There's also somewhat odd data in RADB (look at the changed: line):
route: 194.9.64.0/19
descr: SES-Newskies Customer Prefix
origin:AS16422
remarks: SES-Newskies Customer Prefix
notify:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
mnt-by:MNT-NWSK
changed: [EMAIL
* Eric Brunner-Williams:
However, Google/DoubleClick claim they have the right to collect PII
data and disclose less than their complete data collection policy, and
in particular, claim that endpoint identifiers do not tend to identify
individuals. Further, they assert a property claim on
* Leo Bicknell:
In a message written on Tue, Dec 25, 2007 at 12:43:45AM -0500, Kevin Loch
wrote:
RA is a shotgun. All hosts on a segment get the same gateway. I have
no idea what a host on multiple segments with different gateways would
do. Hosting environments can get complex thanks
* Tim Durack:
Probably why some vendors support dhcp snooping and private vlans for
IPv4 - multiple clients per subnet with isolation.
The isolation is far from perfect because you don't know from which host
the packet actually came. 8-(
* Joe Greco:
Right now, we might say wow, 256 subnets for a single end-user...
hogwash! and in years to come, wow, only 256 subnets... what were we
thinking!?
Well, what's the likelihood of the only 256 subnets problem?
There's a tendency to move away from (simulated) shared media
* Jeroen Massar:
For a list of ISP's doing IPv6 check:
http://www.sixxs.net/faq/connectivity/?faq=native
Does PPPv6 still work on the T-DSL platform? 8-/
The list would be more convincing if it contained links to product
pages.
--
Florian Weimer[EMAIL PROTECTED]
BFK edv
* Sebastian Abt:
* Florian Weimer wrote:
Does PPPv6 still work on the T-DSL platform? 8-/
Yes, it does.
Oh. What happened to the C10K PPPoE length field bug (CSCsd13298, if
I'm not mistaken)?
--
Florian Weimer[EMAIL PROTECTED]
BFK edv-consulting GmbH http
* Jared Mauch:
Within the next 2 major software releases (Microsoft OS) they're
going to by default require signed binaries. This will be the only viable
solution to the malware threat. Other operating systems may follow.
(This was a WAG, based on gut feeling).
The code signing CAs
* Sean Donelan:
I just wish the IETF would acknowledge this and go ahead and define a
DNS bit for artificial DNS answers for all these address correction
and domain parking and domain tasting people to use for their keen
Web 2.0 ideas.
And for all the other non-Web protocols which get
* Adrian Chadd:
So which ISPs have contributed towards more intelligent p2p content
routing and distribution; stuff which'd play better with their
networks?
Perhaps Internet2, with its DC++ hubs? 8-P
I think the problem is that better routing (Bittorrent content is
*not* routed by the
* Sean Donelan:
If its not the content, why are network engineers at many university
networks, enterprise networks, public networks concerned about the
impact particular P2P protocols have on network operations? If it was
just a single network, maybe they are evil. But when many different
* Sean Donelan:
On Sun, 21 Oct 2007, Mikael Abrahamsson wrote:
If your network cannot handle the traffic, don't offer the services.
So your recommendation is that universities, enterprises and ISPs
simply stop offering all Internet service because a few particular
application protocols are
* Eric Spaeth:
Of that group, only DSL doesn't have a common upstream bottleneck
between the subscriber and head-end.
DSL has got that, too, but it's much more statically allocated and
oversubscription results in different symptoms.
If you've got a cable with 50 wire pairs, and you can run
* Sean Donelan:
On Sun, 21 Oct 2007, Florian Weimer wrote:
If its not the content, why are network engineers at many university
networks, enterprise networks, public networks concerned about the
impact particular P2P protocols have on network operations? If it was
just a single network
* Pekka Savola:
Do we need to classify anything (yet)?
I say the proof is in the pudding. Once some major user decides
they'll need 240/4 for something, they'll end up knocking their
vendors' (probably dozens) and their own ops folks' doors.
If there's risk that we'll see end user
* Steve Bertrand:
Anyway, if you've got a customer account that was created with a stolen
credit card, and you get complaints about activity on that account from
various parties, and you still don't act, this shows a rather
significant level of carelessness.
Further to carelessness, this
* Mike Lewinski:
Florian Weimer wrote:
I don't know what case prompted Ferg to post his message to NANOG, but I
know that there are cases where failing to act is comparable to ignoring
the screams for help of an alleged rape victim during the alleged
crime.
