Moscow: global power outage

2005-05-25 Thread Dmitry Kiselev
http://www.mosnews.com/news/2005/05/25/blackout.shtml Regional internet exchange "M9" affected. Most RU networks lost from full view. -- Dmitry Kiselev

Re: Moscow: global power outage

2005-05-25 Thread Gadi Evron
Dmitry Kiselev wrote: > > http://www.mosnews.com/news/2005/05/25/blackout.shtml > > Regional internet exchange "M9" affected. Most RU networks > lost from full view. I suppose it's time to introduce the concept of a UPS. Gadi.

RE: Moscow: global power outage

2005-05-25 Thread Jim McBurnett
Or maybe one of those upteen bazillion Generators that Soviet Government touted a year or so ago. -Original Message- From: Gadi Evron [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Wednesday, May 25, 2005 5:30 AM To: Dmitry Kiselev Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Moscow: global power outage Dmi

Re: FTC, Partners Launch Campaign Against Spam "Zombies"

2005-05-25 Thread Suresh Ramasubramanian
On 5/25/05, Jerry Dixon <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Whelp, can't recall who said it at one of the NANOG presentations > last week but to recap, get involved to help point people in the > right direction in USG or at least provide enough "ops perspective" Not really regulation. The FTC did th

BCP regarding TOS transparancy for internet traffic

2005-05-25 Thread Mikael Abrahamsson
I've been debating whether the TOS header information must be left untouched by an ISP, or if it's ok to zero/(or modify) it for internet traffic. Does anyone know of a BCP that touches on this? My thoughts was otherwise to zero TOS information incoming on IXes, transits and incoming from c

RE: Moscow: global power outage

2005-05-25 Thread Michael . Dillon
> Or maybe one of those upteen bazillion Generators Upteen bazillion is not a number. And if you check this BBC news story http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4578599.stm you will see that generators are available because they used them to get the underground trains into the nearest station in ord

Re: Moscow: global power outage

2005-05-25 Thread Carlos Friacas
Something went really, really wrong :-( http://www.msk-ix.ru/rus/tech/stat.shtml ./Carlos --http://www.ip6.fccn.pt/nativeRCTS2.html Wide Area Network (WAN) Workgroup, CMF8-RIPE, CF596-ARIN FCCN - Fundacao para a Computacao Cientifica Nacional http://w

More on Moscow power failure( was RE: Moscow: global power outage)

2005-05-25 Thread Michael . Dillon
> And if you check this BBC > news story http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4578599.stm > you will see that generators are available because they > used them to get the underground trains into the nearest > station in order to evacuate in an orderly fashion If you can read Russian, there is a lot

IDS/DDOS prevention hardware that doesnt cost $80,000+?

2005-05-25 Thread Drew Weaver
    I’m wondering if there is such an animal out there? All of the ones I have seen are made for the multi-gigabit service provider there aren’t any for the smaller mid-rangers out there. Can anyone suggest anything that we can put in place? The attacks we’re seeing are just a huge

Re: IDS/DDOS prevention hardware that doesnt cost $80,000+?

2005-05-25 Thread trainier
Any firewall/router that supports ratelimiting should suffice for most DDoS mitigation tactics.  A program called snort (layer 7 content filtering) should take care of most of your IDS needs as well.   "Drew Weaver" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent by: [EMAIL PROTECTED] 05/25/2005 10:45 AM To

Re: IDS/DDOS prevention hardware that doesnt cost $80,000+?

2005-05-25 Thread Jared Mauch
On Wed, May 25, 2005 at 10:45:15AM -0400, Drew Weaver wrote: > I'm wondering if there is such an animal out there? All of > the ones I have seen are made for the multi-gigabit service provider > there aren't any for the smaller mid-rangers out there. Can anyone > suggest anything that

Re: IDS/DDOS prevention hardware that doesnt cost $80,000+?

