Re: Operators Penalized? (was Re: Kenyan Route Hijack)

2008-03-17 Thread Pekka Savola
On Mon, 17 Mar 2008, Larry J. Blunk wrote: RFC2827 is about source address filtering which is not really the same as BGP route announcement filtering. Unfortunately, I have not come across any RFC's with a thorough discussion of route filtering. It is mentioned briefly in RFC 3013, but secti

Re: Operators Penalized? (was Re: Kenyan Route Hijack)

2008-03-17 Thread Suresh Ramasubramanian
On Mon, Mar 17, 2008 at 8:48 PM, Larry J. Blunk <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >RFC2827 is about source address filtering which > is not really the same as BGP route announcement > filtering. Unfortunately, I have not come across Yup, radb etc for that. Not fully awake when I wrote that, and h

Re: Operators Penalized? (was Re: Kenyan Route Hijack)

2008-03-17 Thread Joe Maimon
Glen Kent wrote: Do ISPs (PTA, AboveNet, etc) that "unintentionally" hijack someone else IP address space, ever get penalized in *any* form? The net only functions as a single entity because sp's intentionally DONT hijack space and the mutual trust in other sp's rational behavior. Si

Re: Operators Penalized? (was Re: Kenyan Route Hijack)

2008-03-17 Thread Larry J. Blunk
Suresh Ramasubramanian wrote: On Mon, Mar 17, 2008 at 6:38 PM, Jeff Aitken <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: IMHO a better use of our time would be to solve the underlying technical issue(s). Whether it's soBGP, sBGP, or something else, we need to figure out how to make one of these proposals w

Re: Operators Penalized? (was Re: Kenyan Route Hijack)

2008-03-17 Thread Suresh Ramasubramanian
On Mon, Mar 17, 2008 at 6:38 PM, Jeff Aitken <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > IMHO a better use of our time would be to solve the underlying technical > issue(s). Whether it's soBGP, sBGP, or something else, we need to figure > out how to make one of these proposals work and get it implemented. S

Re: Operators Penalized? (was Re: Kenyan Route Hijack)

2008-03-17 Thread Jeff Aitken
On Mon, Mar 17, 2008 at 03:48:07PM +0530, Glen Kent wrote: > Do ISPs (PTA, AboveNet, etc) that "unintentionally" hijack someone > else IP address space, ever get penalized in *any* form? Not usually. I remember an incident (while working at AboveNet, ironically) back in 98/99 where 701 "acciden

Re: Operators Penalized? (was Re: Kenyan Route Hijack)

2008-03-17 Thread Suresh Ramasubramanian
On Mon, Mar 17, 2008 at 3:48 PM, Glen Kent <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Do ISPs (PTA, AboveNet, etc) that "unintentionally" hijack someone > else IP address space, ever get penalized in *any* form? Depending > upon whom and what they hijack, and who all get affected, it sure can PTA's ASN actu

Re: Kenyan Route Hijack

2008-03-17 Thread Ross Vandegrift
On Mon, Mar 17, 2008 at 01:13:04PM +0530, Suresh Ramasubramanian wrote: > anybody see similar routing loops for those other prefixes that'd make > it look like 5999 is a blackhole community at abovenet, so this dude > is seeing what ORBS saw way back when (2000, right) - that is, he had > abuse is

Re: Kenyan Route Hijack

2008-03-17 Thread Jeff Aitken
On Sat, Mar 15, 2008 at 11:57:50AM -0600, Danny McPherson wrote: > An interesting bit is that the current announcement on routeviews > directly from AS 6461 has Community 6461:5999 attached: > ... > 6461 > 64.125.0.137 from 64.125.0.137 (64.125.0.137) > Origin IGP, metric 0, localpref

Operators Penalized? (was Re: Kenyan Route Hijack)

2008-03-17 Thread Glen Kent
> > > > Usually unintentional. See Pakistan Telecom for recent example. > > Pakistan's blackhole was semi-unintentional, kind of like you tried to > shoot your spouse but the bullet went through the wall and > "unintentionally" hit a neighbor. Do ISPs (PTA, AboveNet, etc) that "unintention

Re: Kenyan Route Hijack

2008-03-17 Thread Suresh Ramasubramanian
On 17 Mar 2008 04:12:13 +, Paul Vixie <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > i think, at this stage and at this date, that bringing up the ORBS/abovenet > debacle constitutes a "canard", and should be avoided, for the good of all. Completely unrelated to l'affaire ORBS of course, but in this more rec

Re: Kenyan Route Hijack

2008-03-16 Thread Paul Vixie
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Payne) writes: > > I think it was Abovenet that blackholed a /24 of (I want to say MAPS, > > but that's not right) an anti-spam-RBL sometime pre-1999? > > ORBS, and the only reason it became such a big deal was that Abovenet was > the upstream of ORBS' upstream. And that

Re: Kenyan Route Hijack

2008-03-16 Thread Barry Shein
On March 16, 2008 at 06:25 [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Paul Ferguson) wrote: > > -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- > Hash: SHA1 > > - -- "Glen Kent" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > >If its done intentionally then it would only make sense if theres a > >DOS attack coming from that address block,

Re: Kenyan Route Hijack

2008-03-16 Thread John Payne
On Mar 16, 2008, at 2:36 AM, Christopher Morrow wrote: I think it was Abovenet that blackholed a /24 of (I want to say MAPS, but that's not right) an anti-spam-RBL sometime pre-1999? ORBS, and the only reason it became such a big deal was that Abovenet was the upstream of ORBS' upstream. A