I'm reminded of this story
, but there's
a certain installation base.
--
Florian Weimer[EMAIL PROTECTED]
BFK edv-consulting GmbH http://www.bfk.de/
Kriegsstraße 100 tel: +49-721-96201-1
D-76133 Karlsruhe fax: +49-721-96201-99
* Drew Weaver:
Up until recently, we were only providing the RIR database with
information about our larger allocations /24 or larger. We have
noticed however that many anti-spam organizations such as Spamhaus,
and Fiveten will use the lack of information regarding an IP
allocation as a
* Sean Donelan:
On Sun, 22 Jul 2007, William Allen Simpson wrote:
Comcast still blocks port 25. And last week, a locally well-known person
was blocked from sending outgoing port 25 email to their servers from her
home Comcast service.
MSA port 587 is only 9 years old. I guess it takes
* Patrick W. Gilmore:
IOW: ISPs have no real reason to stop port 587, they do have a reason
(whether you agree it is sufficient or not) to filter port 25.
Sorry for being unclear: If I block 25/TCP to *my* *own* servers for a
*customer*, I will make sure that I block 587/TCP as well.
? Is there a blacklist of RRs which
are known to deliver mostly bogus data to other RRs?
--
Florian Weimer[EMAIL PROTECTED]
BFK edv-consulting GmbH http://www.bfk.de/
Kriegsstraße 100 tel: +49-721-96201-1
D-76133 Karlsruhe fax: +49-721-96201-99
* Jeroen Massar:
I wonder how this solves the, from what I found out, common situation
that people rent cheap root servers in a country like Germany where
they VPN into and thus have full access to everything.
In Germany, the legal framework for filtering transit traffic already
exists, so
* Hank Nussbacher:
Based on http://www.iana.org/assignments/ipv4-address-space I would
assume IANA might be interested in mandating that any organization
having IP space from them must operate an accessible whois server.
For new address space, I agree. I'm not sure if it's worth the
trouble
* Suresh Ramasubramanian:
As frequent as Gadi is with his botnet posts, insecure and wide open
CPE getting deployed across a large provider is definitely
operational.
And if Gadi's examples are not scary enoug for you, there are far more
relevant vulnerabilities.
It seems that the
* Iljitsch van Beijnum:
Ok, I wasn't clear: the problem here is that both ARIN and RIPE claim
net 25.0.0.0/8 as their own.
This is pretty standard for European /8. 53/8 is yet another example
(Germany has moved to five-digit zip codes since that entry was last
updated).
At a previous job, I
* Rene Huizinga:
Well, at least is is still somehow with the same party...
Not quite. The organization formerly known as debis is now called
T-Systems.
Arin states 'Mercedes Benz AG', RIPE 'Daimler Chrysler'... One would
think this would/should actually be just the other way around, but
* Steven M. Bellovin:
A few years ago, the IETF was considering various jumbogram options.
As best I recall, that was the official response from the relevant
IEEE folks: no. They're concerned with backward compatibility.
Gigabit ethernet has already broken backwards compatibility and is
* Steven M. Bellovin:
On Thu, 12 Apr 2007 16:12:43 +0200
Florian Weimer [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
* Steven M. Bellovin:
A few years ago, the IETF was considering various jumbogram options.
As best I recall, that was the official response from the relevant
IEEE folks: no. They're
* Fergie:
While the 0-day exploit is the ANI vulnerability, there are many,
many compromised websites (remember the MiamiDolhins.com embedded
javascript iframe redirect?) that are using similar embedded .js
redirects to malware hosted sites which fancy this exploit.
And some of them have
* Paul Vixie:
since malware isn't breaking dns, and since dns not a vector per se,
the idea of changing dns in any way to try to control malware
strikes me as a way to get dns to be broken in more places more
often.
Well, once more people learn about DLV (especially the NS override
* Ray Burkholder:
How about something like:
http://www.hdfgroup.org/whatishdf5.html
I don't think they support transactional updates, which makes it hard
to use for live data. (A simple crash, and you need to recover from
backup.)
--
Florian Weimer[EMAIL PROTECTED]
BFK edv
* Rodrick Brown:
Right now somewhat more than half of all Internet bandwidth is being
used for BitTorrent traffic, which is mainly video. Yet if you
surveyed your neighbors you'd find that few of them are BitTorrent
users. Less than 5 percent of all Internet users are presently
consuming
* Neil J. McRae:
I didn't see the original post but the topic came
up in 2005 here in the UK as the banks here wanted to
use BGP filtering in the same light. The LINX prepared
a paper on the issues with BGP blackholing and recommended
that if the banks want to trade on the Internet that
* Randy Bush:
I would be glad to run the script but I just want to verify that it
was you who sent it.
darned good point, ron. blush
yes, it was i.
