On Sun, Jan 22, 2006 at 10:42:36AM +0900,
Randy Bush <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote
a message of 4 lines which said:
> any cctld ops seeing unusual traffic in the last hours?
DSC showed nothing at all on Sunday for the ".fr" nameservers that we
directly manage. Some are also secondaries for other
> National Diversity Assurance Initiative.
The financial services industry participates in many
organizations such as BITS and the Financial Services
Roudtable. A couple of extracts from some slides
in a BITS presentation
slide---
Since 9/11, the financial services industry and
government ha
> Any idiot terrorist can walk up to a CO or colo and find the entrance
> facilities (facility in more cases) and walk down the block looking for
> manhole covers with company names or logo's.
They would have to be idiots to waste there time hunting
for buried telecom lines when they could blow
On 22 jan 2006, at 02.42, Randy Bush wrote:
any cctld ops seeing unusual traffic in the last hours?
Nope.
- kurtis -
On Sun, 22 Jan 2006, Mikael Abrahamsson wrote:
> If you have an 8meg ADSL line and want to deliver IPTV you need some kind of
> preferential treatment to the TV packets on this access line to ensure
> quality, for instance in the case of the user doing a file transfer at the
> same time they're w
On Mon, 23 Jan 2006, Todd Vierling wrote:
Provided that IPTV or VoIP are the only [large] datagram streams in
progress, this is not difficult to do on the CPE end -- in fact, this
sort of thing is already available as a QoS option in some home router
appliances. It involves scaling back TCP
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Petri Helenius) writes:
> And the real question is if the money is better spent on implementing
> preferential treatment or upgrading the infrastructure as a whole.
the former, in the current and following quarter.
the latter, in the current and following year.
(can you all
in case some people want to look at routeviews data for themselves,
I have archived a couple of pdf file at:
http://bgpinspect.merit.edu/reports.php
-manish
-
Re: oof. panix sidelined by incompetence... again.
* From: william(at)elan.net
* Date: Sun Jan 22 13:34:47 2006
Can th
I forgot to mention that you can get the RIPE data perspective
on this as well by running a prefix-exact query for "166.84.0.0/16"
at bgp-inspect-RIPE:
http://bgpinspect.merit.edu:9090
If there are enough requests I will probably archive those as well.
thanks
-manish
-- Forwarded m
You can easily repeat the queries on the bgpinspect website to generate
the same results in html files. I just bundled them up into a
single pdf for convenience.
thanks
manish
On Mon, 23 Jan 2006, Fergie wrote:
Out of curiousity, why must these be in .pdf format?
I mean, what's wrong wi
On Jan 21, 2006 09:42 PM, Randy Bush <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
ccTLD .PR doesn't have any unusual traffic at the moment.
Mehmet Akcin
NOC ccTLD .PR
>
> any cctld ops seeing unusual traffic in the last hours?
>
> randy
>
Short of perfect filters, or perfect IRRs combined with PKI, it's a
difficult problem to stop prefix hijacks such as we've seen this
weekend. Myself, Jennifer Rexford, and Stephanie Forrest have been
looking at feasible and incrementally deployable solutions to the
problem and we would really li
On Mon, 23 Jan 2006, Josh Karlin wrote:
> The idea is simply to consider 'suspicious' looking routes as a last
> resort in the decision process (~1 day). Thus if no alternative route
> for a prefix exists, the suspicious route is used regardless, no harm
> done.
It seems l
bill,all,
On Mon, Jan 23, 2006 at 12:08:11PM -0800, Bill Woodcock wrote:
>
> On Mon, 23 Jan 2006, Josh Karlin wrote:
> > The idea is simply to consider 'suspicious' looking routes as a last
> > resort in the decision process (~1 day). Thus if no alternative route
> > for a pre
On Mon, 23 Jan 2006, Todd Underwood wrote:
> > It seems like most of the routers which would need to make this
decision
> > wouldn't have adequate information upon which to do so...
> not necessarily. the decision could be made in "near real time" by
> building prefix fi
On Mon, Jan 23, 2006 at 12:47:38PM -0700, Josh Karlin wrote:
>
> Suspicious routes are those that originate at an AS that has not
> originated the prefix in the last few days and those that introduce
> sub-prefixes. Sub-prefixes are always considered suspicious (~1 day)
> and traffic will be rou
On 23-Jan-2006, at 14:47, Josh Karlin wrote:
Short of perfect filters, or perfect IRRs combined with PKI,
To what extent does the route object validation in the RIPE database
(for routes covering RIPE-allocated space), together with maintainer
object authentication, provide a "perfect IR
At 10:42 AM 1/22/2006 +0900, Randy Bush wrote:
any cctld ops seeing unusual traffic in the last hours?
Nope at .mx.
Gustavo
randy
gus
Maybe I'm ignorant, but isn't there [cc]tld operations mail list somewhere?
On Mon, 23 Jan 2006, Gustavo Lozano wrote:
At 10:42 AM 1/22/2006 +0900, Randy Bush wrote:
any cctld ops seeing unusual traffic in the last hours?
Nope at .mx.
Gustavo
randy
gus
Hey all, probably not the best place to ask this but thought that I
would give it a shot.
At my company I manage 30 or so domain names through various registrars,
they existed before I came on board. Today I received an email from a
person claiming ownership of one of our valuable ones, valu
i am aware of at least 10 of them, 11 if you count NANOG.
--bill
On Mon, Jan 23, 2006 at 01:48:19PM -0800, william(at)elan.net wrote:
>
>
> Maybe I'm ignorant, but isn't there [cc]tld operations mail list somewhere?
>
> On Mon, 23 Jan 2006, Gustavo Lozano wrote:
>
> >At 10:42 AM 1
Are they in .org? If so, I would call PIR. More generally, I would
suggest you contact the registrar, not ICANN.
http://www.icann.org/registrars/accredited-list.html
On Jan 23, 2006, at 2:55 PM, Wil Schultz wrote:
Hey all, probably not the best place to ask this but thought that I
would
> > It seems like most of the routers which would need to make this decision
> > wouldn't have adequate information upon which to do so...
>
> not necessarily. the decision could be made in "near real time" by
> building prefix filters based on the algorithms that josh and co have
> worked on and
> To what extent does the route object validation in the RIPE database
> (for routes covering RIPE-allocated space), together with maintainer
> object authentication, provide a "perfect IRR", according to your
> research?
>
> (I realise the step from "useful, authenticated source of data" to
> "un
The domain in question is a .com
I've spoken with our current registrar and they cannot assist since it
isn't in their database, so I'm dealing with the registrar that the
domain shows at this point. I've asked her to make sure that no changes
would be made until this is resolved, she seemed
Try to go http://www.archive.org/ and use way back machine to see if
there was any page with some contact information or anything like that
on the pages that were cached, might help, or might not.. dunno
sometimes it helps me.
Mehmet Akcin
On Jan 23, 2006 07:43 PM, Wil Schultz <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
For those prefixes announced by ConEd within the last 3 days that it
no longer owns, correct, it would not of helped. But saving some is
certainly better than none. For the second statement things get a
little more subtle. We have considered allowing the trusted
originator of a prefix to split
Hello, hope this isn't too far offtopic here but being a troller for a long
time here I've realized there is a great knowledge base so I wanted to at
least see if i could get some tips. I help run a small colocation company
in California and I am in the middle of recommending a new 'core router'
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