2005-05-25 Thread Kim Onnel
Cisco routers and switches export network accounting information you can write a software that reads these flows and report to you who is the Top Talker/DDoS or you can get an open-source one (flow-tools, ntop,..) or you can buy one (Arbor, lancope, crannog,...) On 5/25/05, Drew Weaver <[EMAIL PRO

Re: More on Moscow power failure( was RE: Moscow: global power outage)

2005-05-25 Thread Fergie (Paul Ferguson)
More from MosNews: UES Management Faces Criminal Investigation After Moscow Power Cut Russian prosecutors on Wednesday opened a criminal case against the management of power monopoly Unified Energy System (UES) after a major power outage in Moscow, agencies reported Wednesday. The case was o

Re: BCP regarding TOS transparancy for internet traffic

2005-05-25 Thread Valdis . Kletnieks
On Wed, 25 May 2005 13:08:29 +0200, Mikael Abrahamsson said: > My thoughts was otherwise to zero TOS information incoming on IXes, > transits and incoming from customers, question is if customers expect this > to be transparent or not. Out of curiosity, what did you hope to accomplish by zeroin

Re: BCP regarding TOS transparancy for internet traffic

2005-05-25 Thread Saku Ytti
On (2005-05-25 11:49 -0400), [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > Out of curiosity, what did you hope to accomplish by zeroing that field? IMHO only reason not to zero TOS byte on AS ingress border is that you explicitly agreed with your neighbour how it is used (what traffic it can contain, what is th

Re: soBGP deployment

2005-05-25 Thread Daniel Karrenberg
On 23.05 22:13, Tony Li wrote: > ... We, > as responsible operators/architects/vendors/coders need to pick a > solution and field it. It may well be an interim solution, but we MUST > act, and soon. We are already seeing the stress patterns, without > reinforcement it is only a matter of time be

Re: BCP regarding TOS transparancy for internet traffic

2005-05-25 Thread Eric A. Hall
On 5/25/2005 7:08 AM, Mikael Abrahamsson wrote: > > I've been debating whether the TOS header information must be left > untouched by an ISP, or if it's ok to zero/(or modify) it for internet > traffic. Does anyone know of a BCP that touches on this? > > My thoughts was otherwise to zero TOS

Re: BCP regarding TOS transparancy for internet traffic

2005-05-25 Thread Sam Stickland
On Wed, 25 May 2005, Eric A. Hall wrote: On 5/25/2005 7:08 AM, Mikael Abrahamsson wrote: I've been debating whether the TOS header information must be left untouched by an ISP, or if it's ok to zero/(or modify) it for internet traffic. Does anyone know of a BCP that touches on this? My tho

Re: BCP regarding TOS transparancy for internet traffic

2005-05-25 Thread Kevin Oberman
> Date: Wed, 25 May 2005 12:35:56 -0400 > From: "Eric A. Hall" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > > > On 5/25/2005 7:08 AM, Mikael Abrahamsson wrote: > > > > I've been debating whether the TOS header information must be left > > untouched by an ISP, or if it's ok to zero/(or

Re: BCP regarding TOS transparancy for internet traffic

2005-05-25 Thread Valdis . Kletnieks
On Wed, 25 May 2005 18:59:51 +0300, Saku Ytti said: > I personally don't want to see DoS traffic taking eg. VoIP priority. If you're seeing enough DoS traffic that an incorrect TOS is causing an issue for you, you probably need to find better ways to mitigate that traffic. Remember that at the

Re: BCP regarding TOS transparancy for internet traffic

2005-05-25 Thread Fred Baker
RFC 2474 permits the DSCP to be over-written on ingress to a network. RFC 3168 gives rules for over-writing the ECN flags. US NCS currently has a filing before the FCC (unless FCC has recently responded) asking for a DSCP value that would be set only by NCS-authorized users, never over-writt

Re: BCP regarding TOS transparancy for internet traffic

2005-05-25 Thread Fred Baker
On May 25, 2005, at 10:39 AM, Sam Stickland wrote: While it's true that IP is end-to-end, are fields such as TOS and DSCP meant to be end to end? A case could be argued that they are used by the actual forwarding devices on route in order to make QoS or even routing decisions, and that the e

Re: BCP regarding TOS transparancy for internet traffic

2005-05-25 Thread Saku Ytti
On (2005-05-25 14:15 -0400), [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > If you're seeing enough DoS traffic that an incorrect TOS is causing an issue > for you, you probably need to find better ways to mitigate that traffic. > Remember > that at the *source* end, the DoS traffic is pretty minimal, and at the