Ah, thanks, I've saved your message and its signature. It could prove
useful in the future for some kind of social engineering attack. 8-P
* Jared Mauch:
My recommendation is to write a letter (in german) and fax it
over to their fax# with the urls clearly written out (eg: iana vs
their url) showing the problem with the address space. it'll likely
sufficently confuse someone that they'll be curious and research it
and
* Chris L. Morrow:
So, all of the current devices need to get upgraded before 'day one' of
32-bit ASN use... that'll be fun :)
| 6. Transition
|
|The scheme described in this document allows a gradual transition
|from 2-octet AS numbers to 4-octet AS numbers. One can upgrade one
|
* Chris L. Morrow:
| 6. Transition
|
|The scheme described in this document allows a gradual transition
|from 2-octet AS numbers to 4-octet AS numbers. One can upgrade one
|Autonomous System or one BGP speaker at a time.
Routers on stub ASs don't need upgrading at all, for
* Alexander Harrowell:
66.36.240.2 AS14361
HOPONE-DCA c-vl102-d1.acc.dca2.hopone.net.255
US Unix: 14:38:16.496
2 0 2 6 0.6 ms [+0ms]
Uhm, are you a Hop One customer? In this case, it's a bit ... strange
that you complain about
* Jim Popovitch:
Two questions for everybody...(any and all responses appreciated, even
if the reply mentions botnets or hammers ;-) )
1) What value is ICMP if everybody pretty much considers it's accuracy
suspect?
The problem with ICMP-based traceroutes is that it doesn't necessarily
test
* Douglas Otis:
Spam being sent through Bot farms has already set the stage for
untraceable DNS attacks based upon SPF. In addition to taking out major
interconnects, these attacks can:
a) inundate authoritative DNS;
b) requests A records from anywhere;
c) probe IP address, port,
* Steven M. Bellovin:
As you note, the 20-25% figure (of addresses) has been pretty constant
for quite a while. Assuming that subverted machines are uniformly
distributed (a big assumption)
I doubt this assumption about distribution is valid. At least over
here, consumer-grade ISPs (think
Has anybody got a working HostRocket contact? They (or their
customers) seem to have a larger security incident. 8-(
Alternatively, someone at Time Warner Telecom who can get in touch
with them would be helpful.
* Michael Dillon:
The volume of data cached would be so small in todays terms that
it only needs a low-end 1U (or single blade) server to handle
this.
The working set is larger than you think, I fear. I've been running
something like this since summer 2004, and the gigabytes pile up
rather
* Hank Nussbacher:
Please show me which virus scanner scans html pages for the words like
V I A G R A, or Free M O R T G A G E, as it is going outbound.
I assumed your Internet cafe example was the concrete scenario you
were trying to address. There are quite a few scaners which contain
* Hank Nussbacher:
Back in 2002 I asked if anyone had a solution to block or rate limit
outgoing web based spam.
What is web-based spam? Comment spam? Wiki defacements? Or do you
want to stop spam sent via web mailers? That's their job. They know
more about their customers than you, and
* Hank Nussbacher:
I guess I wasn't clear enough in my first posting. I am not
interested in smtp (port 25 spam). We have that covered. I am only
interested in blocking outgoing web based spam. A user sits and sends
out spam via automated tools via Hotmail, Yahoo, Gmail, or whatever
* Suresh Ramasubramanian:
Yes, Sean - they are. But it is far, far more productive for the
source of this abuse to be choked off. Call it the difference between
using mosquito repellant and draining a huge pool of stagnant water
just outside your home.
How can I, as an ISP, stop abuse
* Jeremy Chadwick:
On Wed, Aug 02, 2006 at 09:10:31PM +0200, Florian Weimer wrote:
Has anyone come up with a quick method for detecting if a domain
name is parked, but is not being used except displaying ads?
AFAICT, the main challenge is to define what parked means in the
context
* Sean Donelan:
Has anyone come up with a quick method for detecting if a domain
name is parked, but is not being used except displaying ads?
AFAICT, the main challenge is to define what parked means in the
context of your application.
