oorly-operated blacklists are not dangerous. That implies (to me!) an
understatement of the potential effect of poorly-operated blacklists.
If I am wrong in that implication, I apologise.
--
Benjamin P. Grubin, CISSP, GIAC
Information Security Consulting
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> -Original
min P. Grubin, CISSP, GIAC
Information Security Consulting
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] On
> Behalf Of Steven J. Sobol
> Sent: Thursday, June 20, 2002 10:21 PM
> To: Benjamin P. Grubin
> Cc: 'Dan Hollis&
became that due to adoption. There are numerous other examples of
the line, and companies (or individuals) that cross it.
It took decades of high prices and lousy service to force regulation on
the telephone industry. I'd rather force appropriate controls to be in
place before I get bent over for a few years waiting for the government
to poorly regulate what may very well become an abusive industry.
Cheers,
Ben
--
Benjamin P. Grubin, CISSP, GIAC
Information Security Consulting
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
merit, despite the vocal complaints. Why not
discuss viable alternative trigger methods instead of whining about
portscans?
Cheers,
Benjamin P. Grubin, CISSP, GIAC
> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] On
> Behalf Of Greg A. Woods
> Sent: Su
Err--I think you guys are reading too much into this. The license (to
me, and IANAL), seems to indicate that the workstation cannot be used as
a server unless you purchase server licenses. It strikes me that
language very similar to this has been in the workstation products since
NT4.
I do,
It strikes me that much of the focus seems to be people on one hand
wanting "deep security expertise", which is considered technical, and on
another finding it difficult to actually have that single person be able
to impact enterprise/network-wide security. Since "deep security"
experts are a va
