On 1 Jul, 2005, at 23:16, David Conrad wrote:
Remember the marketing hype about OSI? Remember the marketing hype
about ATM?
Or, back on topic, remember GOSIP?
Who's the next Milo?
Sean.
On 7 Jul, 2005, at 21:10, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
Real firewalls pass inbound traffic because a
state table entry exists. NATs do the same thing, with nasty
side-effects. There is no added security from the header-mangling.
To which Len Bosak quipped a few years ago: "If you don't know
On 8 Jul, 2005, at 18:34, Fred Baker wrote:
A NAT, in that context, is a stateful firewall that changes the
addresses, which means that the end station cannot use IPSEC to
ensure that it is still talking with the same system on the outside.
Only if you define IPSEC narrowly as AH in order
On 8 Jul, 2005, at 18:34, Fred Baker wrote:
A NAT, in that context, is a stateful firewall that changes the
addresses, which means that the end station cannot use IPSEC to
ensure that it is still talking with the same system on the outside.
Only if you define IPSEC narrowly as AH in or
Small detail:
On 6 Jul, 2005, at 16:30, David Conrad wrote:
If IPv6 had actually addressed one or more of routing scalability,
multi-homing, or transparent renumbering
These are the same problem, looked at in different ways.
The issue is: graph-sorting scalability demands abstraction;
a