* Patrick W. Gilmore:
Actually, I take that back. Why wouldn't you just get a feed from
Cymru http://www.cymru.com/Bogons/index.html ??
I don't think Team Cymru offers a feed of what is supposed to be in
the routing table. 128/1 isn't a bogon. It's not even that useful
for hijacking adress
* Seth Johnson:
(A) Internet.— The term “Internet” means the worldwide,
publicly accessible system of interconnected
computer networks that transmit data by packet
switching using the standard Internet Protocol (IP),
some
* Steven M. Bellovin:
The second is the precedent that's set -- who gets to decide what zones
are excluded from the tree? OpenDNS? Sure -- and to whom do they
listen? Are any sites to be ruled out on political grounds?
Ideological? Not today, sure, and (I assume) not by OpenDNS -- but
* Mark Newton:
On Tue, Jul 11, 2006 at 07:58:48AM +0200, Florian Weimer wrote:
(I've wondered for quite some time if net neutrality implies that
Ebay or Google must carry third party traffic on their corporate
networks, by the way.)
eBay and Google aren't selling transit.
Neither
* Mark Newton:
On Tue, Jul 11, 2006 at 09:39:50AM +0200, Florian Weimer wrote:
* Mark Newton:
On Tue, Jul 11, 2006 at 07:58:48AM +0200, Florian Weimer wrote:
(I've wondered for quite some time if net neutrality implies that
Ebay or Google must carry third party traffic
* Mark Newton:
I think you're missing the point, Florian. Regardless of any
retail restrictions, the fact still remains that your local
Cable company is selling connectivity to other peoples'
autonomous systems.
Then why do the ads promote their new chat service, instead the
* Fergie:
I disagree with your statement on NAT end-points not being publicly
accessible -- that's certainly not true, and a myth that needs to be
finally killed.
From a security point of view, they are still accessible. From an
operational point of view, they are not, at least not on the
* Mike Tancsa:
Many mini-itx boxes dont have 2 PCI slots. You might be better going
with a mini-itx solution and then use a small switch and trunk the NIC
to act as a VLAN router.
Are there any fanless routers with proper 802.1Q support (with ingress
VLAN tag filtering, for instance)?
* Mike Tancsa:
Many mini-itx boxes dont have 2 PCI slots. You might be better going
with a mini-itx solution and then use a small switch and trunk the NIC
to act as a VLAN router.
Are there any fanless routers with proper 802.1Q support (with ingress
VLAN tag filtering, for instance)?
* Christopher L. Morrow:
On Wed, 14 Jun 2006, Suresh Ramasubramanian wrote:
http://thespamdiaries.blogspot.com/2006/02/new-host-cloaking-technique-used-by.html
* Monitor your local network for interfaces transmitting ARP
responses they shouldn't be.
how about just mac security on
* Christopher L. Morrow:
is it really that hard to make your foudry/extreme/cisco l3 switch vlan
and subnet??? Is this a education thing or a laziness thing?
You need those L3 switches before you can do this. Obviously, L2 gear
is much cheaper, and will work equally well until it is
* Gadi Evron:
Ignoring is the high-road. How long are we going to cry about the
Internet being a battle-ground, the wild west, or whatever else if
we legitimize DDoS?
The project needs to gather supporters before they can do any real
damage. Reports exposing their nefarious practices are
* Gadi Evron:
http://news.google.com/news?q=black+frog
How do we make this folly stop?
Ignore it? It's an inactive Sourceforge project (with some Google
forums attached), and news reports seem to be based on a Slashdot
diary entry announcing it:
* Peter Dambier:
In germany censoring is commonplace. You have to use foraign resolvers
to escape it. There is a lot collateral dammage too - governement has
provided the tools.
This is not true. There has been some questionable advice by a
regulatory body, though. Most damage is done by
* Andy Davidson:
DNS looking glasses, in much the same way that we use web-form based
BGP or traceroute looking glasses today.
Open resolvers are far better then looking glasses to assess the state
of DNS, and we are campaigning against them. You can't have it both
ways. 8-(
* Peter Dambier:
This is not true. There has been some questionable advice by a
regulatory body, though. Most damage is done by ISPs which simply do
not adjust the filters to the moving target and run them as-is since
2001 or so. Null routes tend to filter a different customer after
such
* Joe Shen:
What's your method to deal with such problem? Will
CHAP in PPPoE help?
AFAIK, CHAP does not authenticate the terminal server, either, so it
won't stop all attacks.
