Re: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-24 Thread bmanning
> > Plus, who wouldn't give up the CLI for a candy-based > interface that smiles at you? > > Pete. you missed the :) there. --bill

RE: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-23 Thread Simon Lyall
On Wed, 23 Jul 2003, Pete Kruckenberg wrote: > Plus, who wouldn't give up the CLI for a candy-based > interface that smiles at you? Perhaps the guy sitting next to me who has had two seperate devices in the last couple of weeks that in order to be configured required Latest Java and Internet Expl

RE: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-23 Thread Pete Kruckenberg
On Wed, 23 Jul 2003, McBurnett, Jim wrote: > >Quick solution to this bug, as well as any future bug(s) replace all > >routers with PCs running Zebra. > > That is good until Zebra get's a bug and then someone will say > go to XYZ... Macintosh running Zebra. Macs are as powerful as supercom

Re: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-23 Thread Scott McGrath
Another argument for OSPF authentication it seems. However we are still out of luck in the STP announcements unless you configure all the neat little *guard features (bpdu,root etc) from Cisco et al. On Wednesday, July 23, 2003, at 12:34 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Like I said, it's not

RE: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-23 Thread alex
> Like I said, it's not going to be perfect, but it is better than blindly > spewing out evil packets. Between me and you, ospf packets or bad stp packets are a lot more dangerous than the whack a cisco router. Just try it. Alex

RE: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-23 Thread McBurnett, Jim
>Quick solution to this bug, as well as any future bug(s) replace all >routers with PCs running Zebra. That is good until Zebra get's a bug and then someone will say go to XYZ... Jim

Re: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-23 Thread James Roten
>P.S. The only sure way of eradicating this Cisco bug from the Internet is >to convert the Internet to IPv6. The bug doesn't affect Cisco's IPv6 code >and older routers whose IOS cannot be upgraded also cannot do IPv6 so >they cannot be used in an IPv6 Internet. Food for thought... Quick solut

Re: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-23 Thread Patrick W. Gilmore
-- On Wednesday, July 23, 2003 10:13 +0100 -- [EMAIL PROTECTED] supposedly wrote: P.S. The only sure way of eradicating this Cisco bug from the Internet is to convert the Internet to IPv6. The bug doesn't affect Cisco's IPv6 code and older routers whose IOS cannot be upgraded also cannot do IPv6 so

RE: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-23 Thread Patrick W. Gilmore
-- On Tuesday, July 22, 2003 16:55 -0500 -- "Austad, Jay" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> supposedly wrote: Like I said, it's not going to be perfect, but it is better than blindly spewing out evil packets. Let's all hope they keep to "blindly spewing out evil packets". -- TTFN, patrick

Re: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-23 Thread Patrick W. Gilmore
-- On Wednesday, July 23, 2003 01:59 -0400 -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> supposedly wrote: On Tue, Jul 22, 2003 at 05:53:45PM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Tue, 22 Jul 2003 17:51:20 EDT, [EMAIL PROTECTED] said: > I guess all folks with Ph.D. at Akamai really are paid for nothin

Re: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-23 Thread Michael . Dillon
>> Just a handful of traceroutes would give it enough information to start >> at a major backbone and work back towards itself. >I guess all folks with Ph.D. at Akamai really are paid for nothing if a >virus could calculate that with a few traceroutes. Akamai is a business and has customers payi

Re: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-22 Thread Richard A Steenbergen
On Tue, Jul 22, 2003 at 05:53:45PM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > On Tue, 22 Jul 2003 17:51:20 EDT, [EMAIL PROTECTED] said: > > > I guess all folks with Ph.D. at Akamai really are paid for nothing if a > > virus could calculate that with a few traceroutes. > > It's actually pretty easy if you

RE: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-22 Thread Austad, Jay
> How many thousands of "polls" do you think a looking glass can handle > simultaneously? I am all for the doomsday scenarios, but lets > make them a > little bit less sci-fi, shall we? How about "it would create > valid looking > OSPF packets with garbage in them?" or "create valid looking > S

Re: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-22 Thread Valdis . Kletnieks
On Tue, 22 Jul 2003 17:51:20 EDT, [EMAIL PROTECTED] said: > I guess all folks with Ph.D. at Akamai really are paid for nothing if a > virus could calculate that with a few traceroutes. It's actually pretty easy if you get 20K distributed zombies doing the traceroutes and then distributing the dat

Re: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-22 Thread Valdis . Kletnieks
On Tue, 22 Jul 2003 17:50:17 EDT, [EMAIL PROTECTED] said: > How many thousands of "polls" do you think a looking glass can handle > simultaneously? I am all for the doomsday scenarios, but lets make them a > little bit less sci-fi, shall we? How about "it would create valid looking > OSPF packets