Re: Kenyan Route Hijack

2008-03-16 Thread Jon Lewis
On Mon, 17 Mar 2008, Alastair Johnson wrote: Correct. A particularly interesting case, since ORBS' transit provider was also a transit customer of Above.net. Said transit provider would announce their /16s, of which ORBS sat in a /24 or two of, and have their traffic blackholed. IIRC they

AW: Kenyan Route Hijack

2008-03-16 Thread Gunther Stammwitz
hours of outage... Whoah.. expensive! Gunther > -Ursprüngliche Nachricht- > Von: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Im > Auftrag von Felix Bako > Gesendet: Sonntag, 16. März 2008 09:05 > An: Paul Ferguson > Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; nanog@merit.edu > Betreff: R

Re: Kenyan Route Hijack

2008-03-16 Thread Alastair Johnson
Kameron Gasso wrote: Christopher Morrow wrote: I think it was Abovenet that blackholed a /24 of (I want to say MAPS, but that's not right) an anti-spam-RBL sometime pre-1999? If I'm not mistaken, that was ORBS. Correct. A particularly interesting case, since ORBS' transit provider was als

Re: Kenyan Route Hijack

2008-03-16 Thread Kameron Gasso
Christopher Morrow wrote: > I think it was Abovenet that blackholed a /24 of (I want to say MAPS, > but that's not right) an anti-spam-RBL sometime pre-1999? If I'm not mistaken, that was ORBS. > perhaps they had a significant number of complaints about the address > block and no reaction from

Re: Kenyan Route Hijack

2008-03-16 Thread Matt
Did they provide a reason for the outage? If so, please let us know what the issue was. Felix Bako wrote: Thank guyz for your Help. Above.net finaly resolved the issue Regards Felix Paul Ferguson wrote: -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 - -- "Glen Kent" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: Kenyan Route Hijack

2008-03-16 Thread Felix Bako
Thank guyz for your Help. Above.net finaly resolved the issue Regards Felix Paul Ferguson wrote: -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 - -- "Glen Kent" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: If its done intentionally then it would only make sense if theres a DOS attack coming from that ad

Re: Kenyan Route Hijack

2008-03-15 Thread Christopher Morrow
On Sun, Mar 16, 2008 at 2:07 AM, Glen Kent <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Paul, > > > > Also: I have seen instances where a static route points to a next > > hop that (inadvertently) may be "redistribute-static" injected into > > BGP. This happens occasionally due to ad hoc configurations,

Re: Kenyan Route Hijack

2008-03-15 Thread Paul Ferguson
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 - -- "Glen Kent" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >If its done intentionally then it would only make sense if theres a >DOS attack coming from that address block, or if theres something >"blasphemous" put up there. If none of these, then why locally >black

Re: Kenyan Route Hijack

2008-03-15 Thread Glen Kent
Paul, > Also: I have seen instances where a static route points to a next > hop that (inadvertently) may be "redistribute-static" injected into > BGP. This happens occasionally due to ad hoc configurations, back- > hole null routing, etc. And why would an ISP locally try to blackhole traffic

Re: Kenyan Route Hijack

2008-03-15 Thread Adrian Chadd
On Sat, Mar 15, 2008, Danny McPherson wrote: > > > A bit more analysis of this at the moment, and a few recommendations > and related pointers is available here: > > http://tinyurl.com/2nqg2a Its a good writeup. :) It almost sounds like Felix should talk to some friendly SP's and organise /25

Re: Kenyan Route Hijack

2008-03-15 Thread Paul Ferguson
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 - -- "Bill Stewart" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >I've seen two popular reasons for doing it accidentally >- Fat fingers when configuring IP addresses by hand >- Using old routing protocols such as IGRP or RIP and autosummarizing >routes, > usually d

Re: Kenyan Route Hijack

2008-03-15 Thread Randy Bush
> A popular reason from longer ago was enterprises that used > arbitrary addresses for their internal networks, > which was safe because they'd never be connected to the real internet. > RFC1918 has made that problem mostly go away, > but as recently as 1995 I had a customer who was a bank that wa

Re: Kenyan Route Hijack

2008-03-15 Thread Bill Stewart
On Sat, Mar 15, 2008 at 9:09 PM, Glen Kent <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Unlike the Youtube outage where PTA had issued a directive asking all > ISPs to block Youtube - What is the reason most often cited for such > mishaps? The reason i ask this is because the ISPs that > "inadvertently" hijac

Re: Kenyan Route Hijack

2008-03-15 Thread Glen Kent
Unlike the Youtube outage where PTA had issued a directive asking all ISPs to block Youtube - What is the reason most often cited for such mishaps? The reason i ask this is because the ISPs that "inadvertently" hijack someone elses IP space, need to explicitly configure *something* to do this. So

Re: Kenyan Route Hijack

2008-03-15 Thread Danny McPherson
A bit more analysis of this at the moment, and a few recommendations and related pointers is available here: http://tinyurl.com/2nqg2a -danny

Kenyan Route Hijack

2008-03-15 Thread Danny McPherson
[more accurate subject line] On Mar 14, 2008, at 1:33 PM, Felix Bako wrote: Hello, There is a routing loop while accesing my network 194.9.82.0/24 from some networks on the Internet. | This is a test done from lg.above.net looking glass. 1 ten-gige-2-2.mpr2.ams2.nl.above.net (64.125.26.