:
As far as the RFC is concerned, the AS-set is part of the AS-path. See
Section 4.3, which says the AS-path is a well-known mandatory attribute
that is composed of a sequence of AS path segments. Each AS path segment
is
The RFC also says:
An AS_SET implies that the destinations listed in the NLRI can be
reached through paths that traverse at least some of the
constituent autonomous systems.
which is exactly what we are doing.
Yes, you can cite sections of the RFC that you
So, given these considerations, is everyone announcing an AS-set
announcing routes that falsely claim to have passed through another
autonymous system?
Yes. From RFC1771:
Ok, so if everyone announcing an AS-set is announcing routes that
falsely claim to have passed through another
James [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
They are not playing with the core. The result of what they are
doing is dependent on specific topology and level of direction
they are throwing prefixes at.
While I will not dispute your statement, I believe that every
ASN should be responsible of their
There was actually a story in USA Today a couple of days ago where a
family tried calling 911 on their VoIP service during a burglary only
to be told by a recorded message that they must dial 911 from
another phone...
I was surprised to see on Packet8's web site that they now offer E911
in a lot
Just wondering if there is any way I could use a scanner (I have a home
grown script for this) that would go thru the DNS registries from some
public source, scan for keywords in the domain name.
If you just want the list of domain names and not the rest of the
whois data, it's not hard to get
lorenzo,
i think we're ratholing here. can you tell us in simple words
o what you are trying to learn with your experiment and why
it will help us understand or better manage our networks
(thanks rodney)
o why the way you are doing it is safe and will not affect
the packets
Perhaps it varies by state, but I thought part of the E-911 service
regulations was that if you were offering (charging) for it, you had to
offer it as lifeline service which meant it had to survive power outage.
*shrug*
I guess the original regs weren't written with these things in mind!
Hi
I am in the process of preparing a
process and procedure documents for a newly setup NOC. Could any one help me by
sending sample process and procedure documents / or key domains I need to focus
on
Best regards,
Anvaj
39 matches
Mail list logo
