regards,
__
Al Rowland
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] On
Behalf Of Leo Bicknell
Sent: Tuesday, January 28, 2003 8:03 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Banc of America Article
FWIW:
http
AR Date: Wed, 29 Jan 2003 07:20:35 -0800
AR From: Al Rowland
AR IIRC, the ATM system is similar to CC transactions. A best
AR effort is made to authorize against your account (Credit Card
AR or Banking) but if it fails and the transaction is within a
AR normal range (your daily card limit) the
IIRC, the ATM system is similar to CC transactions. A best effort is
made to authorize against your account (Credit Card or Banking) but if
it fails and the transaction is within a normal range (your daily card
limit) the CC/ATM completes the transaction.
Too bad it is not the case,
At 12:46 PM 1/29/2003, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
IIRC, the ATM system is similar to CC transactions. A best effort is
made to authorize against your account (Credit Card or Banking) but if
it fails and the transaction is within a normal range (your daily card
limit) the CC/ATM completes the
Best regards,
__
Al Rowland
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] On
Behalf Of Leo Bicknell
Sent: Tuesday, January 28, 2003 8:03 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Banc of America Article
FWIW:
http
On Wed, Jan 29, 2003 at 01:19:08PM -0500, Charles Sprickman wrote:
On Wed, 29 Jan 2003, Al Rowland wrote:
Or,
IIRC, the ATM system is similar to CC transactions. A best effort is
made to authorize against your account (Credit Card or Banking) but if
it fails and the transaction is
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
It could be that BoA's network wasn't flooded / servers infected, but that
the ATM's do not dial BoA directly, and dial somewhere else (ie, maybe some
kind of ATM Dial Provider, nationwide wholesale, etc), and then tunnel back
to BoA to get the data. Could be
I'm familiar with some enforced financial institution requirements, no
where did I find transaction data of ATMs on a dedicated network to be
_required_. Is this a common industry practice, or a mandatory standard
I have not discovered?
It is a common practice. Since the alarm line is
FWIW:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A57550-2003Jan28.html
About 13,000 Bank of America cash machines had to be shut down. The
bank's ATMs sent encrypted information through the Internet, and when
the data slowed to a crawl, it stymied transactions, according to a
source, who
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Leo Bicknell writes:
FWIW:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A57550-2003Jan28.html
About 13,000 Bank of America cash machines had to be shut down. The
bank's ATMs sent encrypted information through the Internet, and when
the data slowed to a crawl,
I think you're leaving out a very viable possibility in your summary...
What if BoA took a proactive approach and shut down their SQL environment
(even though none of us known conclusively if they're a SQL or Oracle shop)
to verify that it was in fact clean and not compromised. When you're
knowing absolutely nothing about how BoA ATM's work
It could be that BoA's network wasn't flooded / servers infected, but that
the ATM's do not dial BoA directly, and dial somewhere else (ie, maybe some
kind of ATM Dial Provider, nationwide wholesale, etc), and then tunnel back
to BoA to
Actually, I think too many assumptions were made.
Let's simplify.
We know UUNet traffic capabilities were reduced significantly. Uunet
has many big customers. Other big carriers had similar affects on their
networks, probably particularly at peering points.
We know many companies use
While they may have VPN's at many of their branches which offer significant
savings over leased lines everywhere, their web site access to personal
banking information was also offline. It would be worth grepping logs to
see if there was indeed a SQL server from the inside that was infected.
E.B. Dreger wrote:
Date: Sun, 26 Jan 2003 00:22:02 -0500 (Eastern Standard Time)
From: Alex Rubenstein
Agreed. And, even if it is super encrypted, who cares? Enough
CPU and time will take care of that.
Articles about 1000 years to crack using brute force are a bit
disconcerting if
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], E.B.
Dreger writes:
AR Date: Sun, 26 Jan 2003 00:22:02 -0500 (Eastern Standard Time)
AR From: Alex Rubenstein
AR Agreed. And, even if it is super encrypted, who cares? Enough
AR CPU and time will take care of that.
Articles about 1000 years to crack using brute
Just like the insider TCI theft ring at
http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1106-971196.html , the easy way out is to just to
skip all that and get access to a leased line from the inside - I'll bet
many financial transactions over a private line aren't even encrypted.
- Original Message -
Yes,
]]
Sent: Sunday, January 26, 2003 10:59 AM
To: Ray Burkholder
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: RE: Banc of America Article
Let me summarize, then ask a question:
a) BoA uses the public internet for ATM transactions. The public internet
was so dead, that every one of thier ATM
From: Alex Rubenstein
Does anyone else, based upon the assumptions above, believe this statement
to be patently incorrect (specifically, the part about 'personal
information had not been at risk.') ?
Actually, the statements are correct. Remember, the worm wasn't programmed
to put the
On Sat, 25 Jan 2003, Alex Rubenstein wrote:
Does anyone else, based upon the assumptions above, believe this statement
to be patently incorrect (specifically, the part about 'personal
information had not been at risk.') ?
Patently incorrect? No. It is possible.
Even if the confidentiality
On Sat, Jan 25, 2003 at 05:45:16PM -0500, Alex Rubenstein wrote:
Another article states, Bank of America Corp., one of the nation's
largest banks, said many customers could not withdraw money from its
13,000 ATM machines because of technical problems caused by the attack. A
spokeswoman, Lisa
knowing absolutely nothing about how BoA ATM's work
It could be that BoA's network wasn't flooded / servers infected, but that
the ATM's do not dial BoA directly, and dial somewhere else (ie, maybe some
kind of ATM Dial Provider, nationwide wholesale, etc), and then tunnel back
to BoA to get
Does anyone else, based upon the assumptions above, believe this
statement
to be patently incorrect (specifically, the part about 'personal
information had not been at risk.') ?
Which not technically correct, they are not technically incorrect
either.
Hm. One possible attack on BoA's
On Sat, 25 Jan 2003, Alex Rubenstein wrote:
http://biz.yahoo.com/rb/030125/tech_virus_boa_1.html
Let's make the assumption that the outage of ATM's that BoA suffered was
caused by last nights 'SQL Slammer' virus.
The following things can then be assumed:
a) BoA's network has Microsoft
I think a basic point is being overlooked here..
B of A.. A company that handles untold amounts of cash on a daily
basis. Sure, there are valid needs for people to reach both the
internet and the corporate secure net from inside the company. Might
be very hard to get things done, such as
While it's possible that _none_ of the vulnerable servers have _any_
'personal information', I'd venture to guess otherwise.
Agreed. And, even if it is super encrypted, who cares? Enough CPU and time
will take care of that.
-- Alex Rubenstein, AR97, K2AHR, [EMAIL PROTECTED], latency, Al
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