* Steven M. Bellovin:
CHAP can be bidirectional.
I stand corrected.
However, the value of this type of authentication is rather
questionable if the underlying communication channel is so horribly
insecure.
* Christopher J. Pilkington:
We have a disaster recovery site which will have a clone of the myriad
production servers. We'd like to fail over to that site
automagically.
I'm thinking advertising the same prefix and just doing several
as-prepends. However, now I'm not sure if this is a
* Frank Louwers:
Strange thing is that we have exact the opposite here in Europe. There
is a new bill that has been passed that forces us to keep al logs (mail
and web) for at least 1 or 2 years.
It's not a bill, it's a EU directive which still has to be implemented
in national law. Nothing
* Randy Bush:
so, anyone working on the majordomo and mailman hacks for goodmail?
i am sorry, but you can not subscribe to this list from an aol.com
address. don't ask us to explain, ask [EMAIL PROTECTED]
or am i missing something here? clue-bat if so, please.
I don't expect the existing
* Jeffrey I. Schiller:
Let me attempt to bring this back to the policy question.
Does someone have the *right* to put one of your IP addresses as an NS
record for their domain even if you do not agree?
I don't think it's allowed (and it shouldn't be), but without a
cluestick from legal, you
* Randy Bush:
it is a best practice to separate authoritative and recursive servers.
why?
e.g. a small isp has a hundred auth zones (secondaried far
away and off-net, of course) and runs cache. why should
they separate auth from cache?
Some registrars require that you begin to serve the
If there is a new user account, or if the enable and access passwords
have changed, look out! The miscreants love to scan and find routers
with cisco as the access and enable passwords.
I thought everyone sensible put ACLs on vtys. Guess I was wrong.
I've seen ACL-less VTYs because someone
* william elan net:
For those doing similar exercise, you might want to look at rephrased
version of rfc330 listed blocks:
http://www.completewhois.com/iana-ipv4-specialuse.txt
You should move 192.88.99.0/24 from SPECIAL to YES (although you
shouldn't see source addresses from that prefix,
* Martin Hannigan:
You should move 192.88.99.0/24 from SPECIAL to YES (although you
shouldn't see source addresses from that prefix, no matter what the
folks at bit.nl think). 169.254.0.0/16 should be NO (otherwise it
wouldn't be link-local).
Good example as to why to use authoratative
* william elan net:
You should move 192.88.99.0/24 from SPECIAL to YES (although you
shouldn't see source addresses from that prefix, no matter what the
folks at bit.nl think). 169.254.0.0/16 should be NO (otherwise it
wouldn't be link-local).
I think you just explained it yourself why
* Pim van Pelt:
Hi Florian, others,
| You should move 192.88.99.0/24 from SPECIAL to YES (although you
| shouldn't see source addresses from that prefix, no matter what the
| folks at bit.nl think). 169.254.0.0/16 should be NO (otherwise it
| wouldn't be link-local).
Hi, here's a
* Martin Hannigan:
Dave, RIAA wins almost 100pct vs p2p'ers ir sues. Its an interesting
dichotomy.
Sure, but copyright law is a bit out of proportion. Maybe you could
hunt down the bad guys if they packeted you with Celine Dion
* Barrett G. Lyon:
Here is a list of the compromised machines used in this new botnet we
found in California. These are all web servers connected to good
bandwidth and they are attacking us, so as a nice little holiday gift
to me, please clean your network up if these are on your
* Scott Morris:
Not to mention that many IP's may be set to one device, yet there are
multiple things NAT'd behind it.
Are there any devices which perform non-static NAT and can forward
significant DoS traffic? 8-) Perhaps if it's just a single flow, but
this kind of DoS traffic would be
* Sean Donelan:
ATT, Global Crossing, Level3, MCI, Savvis, Sprint, etc have sold
QOS services for years. Level3 says 20% of the traffic over its
backbone is better than Best-Effort.
Well, are you sure these traffic classes are actually enforced at the
router level? Maybe it's just a
* Steven M. Bellovin:
A-V companies are in the business of analyzing viruses.
Many offer analysis services, but this is done upon special request,
and only if you pay extra.
They should *know* how a particular virus behaves.
You don't need to know what the virus does in order to detect it
* Dennis Dayman:
Interested, but I see many Sober postings and outages on other lists
and not here...has anyone been having issues? I know the ISP's are
fighting the living out of the virus.