Re: BCP regarding TOS transparancy for internet traffic

2005-05-25 Thread Eric A. Hall
On 5/25/2005 1:54 PM, Kevin Oberman wrote: >>Date: Wed, 25 May 2005 12:35:56 -0400 >>From: "Eric A. Hall" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >>the original bits somewhere. Dunno about now, but I would imagine a few >>providers have fallen for the "everybody else is doing it" invented >>justification, and thus

Re: BCP regarding TOS transparancy for internet traffic

2005-05-25 Thread Eric A. Hall
On 5/25/2005 1:39 PM, Sam Stickland wrote: > While it's true that IP is end-to-end, are fields such as TOS and DSCP > meant to be end to end? A case could be argued that they are used by the > actual forwarding devices on route in order to make QoS or even routing > decisions, and that the en

Re: BCP regarding TOS transparancy for internet traffic

2005-05-25 Thread Saku Ytti
On (2005-05-25 14:44 -0400), Eric A. Hall wrote: > 4) The default of no-modify should also apply to non-payinng customers > since they may be flagging their packets for special processing on their > own networks (and they don't want the flags to poof away when the traffic > crosses your hop).

Re: soBGP deployment

2005-05-25 Thread Steve Gibbard
On Mon, 23 May 2005, Tony Li wrote: Which is EXACTLY why we need to remember that we are NOT trying to come up with the perfect solution. We have operational issues *TODAY* that we are trying to address. - We have people (admittedly accidentally) advertising prefixes that they do not own and

Re: BCP regarding TOS transparancy for internet traffic

2005-05-25 Thread Eric A. Hall
On 5/25/2005 2:50 PM, Saku Ytti wrote: > Beatiful idea, how in practice do you suggest this is done, how will > my router know if it should just ignore the TOS bytes or do expedited > forwarding as configured for given value of TOS byte? VLANs? Different route paths? Any of a dozen other ways

Re: BCP regarding TOS transparancy for internet traffic

2005-05-25 Thread sthaug
> > Beatiful idea, how in practice do you suggest this is done, how will > > my router know if it should just ignore the TOS bytes or do expedited > > forwarding as configured for given value of TOS byte? > > VLANs? Different route paths? Any of a dozen other ways to limit special > processing t

Re: BCP regarding TOS transparancy for internet traffic

2005-05-25 Thread Saku Ytti
On (2005-05-25 15:06 -0400), Eric A. Hall wrote: > > Beatiful idea, how in practice do you suggest this is done, how will > > my router know if it should just ignore the TOS bytes or do expedited > > forwarding as configured for given value of TOS byte? > > VLANs? Different route paths? Any of

Re: BCP regarding TOS transparancy for internet traffic

2005-05-25 Thread Eric A. Hall
On 5/25/2005 3:11 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > Seems to me these are far more complex solutions than simply rewriting > TOS at the borders. > > And yes, we also rewrite TOS at the borders for Internet traffic. All you are doing is off-loading the complexity to your customers (and their custom

Re: IDS/DDOS prevention hardware that doesnt cost $80,000+?

2005-05-25 Thread Per Gregers Bilse
On May 25, 10:45am, "Drew Weaver" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > I'm wondering if there is such an animal out there? All of > the ones I have seen are made for the multi-gigabit service provider > there aren't any for the smaller mid-rangers out there. Can anyone > suggest anything that

Re: BCP regarding TOS transparancy for internet traffic

2005-05-25 Thread Lars Erik Gullerud
On Wed, 25 May 2005, Eric A. Hall wrote: On 5/25/2005 2:50 PM, Saku Ytti wrote: Beatiful idea, how in practice do you suggest this is done, how will my router know if it should just ignore the TOS bytes or do expedited forwarding as configured for given value of TOS byte? VLANs? Different

Re: BCP regarding TOS transparancy for internet traffic

2005-05-25 Thread Saku Ytti
On (2005-05-25 11:16 -0700), Fred Baker wrote: > I guess the question is why, just because you don't want to offer a > specific service, you want to prevent other ISPs from offering a stated > service to a user? There are some fairly good-sized ISPs offering > services based on the TOS octet.