Re: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-22 Thread alex
> Just a handful of traceroutes would give it enough information to start > at a major backbone and work back towards itself. I guess all folks with Ph.D. at Akamai really are paid for nothing if a virus could calculate that with a few traceroutes. Alex

RE: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-22 Thread alex
> > Pray tell, the virus will also get BGP feeds to determine > > where the edges > > are? > > It could poll different looking glasses... And I could be the Pope... How many thousands of "polls" do you think a looking glass can handle simultaneously? I am all for the doomsday scenarios, but l

Re: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-22 Thread Steve
Tuesday, July 22, 2003 4:01 PM > > To: Austad, Jay > > Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > Subject: RE: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques > > > > > > > I was thinking about this the other day. The most > > efficient way to make >

RE: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-22 Thread Austad, Jay
It could poll different looking glasses... > -Original Message- > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > Sent: Tuesday, July 22, 2003 4:01 PM > To: Austad, Jay > Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: RE: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniqu

RE: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-22 Thread alex
> I was thinking about this the other day. The most efficient way to make > this work would be to spread using some vulnerability (like the Microsoft > DCOM vulnerability released last week), and then at a predetermined time, > start DoS'ing routers in the IP space of major providers, and then wo

Re: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-22 Thread Jason Frisvold
In our case we use some older routers as managment devices... Not critical to the core unless there is some larger outage... Those devices are old enough that they can't handle a newer rev of code... ACL's are the only answer there.. Luckily they have very little traffic even under heavy use, s

Re: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-22 Thread Allan Liska
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 22 Jul 2003, Jason Frisvold wrote: > > Not only the "clueless", but how about those of us who deploy older > routers sometime in the future with legitimate uses? What happens when > we "forget" that this bug exists? Now we have to go through the

Re: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-22 Thread Jason Frisvold
On Tue, 2003-07-22 at 09:54, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > I'm going to go out on a limb and say that at least 30% of Ciscos are installed > in places that would, if hit with this, have NO CLUE why their router needs to be > power cycled every 30 mins. Not only the "clueless", but how about those

Re: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-22 Thread Chris Lewis
Austad, Jay wrote: I was thinking about this the other day. The most efficient way to make this work would be to spread using some vulnerability (like the Microsoft DCOM vulnerability released last week), and then at a predetermined time, start DoS'ing routers in the IP space of major providers, a

RE: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-22 Thread Austad, Jay
er worm. Jay > -Original Message- > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > Sent: Tuesday, July 22, 2003 9:58 AM > To: Adam Maloney > Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: Re: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques > > > > That is a bit p

Re: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-22 Thread Valdis . Kletnieks
On Tue, 22 Jul 2003 14:58:22 -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] said: > That is a bit paranoid, but it could happen. I have not seen anybody do > anything that intelligent in the past couple of years. Not to say that there > arent people out there that couldn't do that but I think many have thought of > us

Re: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-22 Thread Valdis . Kletnieks
On Tue, 22 Jul 2003 10:08:42 EDT, you said: > I see this as a make or break If someone does not upgrade, > well think of this as a roll-coaster. > Remember the sign? This ride is not advised for > people with bad backs, pregnant ladies.. Someplace I have a sign: "Your clue must be at

Re: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-22 Thread jgraun
That is a bit paranoid, but it could happen. I have not seen anybody do anything that intelligent in the past couple of years. Not to say that there arent people out there that couldn't do that but I think many have thought of using one exploit to expose another, DDoS is the closest I have se

RE: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-22 Thread McBurnett, Jim
rning experiences... J -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Tuesday, July 22, 2003 9:55 AM To: Niels Bakker Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques On Tue, 22 Jul 2003 15:40:02 +0200, Niels Bakker &l

Re: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-22 Thread Valdis . Kletnieks
On Tue, 22 Jul 2003 15:40:02 +0200, Niels Bakker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> said: > > * [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Adam Maloney) [Tue 22 Jul 2003, 15:33 CEST]: > > The next worm taking advantage of the latest Windows' vulnerabilities > > is more or less inevitable. Someone somewhere has to be writing it. > > S

Re: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-22 Thread Stephen J. Wilcox
Hi Adam, I thought the same, and the solution is to apply the filters to all interfaces not just the borders. One thing about the worm idea is that if it hits routers it should burn itself out fairly quickly as it cuts off its own access. Another thing is it is necessary to send out probes p

Re: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

2003-07-22 Thread Niels Bakker
* [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Adam Maloney) [Tue 22 Jul 2003, 15:33 CEST]: > The next worm taking advantage of the latest Windows' vulnerabilities > is more or less inevitable. Someone somewhere has to be writing it. > So why not include the cisco exploit in the worm payload? Why would a worm disable a v