As far as I know. mainly webmail providers were affected, and their
issues are traditionally not
* Christopher L. Morrow:
he might be satisfied with:
mail.pch.net. 86400 IN A 206.220.231.1
:~ host -W 6 -R 10 -t txt 1.231.220.206.asn.routeviews.org
1.231.220.206.asn.routeviews.org text 3856 206.220.228.0 22
which is AS 3856 routing 206.220.228.0/22 ... which
* Christopher L. Morrow:
asn.routeviews.org doesn't do longest-prefix matching, so you need a
short Perl script to get the correct ASN, attached below. However,
which means host -t txt ip will return more than one record, yes?
Exactly.
so he can just scan for the longest length in the
* Valdis Kletnieks:
On Thu, 24 Nov 2005 20:26:56 +0100, Florian Weimer said:
Wouldn't this provide significant economic incentive towards gaining a
high value on this metric? I'm not sure if this a good idea because
even if you call it a trust metric, it does not have to correspond
* Michael Dillon:
How would you feel about having the registries serve as the root of
a hierarchical certificate system?
What about the swamp space?
Presumably if the users of class C blocks in the swamp
The class B assignments are even more interesting because some of them
have been
* Sandy Murphy:
How would you feel about having the registries serve as the root of
a hierarchical certificate system?
What about the swamp space?
So an institution would have its certificate signed
by its upstream (or one of its upstream) providers.
(Don't know where that quote comes
* Steven M. Bellovin:
Furthermore, given that a trust algebra may yield a trust value, rather
than a simple 0/1, is it reasonable to use that assessment as a BGP
preference selector? That would tie the security very deeply -- too
deeply? -- into BGP's guts.
Wouldn't this provide
* Bill Woodcock:
Right. The idea was to lock down things which were in the legacy space,
unless people were prepared to undergo the full scrutiny of having them
transferred into an RIR (basically dampen the rash of hijackings),
In the end, this boils down to disappropriation. Early
* william elan net:
They get to continue to be .COM registry forever as new agreement
would extend to 2012 and then automatically extended further without
formal process as it happened recently for .NET. They also are going
to be able to increase registry fees for .COM by 7% per year which
* Daniel Roesen:
On Sun, Oct 23, 2005 at 09:48:58PM +0200, Florian Weimer wrote:
This isn't the first time this has happened to an ISP. 8-(
Indeed.
Are there any configuration tweaks which can locally confine such an
event? Something like the hard prefix limit for BGP, perhaps.
JunOS
* Daniel Roesen:
On Mon, Oct 24, 2005 at 01:25:23PM +0200, Florian Weimer wrote:
Are there any configuration tweaks which can locally confine such an
event? Something like the hard prefix limit for BGP, perhaps.
JunOS:
set protocols ospf prefix-export-limit n
set protocols isis
* Chris Woodfield:
Said the flowerpot: Oh no, not again...
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D8DEL2TO7.htm?
campaign_id=apn_tech_downchan=tc
I don't understand what VeriSign receives in return for their kowtow
(under the agreement, they basically waive any right to criticize
* Daniel Roesen:
On Sun, Oct 23, 2005 at 11:59:15AM +0200, Peter Dambier wrote:
I means, here in germany we cannot see h.root-servers.net
Nonsense. There is nothing like geopolitical routing.
I wouldn't call it geopolitical routing, routing according to local
policy is more appropriate.
However, due to the number of flooded LSAs, other devices in the
Level 3 network had difficulty fully loading the OSPF tables and
processing the volume of updates. This caused abnormal conditions
within portions of the Level 3 network. Manual intervention on
specific routers was required
* Daniel Roesen:
On Wed, Oct 12, 2005 at 11:13:12AM -1000, Randy Bush wrote:
also to be noted is that rir statistics on who has what space are
not in the best of shape, ripe's being particularly obfuscated.
*raising an eyebrow*
Would you care to elaborate on that?
AFAIK, the status of
* Joe Abley:
On 5-Oct-2005, at 05:53, william(at)elan.net wrote:
2002::/16 AS3344 - 6to4 relay anycast - no longer done, right??
6to4 is alive and well.
For some values of. I believe the bit.nl 6to4 gateway still generates
IPv4 packets with non-routable source addresses, which are uRPFed
* Gadi Evron:
I would really like to hear some thoughts from the NANOG community on
threats such as the one described above. Let us not get into an argument
about 0-days and consider how many routers are actually patched the
first... day.. week, month? after a vulnerability is released.
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