I just submitted an I-D on TCP-MD5 key change. Until it shows up in the
official repository, see
http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/papers/draft-bellovin-keyroll2385-00.txt
Here's the abstract:
The TCP-MD5 option is most commonly used to secure
BGP sessions between r
Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
I just submitted an I-D on TCP-MD5 key change. Until it shows up in the
official repository, see
http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/papers/draft-bellovin-keyroll2385-00.txt
Here's the abstract:
The TCP-MD5 option is most commonly used to secure
On 19-jun-2006, at 14:32, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
I just submitted an I-D on TCP-MD5 key change. Until it shows up
in the
official repository, see
http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/papers/draft-bellovin-
keyroll2385-00.txt
Here's the abstract:
The TCP-MD5 option is most
On Mon, 19 Jun 2006 08:59:45 -0400, Joe Maimon <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
>
> > I just submitted an I-D on TCP-MD5 key change. Until it shows up in the
> > official repository, see
> > http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/papers/draft-bellovin-keyroll2385-00.txt
> >
On Mon, Jun 19, 2006 at 03:40:50PM +0200, Iljitsch van Beijnum wrote:
>
> On 19-jun-2006, at 14:32, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
>
> >I just submitted an I-D on TCP-MD5 key change. Until it shows up
> >in the
> >official repository, see
> >http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/papers/draft-bellovin-
On Mon, 19 Jun 2006 15:40:50 +0200, Iljitsch van Beijnum
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On 19-jun-2006, at 14:32, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
>
> > I just submitted an I-D on TCP-MD5 key change. Until it shows up
> > in the
> > official repository, see
> > http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/papers/d
> There doesn't really seem to be a way to introduce a new key other
> than to just to agree on a time. I'm not sure this is good enough.
try reading more carefully
Folks,
The IAB is considering holding a routing and addressing
workshop, perhaps in the fall 2006 time frame (see the
draft invite below). We're in the process of collecting
potential participants, so please pass along any the
names of folks that t
On 19-jun-2006, at 16:18, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
Comments welcome.
I wonder how long that policy will hold. (-:
I'm not certain what you mean by that, but since it sounds
insulting to
someone I'll ignore it.
I see that my attempts at levity (this one by referring to the
infamous
On 19-jun-2006, at 16:54, Randy Bush wrote:
There doesn't really seem to be a way to introduce a new key other
than to just to agree on a time. I'm not sure this is good enough.
try reading more carefully
Didn't help...
>>> There doesn't really seem to be a way to introduce a new key other
>>> than to just to agree on a time. I'm not sure this is good enough.
>> try reading more carefully
> Didn't help...
how sad, as the whole document is about how to usefully be able
to introduce and roll to new keys without ag
On 19-jun-2006, at 19:10, Randy Bush wrote:
try reading more carefully
Didn't help...
how sad, as the whole document is about how to usefully be able
to introduce and roll to new keys without agreeing on a narrow
time.
Well, as you can tell from my message just now, I don't think going
On Jun 15, 2006, at 7:06 AM, Kristal, Jeremiah wrote:
I don't think it was Extreme that filed it, or at least they didn't
write it. It was the good folks at Qwest engineering who came up with
the idea, which was implemented (for some low value of implemented) by
Extreme. The authors had move
IvB> Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2006 15:40:50 +0200
IvB> From: Iljitsch van Beijnum
IvB> And is NANOG now officially an IETF working group...?
More interaction between IETF and NANOG is good. Kudos to SMB for
trying to inspire more of it.
Eddy
--
Everquick Internet - http://www.everquick.net/
A divisi
On 6/19/06, Lionel Elie Mamane <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
You don't do your financial transactions over HTTPS? If you do, by the
very design of SSL, the tor exit node cannot add any HTTP header. That
would be a man-in-the-middle attack on SSL.
Which, for an anonymizing network, could be a del
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