Re: BCP regarding TOS transparancy for internet traffic

2005-05-25 Thread Eric A. Hall
On 5/25/2005 3:42 PM, Lars Erik Gullerud wrote: > I.e. my customer with two offices who run their own IPSec tunnel between, > should in other words no longer be able to pay me for improved delivery > without buying a full VPN offering from me (which they don't really need, > or want)? If the

Re: BCP regarding TOS transparancy for internet traffic

2005-05-25 Thread Lars Erik Gullerud
On Wed, 25 May 2005, Eric A. Hall wrote: On 5/25/2005 3:42 PM, Lars Erik Gullerud wrote: I.e. my customer with two offices who run their own IPSec tunnel between, should in other words no longer be able to pay me for improved delivery without buying a full VPN offering from me (which they don

Re: BCP regarding TOS transparancy for internet traffic

2005-05-25 Thread Mikael Abrahamsson
On Wed, 25 May 2005, Lars Erik Gullerud wrote: The "general population", who does NOT pay for that privilege, gets the BE-treatment, which is what they pay for. And that requires a rewrite of the DSCP/TOS for said traffic, otherwise how do you prevent packets from the "general population" fil

Re: soBGP deployment

2005-05-25 Thread Tony Li
Steve, > I know all the issues up there are real, since I've occasionally heard > about them happening. I understand the devastating consequences of > somebody finding a sufficiently well connected unfiltered BGP session > and using it to announce some important prefixes. I fully agree that i

Re: IDS/DDOS prevention hardware that doesnt cost $80,000+?

2005-05-25 Thread Aaron Glenn
On 5/25/05, Per Gregers Bilse <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > (snip)...which then deploy a unique and highly innovative > method (patent pending) for identifying and filtering out the attack > traffic, while letting bona fide traffic through unhindered. ...(snip) well, that is the important part.

Re: soBGP deployment

2005-05-25 Thread Tony Li
Daniel, Well, I wish I could have been part of the discussions that you had, as what you report is at variance with what I've heard. Fundamentally, there is a serious scalability issue with doing everything at configuration generation time. Since one cannot predict with certainty what AS path

Re: BCP regarding TOS transparancy for internet traffic

2005-05-25 Thread Sean Donelan
On Wed, 25 May 2005, Fred Baker wrote: > services based on the TOS octet. Are you trying to drive users to them? > Any customer that is setting EF on VoIP service is certainly expecting > that to go end to end. Users' rarely set DSCP/TOS bits. On the other hand lots of software and applications,

Stanford Hack Exposes 10,000

2005-05-25 Thread Fergie (Paul Ferguson)
Yet another unfortunate disclosure... http://www.techweb.com/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=163701121 - ferg -- "Fergie", a.k.a. Paul Ferguson Engineering Architecture for the Internet [EMAIL PROTECTED] or [EMAIL PROTECTED] ferg's tech blog: http://fergdawg.blogspot.com/

Re: soBGP deployment

2005-05-25 Thread Steve Gibbard
On Wed, 25 May 2005, Tony Li wrote: I know all the issues up there are real, since I've occasionally heard about them happening. I understand the devastating consequences of somebody finding a sufficiently well connected unfiltered BGP session and using it to announce some important prefixes.

Re: BCP regarding TOS transparancy for internet traffic

2005-05-25 Thread Sean Donelan
On Wed, 25 May 2005, Eric A. Hall wrote: > If they don't need or want special handling what are they paying for? But > since they are paying for it, perhaps its up to you to figure out how to > deliver on your promise. If existing software applications only set the DSCP values when the user asked

Re: Stanford Hack Exposes 10,000

2005-05-25 Thread Adam McKenna
On Wed, May 25, 2005 at 11:59:17PM +, Fergie (Paul Ferguson) wrote: > > > Yet another unfortunate disclosure... > > http://www.techweb.com/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=163701121 I wonder when schools are going to get the hint and stop using SSN's as ID numbers.. --Adam

Re: Stanford Hack Exposes 10,000

2005-05-25 Thread Mark Newton
On Wed, May 25, 2005 at 05:12:18PM -0700, Adam McKenna wrote: > On Wed, May 25, 2005 at 11:59:17PM +, Fergie (Paul Ferguson) wrote: > > Yet another unfortunate disclosure... > > http://www.techweb.com/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=163701121 > > I wonder when schools are going to get the h

Re: Stanford Hack Exposes 10,000

2005-05-25 Thread Fergie (Paul Ferguson)
I really didn't mean to start an off-topic rat-hole discussion, but instead, point out how bad (nonchalant, cavalier) site security has become with reagards to storing sensitive information. This is just gettinh wy out of hand. And appears to be getting worse. Operational issue? You decide.

RE: Stanford Hack Exposes 10,000

2005-05-25 Thread Dave Hilton
Just like the original law provided. "Around about whenever the US Federal Government gets the hint and passes a bill which makes it illegal to use social security numbers for any purpose other than the administration of social security." Hilton But I'll bet you knew that and I just bit down HA

Re: Stanford Hack Exposes 10,000

2005-05-25 Thread Adam McKenna
On Thu, May 26, 2005 at 12:28:32AM +, Fergie (Paul Ferguson) wrote: > I really didn't mean to start an off-topic rat-hole discussion, > but instead, point out how bad (nonchalant, cavalier) site security > has become with reagards to storing sensitive information. Has it really 'gotten' bad o

Re: Stanford Hack Exposes 10,000

2005-05-25 Thread Fergie (Paul Ferguson)
Everything is new again. - ferg -- Adam McKenna <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: On Thu, May 26, 2005 at 12:28:32AM +, Fergie (Paul Ferguson) wrote: > I really didn't mean to start an off-topic rat-hole discussion, > but instead, point out how bad (nonchalant, cavalier) site security > has becom

Re: Stanford Hack Exposes 10,000

2005-05-25 Thread Jay R. Ashworth
On Thu, May 26, 2005 at 09:49:06AM +0930, Mark Newton wrote: > On Wed, May 25, 2005 at 05:12:18PM -0700, Adam McKenna wrote: > > On Wed, May 25, 2005 at 11:59:17PM +, Fergie (Paul Ferguson) wrote: > > > Yet another unfortunate disclosure... > > > http://www.techweb.com/showArticle.jhtml?art

Re: BCP regarding TOS transparancy for internet traffic

2005-05-25 Thread Eric A. Hall
On 5/25/2005 4:27 PM, Lars Erik Gullerud wrote: > The "general population", who does NOT pay for that privilege, gets the > BE-treatment, which is what they pay for. Overwriting the tos flags is not "best effort", it is "degraded service" Oh sure, it might be BE on your specific network, but

Re: BCP regarding TOS transparancy for internet traffic

2005-05-25 Thread Sean Donelan
On Wed, 25 May 2005, Eric A. Hall wrote: > Again, you are under no obligation to do anything with QoS flags from > non-paying customers, and I'm not advocating for anybody to get a free > ride here. Ignore the markings, but leave them alone too. Are you suggesting every router along the path need

Re: BCP regarding TOS transparancy for internet traffic

2005-05-25 Thread Eric A. Hall
On 5/25/2005 9:06 PM, Sean Donelan wrote: > Do you really think this scales well in a core network? Feasibility can be empirically demonstrated easily enough. Which of your competitors' networks do you want me to ping probe with ToS flags enabled? [Although I suppose I should add the disclaim

Be afraid: IPv6 techies get bent out of shape.... again

2005-05-25 Thread Fergie (Paul Ferguson)
H. IPv6 bullies again? http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/25/AR2005052501760.html :-) - ferg -- "Fergie", a.k.a. Paul Ferguson Engineering Architecture for the Internet [EMAIL PROTECTED] or [EMAIL PROTECTED] ferg's tech blog: http://fergdawg.blogspot.com/

Re: BCP regarding TOS transparancy for internet traffic

2005-05-25 Thread Alan Hannan
Back in 1999 or early 2000, at GBLX we decided to implement DSCP settings on transit network traffic. We found that a remotely small % of TCP traffic abended when the DSCP were changed within the stream. Understandably, we were concerned. Given the incompatibility with intended TOS/